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'Great Scott, the ontological argument is sound'--Betrand Russ


Myles Domini

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Myles Domini

I was in a debate recently with relativists who claimed that we cannot know that there was an objective good. It was long and drawn out but eventually I managed to provide them with an argument that they could not rebuff. That argument was, in short, that what man orates is merely the conveyance of what he mentally apprehends and then while conceding that what we orate cannot convey the essence of the object about which we're speaking we all share an understanding of the approximate semantics. Regardless of the cultural milieu from which language arises we comprehend as humans that 'Je deteste' should be rendered in English as 'I hate' rather than as 'I dislike'. There is an unspoken intution at work deep in man that percieves the meaning behind the oration.

Using this as my basis I asked why it was unlawful and inconsistent to infer from the existence of Y and Z--contrasting/different interpretations of goodness that X--goodness itself did not exist. I challenged my opponents to justify the claim that simply because people had different (sometimes skewered and perverted) perceptions of the good that there was indeed no essence of goodness behind their utterances. Y is after all closer to X than Z is. Just because both orations of the good exist doesn't mean the intuitve grasp that both orators have that there is indeed goodness in the world is false. Moreover, given that Y and Z always follow on from X in my experience it actually seems to fly in the face of common sense to deny that there is an X towards which Y and Z point and from which they gain their reference.

This I substantiated by saying that I cannot prove, for instance, that when I stand up that I wont go flying into the ceiling. The fact that when I stand up that I do not go 'splat' could indeed be an incredibly consistent coincidence. Scientifically, I admitted, I cannot prove that there is a causal connection at work. However, given that phenomena A (me standing) is in my experience accompanied by phenomena B I can make a philsophical/metaphysical deduction that there is a regular relationship between A and B. In other words I used common sense to surmise that when I stand its unlikely I need fear being splattered against my ceiling. Though I cannot eliminate that element of skepticism the regular relationship between A and B does away with my doubts. (Thankyou David Hume :P: )

One can apply this to numerous different situations--Indeed we do on a daily basis--and this being the case I asked my opponents the question: if we use this type of reasoning, that is, that there is a regular relationship between phenomena A and phenomena B throughout our lives e.g. to believe in 'friendship' that it was just as legitimate to use it to believe in 'goodness'. Indeed, it was only common sense to infer from Y and Z that X is an actuality. To this I recieved no rebuttal that I could not overturn and that got me thinking...

...if by intitution all men have a concept of "that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought" would it not be perfectly justified from the existence of Y and Z in this case to infer an X. That is, that a real "that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought" exists behind the concept grasped within us by intution? Indeed, does it not seem to go against common sense not to infer this? More still, if that be the case and it is better to exist outside the mind than simply within it does it not mean that "that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought" namely God does really exist outside of ourselves and by neccessity?

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dairygirl4u2c

I find your arguments compelling for the proof for good. It could be social constructions that allow us to call those things good, but regardless, we perceive them to be good. Objectively, however, if they are social constructions, I don't know that you can prove that they are objectively good. You could prove that they are objectively subjectively good because of the persons who perceive them but I don't know about objectively objectively good.

As for Anslem's argument, I agree it's common sense to make the conclusions you give. If God is good, however, I don't know you can make that statement objectively without faith. Look at all the "bad" in the world. God could be percieved to be many things. It's alos a stretch from the evidence to say that God is a father like being. It'd make sense to say he originates all things as a father, but I mean in a paternal type way. I suppose most people agree the paternal terminology is simply social convention. (I think) What I'm ultimately getting at is there's not a lot that we can necessarily attribute to that conclusion that is God. Intelligence, originator yes. Umm..
This would be an interesting study to do... what can we objectively know about God.
You'd of course start getting into religions and revealed "truths" though they are disputed. They still deserve mention.

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[quote name='Myles' post='961997' date='Apr 26 2006, 02:21 PM']
I was in a debate recently with relativists who claimed that we cannot know that there was an objective good. It was long and drawn out but eventually I managed to provide them with an argument that they could not rebuff. [/quote]

It was for people such as your dissenter that G.K. Chestorton carried a gun. Chesterton could have pulled the gun, pointed at him and ask for moral proof as to why Chesterton should not shoot him. :detective:

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Myles Domini

[quote name='dairygirl4u2c' post='962172' date='Apr 27 2006, 12:53 AM']
I find your arguments compelling for the proof for good. It could be social constructions that allow us to call those things good, but regardless, we perceive them to be good. Objectively, however, if they are social constructions, I don't know that you can prove that they are objectively good. You could prove that they are objectively subjectively good because of the persons who perceive them but I don't know about objectively objectively good.

As for Anslem's argument, I agree it's common sense to make the conclusions you give. If God is good, however, I don't know you can make that statement objectively without faith. Look at all the "bad" in the world. God could be percieved to be many things. It's alos a stretch from the evidence to say that God is a father like being. It'd make sense to say he originates all things as a father, but I mean in a paternal type way. I suppose most people agree the paternal terminology is simply social convention. (I think) What I'm ultimately getting at is there's not a lot that we can necessarily attribute to that conclusion that is God. Intelligence, originator yes. Umm..
This would be an interesting study to do... what can we objectively know about God.
You'd of course start getting into religions and revealed "truths" though they are disputed. They still deserve mention.
[/quote]

Your first paragraph does not aptly capture my argument. You are talking about Y and Z when I am merely trying to determine the existence of X. That is the fact that people are able to call things good that behind their varied perceptions of what exactly is good be they arising from a deformed conscience or what not there is an intuitive grasp of goodness itself. Man orates what he already percieves and thus to speak about things as though they are good whether or not they are objectively so seems to indicate that man naturally can percieve the object good. Even if in his oration of this concept he is often unable to convey its essence or even gets its essence entirely wrong. X logically precedes Y and Z.

This is why I gave the example of friendship. Friendship cannot be proven scientifically, you cannot observe changes in states of being that illustrate that a person is really your friend. A well rehursed liar or a con artist would be more than able to decieve you into believing they're your friend. Yet you make a common sense deduction from the way the person acts that there is behind his actions an abstract that you call 'friendship'. This concept is by no means culturally determined and indeed transcends cultural boundaries as its appearance in various different human languages displays. Likewise with 'goodness'.

I'm not particularly bothered that different people have subjective views of what goodness, friendship et al. entail what I'm basing my supposition on is the fact that everyone seems to have an intuitive sense that these things really exist regardless of how this is filtered through in the subjects. Hence, I make the common sense deduction that behind the many subjectivites is an objectivity which all humans are able to percieve by natural intution.

I'm getting a little lost about what you have to say about Anselm and I think its the subject of another discussion. My justification for proposing the validity of the Ontological argument is that its quite clear that inspite of all the subjective shapes that it takes every human society seems to have a concept of a "that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought". Hence it seems sensible to deduce from this that behind that concept is, again, something grasped inwardly by intutition.

As for what we can say about the X given the existence of Y and Z I think it makes perfect sense to conclude that Y is closer to X than Z. That is, that some definitions are closed to what we want to say than others. Hindu's for example use the term God in an emanationist sense there is some bit of God in all of us ala neoplatonism whereas we posit an ontological distinction between Creator and created. How to decide which definition is closer to X? X itself? Simple via nature. If our intution of these orated concepts is natural then it seems logical to believe that in nature there would be clues as to what God, goodness etc.etc. are really like. Natural Theology is the next reasonable step as the very format of the Proslogion illustrates.

Lastly, actually jswranch the Humean view of causality is more of a help to me than a hinderance and not just herein either. Removing the causal connection between events and happenings and replacing it with a regular relationship only percievable by experience aka 'common sense' simultaneously removes the so-called 'fatal flaw'. According to Hume himself and later Kant the problem with the Cosmological argument is that it moves from what we can know of the physical to the metaphysical. However, if Hume is consistent then he cannot actually hold to that because he has already said we cannot know anything about the physical.

According to Hume all we can do is indicate that there is a regular relationship between phenomena A and phenomena B. Now this being true then the Cosmological argument does not include a 'fatal flaw' because there is no jump from knowledge of the physical to knowledge of the metaphysical because according to Hume there is no definitive knowledge of the physical only what we have to go on by common sense. Now, if our all pervasive use of common sense knowledge e.g. the gun example (the regular relationship between A) the gun being fired and B) the bullet going through ya) is not knowledge directly of the physical it can only be based upon the physical and thus should be rightly called metaphysical knowledge.

That means St Thomas' 5 ways do not involve a jump from one plane of understanding to the other, rather the logic he is using is consistently metaphysical and common sensical. This not only removes the main stumbling block to Aquinas' 5 ways but it also makes it the common sense argument given that this metaphysical knowledge of the regular relationship between A and B is used by everyone everywhere just to live and thus disagreeing with it is completely the opposite of what any right thinking human would do.

I cannot prove that when I tap my keys that its actually that its anything other than an incredibly consistent coincidence that letters appear on screen yet I still make the common sense deduction that there is a regular relationship between A and B. When I stand up it could possibly be a mere coincidence that I dont go 'splat' on my ceiling yet I still make the common sense deduction that there is again a regular relationship between A and B. It could be that when I turn on the lamp in my room and it illuminates the area that it was a simple coincidence that it actually acted as it did but I still make the common sense connection between A and B. Not only I, but everyone, we all use this reasoning and yet as Hume highlights it cannot be rightly called physical because we can never definitively get rid off that element of doubt no matter how implausible it might seem to us.

Therefore, St Thomas is perfectly justified in using the argument from motion or cause etc. because he's merely using the same logic as everyone else always uses and anyone who disagrees with him is actually disagreeing with the common sense logic they use every single day in their encounters with their physical surroundings. Disagreeing with Thomas' deductions put you on the wrong side of common sense since you use precisely the same logic simply to get out of bed in the morning. After all try proving that you actually woke up this morning scientifically and I guarantee ya before too long you'll concede that all you can illustrate is that it only appears that way and that the deduction you're making that you're awake cannot be confirmed absolutely by the physical evidence only by the regular relationship between A and B in your experience.

So if you can believe you're awake athiest lurker why cant you believe in God? :P:

Edited by Myles
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Guest JeffCR07

A few points to make, though in general I like your thoughts:

1.) Try to take Hume a little more seriously. If Hume's argument concerning causality is to be taken (as you seem to) as being valid then he has utterly destroyed the Cosmological Argument. In your treatment of him you seem not to be taking into account his distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas.

2.) Try not to read Anselm as a proto-Aquinas, which I am noticing you have a tendency to do. First and foremost, there was no distinction for Anselm between Natural Theology, Philosophy, Metaphysics, etc, since he was a staunch Neo-Platonist. Second, Anselm did not believe in "intuition" or the Thomistic theory of knowledge, rather, he adhered to the Augustinian doctrine of illumination.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

Oh, and in line with the title of this thread, yes, in S5 modal logic the Ontological Argument is sound. :D:

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Myles Domini

[quote name='JeffCR07' post='962614' date='Apr 27 2006, 01:53 PM']
A few points to make, though in general I like your thoughts:

1.) Try to take Hume a little more seriously. If Hume's argument concerning causality is to be taken (as you seem to) as being valid then he has utterly destroyed the Cosmological Argument. In your treatment of him you seem not to be taking into account his distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas.

2.) Try not to read Anselm as a proto-Aquinas, which I am noticing you have a tendency to do. First and foremost, there was no distinction for Anselm between Natural Theology, Philosophy, Metaphysics, etc, since he was a staunch Neo-Platonist. Second, Anselm did not believe in "intuition" or the Thomistic theory of knowledge, rather, he adhered to the Augustinian doctrine of illumination.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

Oh, and in line with the title of this thread, yes, in S5 modal logic the Ontological Argument is sound. :D:
[/quote]

You're right on both counts. I still haven't accustomed myself to Anselm as yet and at the moment I'm standing on shifting sand. I'm currently studying for my 'History and Theology of Western Christianity 1050-1350' paper at University and its expanding my horizons significantly. I'm slowly becoming more acquainted with Anselm's thoughts and I'm not quite sure where I stand vis a vis Bec and the Sorbonne. Indeed, I'm hardly qualified to make such a judgement as yet and its probable that you'll see more of my own thoughts coming filtering through my posts than you will the teaching of either Sts Anselm or Aquinas. Hopefully when I'm better educated I'll be able to sift through the jungle of my own mind and come up with a consistent and coherent arrangement of my thoughts--dont count on it though :P:

As for Hume I do not see from whence his distinction between causes and ideas arises. How is it that both do not fall under the same skeptical condemnation? Thats not a counter its a genuine question if you could answer me I'd be grateful. The way I read him the only way to live was by common sense and experience and the Cosmological argument is most certainly built upon both.

Edited by Myles
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Guest JeffCR07

If you revisit Hume's [i]Inquiry[/i], you will find that he makes a distinction between one realm of "relations of ideas" and another realm of "matters of fact." In the former are all [i]a priori[/i], definitionally based, logical necessities, such as those of mathematics or the statement that "a bachelor is an unmarried male." In the latter grouping are all empirically based claims.

Hume's point is that necessity, causality, etc. are proper only to "relations of ideas" and not to "matters of fact." Thus, we cannot apply the ideas of necessity and causality to the actual world or real events. This is [i]very[/i] different from the position that you claim he takes, namely, that "he has already said we cannot know anything about the physical."

Hume [i]does[/i] say that we can know things about the physical: We can know that we have sense perceptions as objects of intuition just like we can know that the sun came up this morning. What Hume says we [i]cannot[/i] know is that the sun will rise tomorrow. We can guess. We can look to the past and see that it has risen consistently every day, but this does not, in Hume's mind, give us the right to claim that it [i]must[/i] rise. Claiming that we [i]know[/i] the sun will rise tomorrow is, for Hume, applying an idea of necessity or causality (which can only exist in the realm of relations of ideas) to matters of fact, and that is an invalid move to make.

Thus, Humean Skepticism [i]does[/i] defeat the Cosmological Argument, because it works under the assumption that "what is moved must be moved by something," et. all. But that is to apply the concept of necessity or causality to matters of fact, like objects moving.

Luckily for us, Hume is wrong. :D:

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

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Incidentally, I had to write a single-source research paper ("book report" sounds too middle school for my professor, I guess) on the Ontological Argument. I turned it in yesterday based off the work of Ermanno Bencivenga, [i]Logic and Other Nonsense: the case of Anselm and his God[/i]. It's a post-modernist text, so naturally it'd be very embarrassing for Bencivenga to concede Anselm's proof. I'm going to jump around quite a bit here, so just be patient.

The odd thing about Hume is that he had an infatuation with Malebranche, but exploited the priest's views for his own antithetical stances. Malebranche's system of Occasionalism is not logically sound, but it is what predicated his system of skepticism which Hume loved so. Humean skepticism makes sense in its original Occasionalist context (that is, while Occasionalism can't withstand scrutiny from other angles, it makes perfect sense to espouse causal skepticism within it), but Hume's use of it is just a little weird. As the title of Hume's work suggest, his skepticism outlines a flaw in human understanding but not in external reality. If we want to question the verity of external reality's existence, sure sure knock yourself out, but give credit to Descartes instead of Hume.

When I first encountered Anselm's Ontological Argument, I had an instinctual distrust of it and the more I came to understand what it actually says the less credible it seemed. Of course Gaunilo's Island came to mind before I even heard of Gaunilo, but that's not the real problem. As I see it, the main problem is that any argument centered on a deficiency of understanding that makes implicit demands on external reality is crossing a logical threshold without sufficient plausibility. The substantive "greater" adjective has no formal definition, and that it is said explicitly to transcend human understanding means that if you DID define it then the argument would collapse because you're obviously thinking about something that you shouldn't be able to think about. Anselm avoids this problem by not explicitly stating that we cannot conceive of God, only that we cannot conceive of anything greater, but this implies that if someone has greater conceptualization abilities than I then the two of us have our own realities replete with our own Gods.

Bencivenga's argument was quite different than mine, of course. His main approach was to prove that Anselm oscillates between realist logic and transcendental logic, and so cannot be construed as a self-sustaining whole. He does explore counterfactual arguments wherein all axioms are translated into realist or transcendental logic. I'm not entirely sure how to best represent both of these, but the realist side seemed to me to incur the problem that you can imagine that than which... as existing in one hypothetical world and something greater as existing in some other worlds, but no matter how many hypothetical worlds you envision you can never definitively label one as reality. The transcedental logic is an indecipherable trainwreck in that it relates only to experiences of thoughts, and as you can not experience one concept in one world and something greater than it in another, the whole project becomes vacuous and at any rate unrepresentative of what Anselm had to say.

The proem of the Proslogion is quite clear that all of the arguments presented are not "proofs" in the sense of taking a set of initial conditions and building from them hitherto unknown knowledge, but a sober meditation on why long-established tenants of faith as concrete as fact to Anselm and his audience are logically sound. Even though it's at best a pleasant perversion of human epistemology, it was never intended as a prosyletizing tool.

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Guest JeffCR07

[quote name='Snarf' post='964852' date='Apr 29 2006, 04:20 AM']
Incidentally, I had to write a single-source research paper ("book report" sounds too middle school for my professor, I guess) on the Ontological Argument. I turned it in yesterday based off the work of Ermanno Bencivenga, [i]Logic and Other Nonsense: the case of Anselm and his God[/i]. It's a post-modernist text, so naturally it'd be very embarrassing for Bencivenga to concede Anselm's proof. I'm going to jump around quite a bit here, so just be patient.

The odd thing about Hume is that he had an infatuation with Malebranche, but exploited the priest's views for his own antithetical stances. Malebranche's system of Occasionalism is not logically sound, but it is what predicated his system of skepticism which Hume loved so. Humean skepticism makes sense in its original Occasionalist context (that is, while Occasionalism can't withstand scrutiny from other angles, it makes perfect sense to espouse causal skepticism within it), but Hume's use of it is just a little weird. As the title of Hume's work suggest, his skepticism outlines a flaw in human understanding but not in external reality. If we want to question the verity of external reality's existence, sure sure knock yourself out, but give credit to Descartes instead of Hume.

When I first encountered Anselm's Ontological Argument, I had an instinctual distrust of it and the more I came to understand what it actually says the less credible it seemed. Of course Gaunilo's Island came to mind before I even heard of Gaunilo, but that's not the real problem. As I see it, the main problem is that any argument centered on a deficiency of understanding that makes implicit demands on external reality is crossing a logical threshold without sufficient plausibility. The substantive "greater" adjective has no formal definition, and that it is said explicitly to transcend human understanding means that if you DID define it then the argument would collapse because you're obviously thinking about something that you shouldn't be able to think about. Anselm avoids this problem by not explicitly stating that we cannot conceive of God, only that we cannot conceive of anything greater, but this implies that if someone has greater conceptualization abilities than I then the two of us have our own realities replete with our own Gods.

Bencivenga's argument was quite different than mine, of course. His main approach was to prove that Anselm oscillates between realist logic and transcendental logic, and so cannot be construed as a self-sustaining whole. He does explore counterfactual arguments wherein all axioms are translated into realist or transcendental logic. I'm not entirely sure how to best represent both of these, but the realist side seemed to me to incur the problem that you can imagine that than which... as existing in one hypothetical world and something greater as existing in some other worlds, but no matter how many hypothetical worlds you envision you can never definitively label one as reality. The transcedental logic is an indecipherable trainwreck in that it relates only to experiences of thoughts, and as you can not experience one concept in one world and something greater than it in another, the whole project becomes vacuous and at any rate unrepresentative of what Anselm had to say.

The proem of the Proslogion is quite clear that all of the arguments presented are not "proofs" in the sense of taking a set of initial conditions and building from them hitherto unknown knowledge, but a sober meditation on why long-established tenants of faith as concrete as fact to Anselm and his audience are logically sound. Even though it's at best a pleasant perversion of human epistemology, it was never intended as a prosyletizing tool.
[/quote]


A few points:

First, you should read more than Bencivenga if you wish to really discuss and pass judgement on the Ontological Argument. His work is neither seminal to the Anselmian discussion, nor is it a good starting point. His reading is anachronistic (Kant's transcendental logic was not to hit the philosophical scene for centuries) and does not address Anselm within the cultural framework in which he worked.

If you really wish to argue with Anselm, I suggest that you read Kant's critique, as it is the only plausible argument against him. Gaunilo's Island is woefully inadequate and Aquinas' treatment is either trite or question begging depending on how charitably you want to approach him.

It should also be pointed out that your final paragraph, which claims that Anselm did not think his argument a true "proof" is, quite blatantly, wrong. Anselm certainly wrote the argument in the form of a prayer, but there is no textual evidence to support the notion that he thought that would take away from its validity. In fact, there is every reason to believe that he thought his argument to be formally valid and sound. He addresses it to the "fool" and concludes by saying that he finally understands why the person who denies God's existence truly is a fool. Moreover, he says explicitly that he sought to achieve the same results as held in the [i]Monologion[/i], but via one single argument. Now if he did not consider the [i]unum argumentum[/i] to be a "proof" then it would follow that he did not consider the points in the [i]Monologion[/i] to have been proved either. But this is obviously not the case. Anselm most certainly [i]did[/i] consider the Ontological Argument to be a proof, even if he did decide to couch it in the context of a contemplative prayer (and he had good reason to, but I won't get into that now).

The fact of the matter is, Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz, and Hegel all agreed that it is valid. Aquinas, Kant, and others disagree. In recent times, Hartshorne, Malcolm, and Plantinga have all formulated the argument within the confines of analytic formal logic, and in S5 Modal logic the argument is valid. Having read Bencivenga and possibly Gaunilo is not sufficient for one to meaningfully discuss the argument.

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For the past semester I've been taking a class devoted to Anselm, hence the assignment, so just telling me that I'm not well-versed in the matter and ignoring every actual statement I've made is not much for sound approach.

It seems odd that you would argue for a realation of Anselm's cultural framework as being of any relevance, since obviously it is not. You could certainly use it in certain scholarly investigations such as "Was Anselm's Proof sound within his own context?" or "Why did Anselm write the proof?", but historical empathy generally isn't something that belongs within formal logic.

As for your treatment of that last paragraph of mine, I never said that Anselm was unconvinced by his own logic or that because it doesn't fit classic notions of proof that he didn't feel vindicated in stating it.

[i]Having read Bencivenga and possibly Gaunilo is not sufficient for one to meaningfully discuss the argument.[/i]

So, I can overlook your inaccurate guessing of what I have or haven't read. What does bother me is your attitude seems to be that you can ignore any argument not agreeing with you so long as you've read more books than someone else. That's just absolutely rank of elitism and condescension, the intellectual equivalent of yelling "I am rubber, you are glue".

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Guest JeffCR07

[quote name='Snarf' post='965428' date='Apr 29 2006, 03:49 PM']
For the past semester I've been taking a class devoted to Anselm, hence the assignment, so just telling me that I'm not well-versed in the matter and ignoring every actual statement I've made is not much for sound approach.

It seems odd that you would argue for a realation of Anselm's cultural framework as being of any relevance, since obviously it is not. You could certainly use it in certain scholarly investigations such as "Was Anselm's Proof sound within his own context?" or "Why did Anselm write the proof?", but historical empathy generally isn't something that belongs within formal logic.

As for your treatment of that last paragraph of mine, I never said that Anselm was unconvinced by his own logic or that because it doesn't fit classic notions of proof that he didn't feel vindicated in stating it.

[i]Having read Bencivenga and possibly Gaunilo is not sufficient for one to meaningfully discuss the argument.[/i]

So, I can overlook your inaccurate guessing of what I have or haven't read. What does bother me is your attitude seems to be that you can ignore any argument not agreeing with you so long as you've read more books than someone else. That's just absolutely rank of elitism and condescension, the intellectual equivalent of yelling "I am rubber, you are glue".
[/quote]


If you would like to discuss the validity of Anselm's argument, I am more than happy to do so. Looking back over your initial post, I can only see two main points, the more central of the two being based on Bencivenga. My previous post [i]did[/i] address your arguments, as I pointed out that Bencivenga's account is thoroughly anachronistic. If you disagree, then I invite you to explain why. If you agree, but still think that Anselm's proof is invalid, then I invite you to explain why.

Now, the second point you made was simply, "As I see it, the main problem is that any argument centered on a deficiency of understanding that makes implicit demands on external reality is crossing a logical threshold without sufficient plausibility." I did not want to discuss this point for multiple reasons:

1.) It is a straw man argument. Anselm's proof does not say "that than which nothing greater can be conceived [i]by me[/i]" but rather, "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." Thus, either you have this thing in your understanding or you do not. If you do not, then you cannot speak concerning its existence or non-existence. If you do, then you must assert that it is the same thing that I have in my understanding should I understand those words, just as you and I have the same thing in our understanding when we hear the utterance "George Washington."

2.) It is too vague. From what metaphysical background are you approaching the phrase "external world." To any Platonic, Neo-Platonic, or Hegelian realist [i]or[/i] Idealist, thought has just as valid (though admittedly a different) an ontological status as corporeal things, and so there exists no jump at all.

3.) The final assertion is unfounded. If it is your opinion (like Aquinas) that no jump from mental existence to actual existence is ever possible, then the burden of proof lies on you to make a case. Even without granting the Ontological Argument its validity, it must be acknowledged that it provides [i]prima facie[/i] evidence that such a move is possible. Your argument makes no such attempt at proof, but rather just assumes your position as true.

As an aside, it is actually quite important that we take Anselm in context, and not purely for academic reasons. He is grounded in a Neo-Platonic metaphysic that is being seriously considered for its strength by many of today's platonists. Thus, it is not merely an antiquated and dead system, but one that remains in dialogue with philosophical systems of today.

Now, if my last post seemed conceited, then I do sincerely apologize. I have done quite a bit of work on Anselm, and he is often misrepresented by many who have little to no actual knowledge of his work. It can be quite frustrating and can have the effect of making me come down like a hammer on those who don't deserve it. If you are one of these, then I really do apologize.

Also, who is the professor that teaches the course that you are taking on Anselm? There is an off-chance that I may know him or her.

- Jeff

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My professor here on the subject of Anselm is Paul Vincent Spade.

To understand what Anselm is saying or not saying, I agree absolutely that it's of the utmost importance to place him in context with his philosophical and cultural upbringing. To analyse the factual cogency of his arguments, however, requires extraneous (and yes, anachronistic) perspectives. The question is not "Does the Ontological Argument affirm the existence of God for a medieval monk", but "Does the Ontological Argument prove the existence of God". The former is a totally seperate question that many love to explore, but the latter is what most people consider relevant to the world at large. Example, the Greeks believed in geocentrism not because heliocentrism had never been presented (it had, in fact, by Aristarchus among others), but because heliocentrism lacked any substantial evidence. Moreover, the geocentrist camp presented the fact that if heliocentrism were correct, then stellar parallax would be observed--and it was not. That alone silenced the debate until Copernicus, who turned the scales in heliocentrism's favor, and later still parallax was observed with telescopes. We can argue day and night whether or not the Greeks "proved" in some metaphysical sense of the word that the sun revolves around the earth, but that does nothing to the fact that geocentrism is not something you can take seriously. Now, did Anselm prove there is a God in the same sense that the Greeks proved the earth to be the center of the universe? It's debatable, and I could go either way. Using our philosophical telescopes, did Anselm prove that a God exists for all time? No.

[i]Anselm's proof does not say "that than which nothing greater can be conceived by me" but rather, "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." [/i]

I understand what you're saying, but it doesn't really do much. Applying "potere" to the passive voice of "to conceive" relates to an intelligent body, so it does in fact incur the problem of who or what is doing the conceiving. The substantive "greater" doesn't mean anything, "can be conceived" means even less.

[i]To any Platonic, Neo-Platonic, or Hegelian realist or Idealist, thought has just as valid (though admittedly a different) an ontological status as corporeal things, and so there exists no jump at all.[/i]

Again, I'm not arguing Anselm's cogency within a select school of thought. You can define a philosophical boundary condition wherein grass must be purple of logical necessity, and that's not going to negate real grass from being green. As far as I know, all those systems of thought do distinguish between existence of experience and existence of thought. Proving that than which... as a chimera does nothing to prove its existence outside of the mind. Furthermore, I think that Anselm's operational definition of God violates his own a priori, particularly Augustine's treatment of the Trinity as being universally ineffable. Yes, I do understand that the ambiguity of the term "to be conceived" works in Anselm's favor, that saying "that than which nothing greater can be conceived and cannot be understood" does something to kill the beauty of the argument, but to argue the case for something beyond understanding as being capable of being conceived of seems to arbitrate between God and a self-serving definition of God.

[i]If it is your opinion (like Aquinas) that no jump from mental existence to actual existence is ever possible, then the burden of proof lies on you to make a case. Even without granting the Ontological Argument its validity, it must be acknowledged that it provides prima facie evidence that such a move is possible. Your argument makes no such attempt at proof, but rather just assumes your position as true.[/i]

Every time I read that second sentence, I get a different idea of what you mean to be the prima facie evidence, so I kindly request you articulate. I don't get at all how you think that the burden of proof falls on the negative statement that "mental existence cannot per ipsum substantiate actual existence". There is no empircal evidence anywhere suggesting that mental existence has ever done this in the tangible realm, so it just seems conspicuous when the claim stands that it can be done for the ethereal.

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Guest JeffCR07

[i] I understand what you're saying, but it doesn't really do much. Applying "potere" to the passive voice of "to conceive" relates to an intelligent body, so it does in fact incur the problem of who or what is doing the conceiving. The substantive "greater" doesn't mean anything, "can be conceived" means even less.[/i]

You misunderstand my argument. I am most certainly not saying that Anselm's argument does not "relate to an intelligent body" - it clearly does. What I am saying is that the object that is being understood is not conditioned by the subjectivity of the observer. "That than which nothing greater can be conceived" is not different for you than it is for me if we both understand what is being said. This is necessicarily the case because meaningful discussion of the phrase "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" presupposes a common referent, even if that referent might be a class or category rather than a particular. If you and I both understand the phrase, then we have the same thing in our understanding. This is proven even moreso by the fact that the phrase in question is able to be formulated within modal logic.

[i]Furthermore, I think that Anselm's operational definition of God violates his own a priori, particularly Augustine's treatment of the Trinity as being universally ineffable. Yes, I do understand that the ambiguity of the term "to be conceived" works in Anselm's favor, that saying "that than which nothing greater can be conceived and cannot be understood" does something to kill the beauty of the argument, but to argue the case for something beyond understanding as being capable of being conceived of seems to arbitrate between God and a self-serving definition of God.[/i]

There are a few points to make here. First, Anselm does break, at least slightly, from the tradition of the [i]via negativa[/i]. He maintains that we can make univocal predications of God, and that these are true and valid. However, he does not break so much as to disregard His ineffible Nature. In fact, if we look at Anselm's work as a whole, rather than focusing exclusively on the [i]Prosologion[/i], we find that your question concerning ineffibility has already been answered. [i]Monologion 65[/i] takes a subtle and ingenious turn. While God is indeed ineffible, this does not mean that we cannot say anything correctly about Him, it only means that we cannot say anything [i]properly[/i] about Him. This is to say, nothing we could ever say will ever exhaust the reality of God. However, what we do say about Him is indeed true, it is simply not the whole truth. In this way, we see God, "but we see it by means of some likeness or image-when, for example, we make out someone's face in a mirror."

To take Anselm's image a step further, it is as if we are looking at God when He is behind a veil. We can make out His shape, and we may be able to say true things about his figure, but he is ineffible precisely because nothing that we can ever say will exactly [i]pinpoint[/i] every feature of God.

Thus, Anselm is not engaging in a slight-of-hand here. He is entirely consistent because he sees no contradiction between univocal predication of the Divine and at the same time asserting the ineffibility of God.

[i]I don't get at all how you think that the burden of proof falls on the negative statement that "mental existence cannot per ipsum substantiate actual existence". There is no empircal evidence anywhere suggesting that mental existence has ever done this in the tangible realm, so it just seems conspicuous when the claim stands that it can be done for the ethereal.[/i]

Ah, I think I see where you are misunderstanding the intricacies of the Anselmian Argument. Anselm is [i]not[/i] saying that the "mental stuff" that corresponds to "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" somehow generates or crosses into an "ethereal stuff" that is an objective form of that previous mental existence. Rather, Anselm is saying that the objective existence of God is a necessary precondition for anyone being able to understand "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." We simply cannot conceive of God not existing precisely because his existence is necessary in order for our thought of Him to be possible.

Also, regarding your point about how there is no example of any empirical evidence supporting a mental existence forcing its way into the tangible, I think it is extremely telling to point out the fact that Anselm has already dealt with this critique with his dismissal of Gaunilo. The Anselmian argument [i]can't[/i] work for any tangible or finite thing, precisely because no tangible or finite thing could ever fit the definition of "that than which nothing greater can be conceived. Like numbers, finite things are what they are precisely because they [i]have[/i] limits.

[u]Pointing to the corporeal, external world and saying "I can't find any evidence for this, so it must be impossible" cannot be regarded as a legitimate argument against Anselm precisely because he is saying that you can't find an example in the finite [i]in principle[/i].[/u]


I'm enjoying this conversation, and look forward to your reply!

- Jeff

Edited by JeffCR07
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