The Argument From Gradation

[Myles Domini]

Alas, my exams are over and I am back and co-incidentally I also have something I wish to discuss.

[quote]The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.[/quote]

This is the fourth way in which St Thomas Aquinas attempts to demonstrate the existence of God in the Summa Theologiae. Honestly I never quite [i]got[/i] this one and always sort of skimmed over it but recently I have been trying to fumble my way through it to try and figure out what the Angelic Doctor was on about. Perhaps I am mistaken but it seems to me that this argument is virtually the same as the first way. In that in it St Thomas argues, from my vantage point, that there are things which do not have utter potency and the existence of different grades of actuality leads us to conclude ultimately that there is a perfectly actual or good: God. Is this correct? If so why did St Thomas feel it neccessary to include this logical demonstration in light of the first way? Comparing the five ways to the proof's offered in the Summa Contra Gentiles its obvious that Aquinas chose these five for a particular reason. So why #4?

[Petrus]

His first four are very similar. The main difference that I see is that the idea of perfection is not mentioned in the first way. The fourth way reminds me the most of the ontological argument, in that it directly shows the existence of a perfect being.

Another nice thing about the fourth way compared to the first is that it avoids the question of whether the universe had a beginning.

[Myles Domini]

[quote name='Petrus' post='1294096' date='Jun 13 2007, 04:27 AM']His first four are very similar. The main difference that I see is that the idea of perfection is not mentioned in the first way. The fourth way reminds me the most of the ontological argument, in that it directly shows the existence of a perfect being.

Another nice thing about the fourth way compared to the first is that it avoids the question of whether the universe had a beginning.[/quote]

I sort of disagree. Since St Thomas' aim is not to demonstrate that there is a perfect being but that there is self-subsistent being. God is not a perfect being, God is being. Though I assume that is what you meant to say, no? The point you raise about the fourth way avoiding the question about beginning is interesting though given St Thomas' willingness to entertain an eternal world. Still, I dont know if Aquinas' preceeding arguments hinge upon whether or not the universe had a beginning. The distinction between [i]in fieri[/i] causes and [i]in esse[/i] causes introduced by thomists to defend Aquinas' cosmological arguments seem to assume that they do not depend upon the question of whether or not the world is eternal. Considering the matter carefully I am starting to think that Aquinas' own words indicate what he's upto in the association of 'being' and 'good'. Rather than frame his argument around beauty, for example, St Thomas emphasises that goodness and being are pretty much the same: Since the privation of being or non-being is evil the argument highlights that God cannot be evil in a way the others perhaps do not.

Whaddya think?

[Justified Saint]

If Aquinas identifies "Being" with the "good", then what does he make of Plato's argument in the [i]Republic[/i] that the good is beyond and otherwise than Being?

[Myles Domini]

[quote name='Justified Saint' post='1294211' date='Jun 13 2007, 05:36 AM']If Aquinas identifies "Being" with the "good", then what does he make of Plato's argument in the [i]Republic[/i] that the good is beyond and otherwise than Being?[/quote]

He both accepts and rejects it. If you are talking about created being he would agree but otherwise he would not. God, St Thomas maintains, is Being and this gives him licence to rework Pseudo-Denys. In the Commentary on the Divine Names Pseudo-Denys says outwardly contradictory things like God is nameless and yet has the names of all things because they existed in Him before creation. His aim is to defend God from being just a really great thing. That is, he does not wish for God to become a being amongst beings. Which is why he has to seperate God from being, which is effectively what Plato does and what Plotinus does. St Thomas doesn't need to make such a distinction.

Thomistic metaphysics says effectively that God is being and creation is not. So it reverses the order. God is characterised as being whereas creation is characterised as [i]becoming[/i]. From a certain point of view according to St Thomas God cannot be called good, true, beautiful or anything else because God isn't actually any of these things. These predicates only exist as we know them in us where they are differentiated and exist as accidents. However, in the same way a creation manifests something about the nature of the creator because it comes from the creator these manifest something that is true of God's nature. So we can say that God is good and know there is a truth to this because his nature produced the goodness we know. However, God isn't strictly 'good'. Goodness is in God's nature or rather God's nature can be characterised as good because goodness manifests something about God's nature so we can say accurately, analgously that God is good but not in the same way as we would say a created thing is good because created things dont have goodness in the same as God. Created things have predicates like 'good' accidentally, they are not undifferentiated as they are in God, and they are of course infinitely inferior to the way they exist in God (Summa Theol. I,13,5). [b]Bad[/b] analogy would be to see God as white light and creation as a prism that seperates what in God is undifferentiated and then imparts it to beings accidentally and in a lesser degree.

This way of conceiving of the relationship of God and the world allows St Thomas to theologise without employing to the hyperousious Theos distinction.

[Petrus]

Ok, I guess I was being a sloppy philosopher, I didn't mean to argue that God is a being.

My comment about the world possibly having no beginning in the first way was not to explain his reasoning for proposing the fourth way, but rather to offer a reason why the fourth way might be valuable to others.

I think you are right about the goodness=being as an important part of the argument that highlights that God cannot be evil. This conclusion can still be reached using the first or any of the other ways, but maybe the fourth way is faster.

[Myles Domini]

[quote name='Petrus' post='1294327' date='Jun 13 2007, 06:23 AM']Ok, I guess I was being a sloppy philosopher, I didn't mean to argue that God is a being.

My comment about the world possibly having no beginning in the first way was not to explain his reasoning for proposing the fourth way, but rather to offer a reason why the fourth way might be valuable to others.

I think you are right about the goodness=being as an important part of the argument that highlights that God cannot be evil. [u]This conclusion can still be reached using the first or any of the other ways[/u], but maybe the fourth way is faster.[/quote]

This is what gets me. You're right about this point, no doubt. St Thomas rarely repeats himself he just refers above. So...thats why it bugs me. Sorry I am like this I get a bee in my bonnet and then BUZZZZZZZZZZZZ about the same thing for ages.

[Petrus]

[quote name='Myles Domini' post='1294378' date='Jun 13 2007, 02:17 AM']This is what gets me. You're right about this point, no doubt. St Thomas rarely repeats himself he just refers above. So...thats why it bugs me. Sorry I am like this I get a bee in my bonnet and then BUZZZZZZZZZZZZ about the same thing for ages.[/quote]

I think we should be glad that all five ways produce the same predicates for God. If different ways logically implied different predicates, there would be a big problem. The arguments for the existence of God themselves are different, he doesn't repeat himself there, but the conclusion of both is exactly the same.

[Justified Saint]

[quote name='Myles Domini' post='1294262' date='Jun 12 2007, 10:02 PM']He both accepts and rejects it. If you are talking about created being he would agree but otherwise he would not. God, St Thomas maintains, is Being and this gives him licence to rework Pseudo-Denys. In the Commentary on the Divine Names Pseudo-Denys says outwardly contradictory things like God is nameless and yet has the names of all things because they existed in Him before creation. His aim is to defend God from being just a really great thing. That is, he does not wish for God to become a being amongst beings. Which is why he has to seperate God from being, which is effectively what Plato does and what Plotinus does. St Thomas doesn't need to make such a distinction.

Thomistic metaphysics says effectively that God is being and creation is not. So it reverses the order. God is characterised as being whereas creation is characterised as [i]becoming[/i]. From a certain point of view according to St Thomas God cannot be called good, true, beautiful or anything else because God isn't actually any of these things. These predicates only exist as we know them in us where they are differentiated and exist as accidents. However, in the same way a creation manifests something about the nature of the creator because it comes from the creator these manifest something that is true of God's nature. So we can say that God is good and know there is a truth to this because his nature produced the goodness we know. However, God isn't strictly 'good'. Goodness is in God's nature or rather God's nature can be characterised as good because goodness manifests something about God's nature so we can say accurately, analgously that God is good but not in the same way as we would say a created thing is good because created things dont have goodness in the same as God. Created things have predicates like 'good' accidentally, they are not undifferentiated as they are in God, and they are of course infinitely inferior to the way they exist in God (Summa Theol. I,13,5). [b]Bad[/b] analogy would be to see God as white light and creation as a prism that seperates what in God is undifferentiated and then imparts it to beings accidentally and in a lesser degree.

This way of conceiving of the relationship of God and the world allows St Thomas to theologise without employing to the hyperousious Theos distinction.[/quote]

That is somewhat helpful, although I am not well-read enough in classical and Thomistic metaphysics/philosophy to grasp all the necessary distinctions.

I like how you address the charge of God being one being among many. Yet, on the most basic level of creator and created, I am not quite convinced on how the distinction between being and becoming holds up if creation only implies an inferior and differentiated manifestation of the perfect creator. Aren't we still dealing with the super, perfect being among lesser beings who are just an image and shadow of the former?