3 Best Arguments Against Abortion

[Didacus]

[quote name='Raphael' date='02 December 2009 - 11:42 AM' timestamp='1259772126' post='2013191']
[snip]

Now, we cannot say that a person is only [i]sui juris[/i] (and therefore only a person) when that individual is exercising free will, or else any time that a person is unconscious or even simply not making any decisions, such an individual is not a person. Some would also argue that an infant does not have free will because an infant cannot know or understand actions and choices.

[snip]
[/quote]

This is why I've always said that the potential for sentience, or free-will, or in french '
le potentiel d'epanouissement', is the key. it is the potential of possibly being happy that is wrong to remove from a person, but the fact that a person, at a given time (either being unconscious or unborn) is irrelevnat.

I think CAM said it best 'He who is to be man, is man already!'.

Where is CAM these days anyways? He seems to have simply dispeared like LittleLes --- strange...

[Thy Geekdom Come]

[quote name='Didacus' date='02 December 2009 - 01:25 PM' timestamp='1259778352' post='2013225']
This is why I've always said that the potential for sentience, or free-will, or in french '
le potentiel d'epanouissement', is the key. it is the potential of possibly being happy that is wrong to remove from a person, but the fact that a person, at a given time (either being unconscious or unborn) is irrelevnat.

I think CAM said it best 'He who is to be man, is man already!'.

Where is CAM these days anyways? He seems to have simply dispeared like LittleLes --- strange...
[/quote]
He and another PMer had a disagreement and he left. I wish he hadn't.

[Thy Geekdom Come]

[quote name='mommas_boy' date='02 December 2009 - 01:13 PM' timestamp='1259777625' post='2013215']
I think that this is the single best argument that I have seen in defense of the pro-life cause. Well done.
[/quote]
Well, it still won't stop people from arguing that personhood is marked by some other criteria, but this is the definition of personhood that has been used since ancient times. There are so many people who think that personhood is a matter of personality or relationships with others or quality of life, but all of those offend our very nature. We know what personhood is and deep down, every human person knows what violates their dignity.

[mommas_boy]

[quote name='Raphael' date='02 December 2009 - 01:40 PM' timestamp='1259779209' post='2013243']
Well, it still won't stop people from arguing that personhood is marked by some other criteria, but this is the definition of personhood that has been used since ancient times. There are so many people who think that personhood is a matter of personality or relationships with others or quality of life, but all of those offend our very nature. We know what personhood is and deep down, every human person knows what violates their dignity.
[/quote]

I was about to ask: is that the definition of person that is on the books in most modern countries?

[Didacus]

[quote name='Raphael' date='02 December 2009 - 01:33 PM' timestamp='1259778803' post='2013231']
He and another PMer had a disagreement and he left. I wish he hadn't.
[/quote]
me neither...

[Thy Geekdom Come]

[quote name='mommas_boy' date='02 December 2009 - 02:09 PM' timestamp='1259780989' post='2013258']
I was about to ask: is that the definition of person that is on the books in most modern countries?
[/quote]
Not likely, but only because most modern societies are too confused to know what many words mean. What I can say is that that is the meaning the word has always had and it would be very wrong to remove it from it's context. Verbal engineering is always employed by the immoral because it allows them to strip away any objective meaning from words they fear.

[rkwright]

Quasi-Legal argument I heard from Peter Kreeft that I like...

The leading case is obviously Roe v. Wade on this issue. Roe outright says the Supreme Court does not know when life begins and is not going to get involved in that discussion. Most arguments focus on when personhood actually begins, but this one assumes that we don't actually know if the baby (fetus/embryo) is a person.

Assume there is an abortion. We are left with 4 options (makes a nice matrix).

1) The fetus is in fact a person and we know it. This is outright murder. We intentionally killed what we knew was a person.
2) The fetus is in fact a person and we do not know it. This is manslaughter. We unintentionally killed a person. This is the world Roe v. Wade puts us in.
3) The fetus is not in fact a person but we do not know it. Abortion becomes criminally negligence. You don't go around doing extremely dangerous things that could kill a person if you don't know theres a person there. You don't shoot bullets into a home when you don't know if its empty.
4) The fetus is not in fact a person and we know it. Abortion ok.

The only time abortion is ok is when we know for sure that the baby is not a person. Until we know for sure that the baby is not a person, abortion should be illegal.

[mommas_boy]

[quote name='Raphael' date='02 December 2009 - 03:51 PM' timestamp='1259787084' post='2013297']
Not likely, but only because most modern societies are too confused to know what many words mean. What I can say is that that is the meaning the word has always had and it would be very wrong to remove it from it's context. Verbal engineering is always employed by the immoral because it allows them to strip away any objective meaning from words they fear.
[/quote]

Agreed. I was thinking that even if it were a law today in America, that the pro-aborts would simply endeavor to re-write the definitions.

[quote name='rkwright' date='02 December 2009 - 04:25 PM' timestamp='1259789107' post='2013319']
Quasi-Legal argument I heard from Peter Kreeft that I like...

The leading case is obviously Roe v. Wade on this issue. Roe outright says the Supreme Court does not know when life begins and is not going to get involved in that discussion. Most arguments focus on when personhood actually begins, but this one assumes that we don't actually know if the baby (fetus/embryo) is a person.

Assume there is an abortion. We are left with 4 options (makes a nice matrix).

1) The fetus is in fact a person and we know it. This is outright murder. We intentionally killed what we knew was a person.
2) The fetus is in fact a person and we do not know it. This is manslaughter. We unintentionally killed a person. This is the world Roe v. Wade puts us in.
3) The fetus is not in fact a person but we do not know it. Abortion becomes criminally negligence. You don't go around doing extremely dangerous things that could kill a person if you don't know theres a person there. You don't shoot bullets into a home when you don't know if its empty.
4) The fetus is not in fact a person and we know it. Abortion ok.

The only time abortion is ok is when we know for sure that the baby is not a person. Until we know for sure that the baby is not a person, abortion should be illegal.
[/quote]

Very nice!

[N/A Gone]

Micah---WoW. (I posted it to my FB--hope you do not mind)

Seriously, wow.

[Luigi]

[quote name='mommas_boy' date='02 December 2009 - 12:55 PM' timestamp='1259776516' post='2013212']
I'm not sure here, but it sounds as though you are attempting to reduce the essence of a human person to their genetic code. There are a couple of problems with this: (1) genetic material can be preserved past the death of the person; (2) genetic code can be changed through various means, such as by a retro virus, gene therapy, or genetic mutation -- yet the person remains the same, substantially; and (3) a single person may have multiple genetic signatures thanks to chimerism -- a fraternal twin may have been absorbed in utero, and the cells of both twins went on to produce a single person with a single consciousness, not two people.
[/quote]
Obviously you know more about the biology involved, and I accede to that knowledge. My objective was to prove that the fetus is more than "just a blob" and is, in fact, a human being. I think many arguments against abortion are based on theological foundations which are accepted by the pro-life movement but not accepted by the other side. Therefore, I think one of the strongest arguments against abortion is to prove that the embryo/fetus is a full-fledged human being without making reference to theological arguments but emphasizing biological arguments,which may be more broadly accepted as "scientific" by non-religious individuals.

[mommas_boy]

[quote name='Luigi' date='02 December 2009 - 10:53 PM' timestamp='1259812419' post='2013573']
Obviously you know more about the biology involved, and I accede to that knowledge. My objective was to prove that the fetus is more than "just a blob" and is, in fact, a human being. I think many arguments against abortion are based on theological foundations which are accepted by the pro-life movement but not accepted by the other side. Therefore, I think one of the strongest arguments against abortion is to prove that the embryo/fetus is a full-fledged human being without making reference to theological arguments but emphasizing biological arguments,which may be more broadly accepted as "scientific" by non-religious individuals.
[/quote]



I applaud what you were trying to do, and feel that it is the only way to have a discussion on a "level playing field", as it were: a discussion where both "religious and non-religious" as you put it are able to access the conversation.

The problem is that DNA, like a finger print, may very well be unique to a person, [b]but it is not the person[/b]. I understand that you were trying to say that DNA is unique to a person, such that a single DNA signature must belong to one and only one person (not true: cf. identical twins), and that a person must have one and only one DNA signature (also not true: cf. chimerism). Thus, the limit of one's body is where tissue of one genetic code stops, and another one starts. In the case of a chimera, though, we have one person possessing tissues of two distinct genetic codes. For an extremely interesting and real example of the legal ramifications of this, look up Lydia Fairchild.

But, you are right to be thinking along the line of "what makes a person a person" ... individual and whole ... from a secular lens. Again, DNA doesn't make a person a person, no more than their individual finger prints, or their shoe size, or even their personality (or in the case of certain politicians, a complete lack thereof). These are merely traits, attributes, or accidents of the person's substance. For great discussion on what makes a person a person, have a look at Raphael's post, sometime following my response to yours.

The reason why I jump on this so much is because what the secular world misses is that they want to attach personhood to these traits, these accidents. They want to say that you must have the [b]trait[/b] of a consciousness to be a person; you must have the [b]trait[/b] of being so old, you must have he [b]trait[/b] of being outside of the mother's womb, the [b]trait[/b] of being able to take care of yourself, etc. What they're missing is what it means to be a person. And that's where we have to evangelize.

Cheers!

[Fiat_Voluntas_Tua]

Having had to teach a semester of ethics at a large undergrad institution, I had to teach abortion...being a philosophy class I present the arguments as arguments, not as sound arguments (those who know the difference b/w sound arguments and arguments will know where I am going)... So, I presented arguments on both sides of the fence...As a philosopher I will say there are quite a few of arguments against abortion which I think are pretty bad, and these are often the 'token' arguments that supporters of abortion usually focus on in arguing against "pro-lifers". I am not sure if it would be scandalous to present a few pro-abortion arguments to see how you guys would respond to them...I also could present an argument I came up with arguing against abortion. Do you guys think that would be ok? I am not really wanting to 'debate' the issue here, but only present it so that I can get different responses to it.

Any thoughts?

[Fiat_Voluntas_Tua]

Here is my argument against abortion... It has to do with whether intentionally harming a fetus is morally wrong. NOTE: the conclusion doesn't flat out state it is wrong to have an abortion, it claims it is wrong only if some other action is wrong...And may people think this other action IS wrong, therefore abortion is wrong... The conclusion is a conditional, not an assertion. That is important to realize.


So about five months ago, shortly after my wife and I found out we were expecting, I was at the dentist getting an X-Ray when I say the sign that said, "If you are pregnant or think you might be pregnant let the dentist know before getting an X-ray. I couldn't help but wonder whether a woman who knew she was pregnant, and despite that fact she decided to get an x-ray (or say smoke excessively or drink excessively), would she be doing something morally wrong.
At least for me, my intuitions (which I don't want to place too much weight on) tell me that there is some kind of moral irresponsibility on the part of the woman (given she knows smoking/drinking/x-ray's are harmful to what is in her womb). If this is true for a woman who intends to carry the fetus to term (that is it is wrong to intentionally let a fetus undergo an x-ray/smoking/drinking), it looks like the act is either:

(a) wrong when the mother performs the irresponsible act (i.e., the fetus has 'rights', or some kind of moral status at the moment of the x-ray), or,

(b) wrong later on down the pregnancy when the fetus becomes a person/or begins to possess rights or a moral status (e.g., at birth).

Let us suppose (b) is true. What would make the mother's choice of getting an x-ray wrong would be the fact that the x-ray caused some sort of physical change in the fetus which later caused a physical deformation/or mental handicap in the child. And it is the end of this causal chain (mental handicap/deformation) that made the beginning of the causal chain (getting an x-ray) an immoral act. However, it seems that the mother would still have done something wrong in getting the x-ray even if the fetus, upon gaining personhood/moral status/rights, actually didn't end up getting physical deformations or a mental handicap. If this is true, then it seems (b) is false.
This means that (a) is true.
Therefore, the mother acted immorally at the time she got the x-ray. It seems what makes it wrong would be the fact that the fetus has moral status/rights. Therfore, if it is wrong to get an x-ray/smoke/or drink when pregnant then it is wrong to do any other kind of physical harm to the fetus, including abortion. Therefore, if it is wrong to get an x-ray/smoke/or drink when pregnant then abortion is wrong.

[tinytherese]

This is part of an article that I had to read in my logic and nature class regarding whether or not fetuses are persons. I've included a link to the full article if anyone is interested.

II. We are Essentially Human Physical Organisms



This is step #2 in our overall argument.

Perhaps the most popular argument to deny the intrinsic value of human embryos is the “no-person argument.” According to this argument, the human embryo or fetus is a human being, a human organism, but it is not a person. The argument is that only persons deserve moral respect; that is, only persons are intrinsically worthwhile, are the sorts of things we should not kill, are entities whose interests we should take account of. But human embryos or fetuses, according to this argument, are not persons.

Sometimes it is argued that human embryos are not persons because human embryos do not have mental functions. Thus, Mary Anne Warren, for example, argued that in order to be a person, an entity must have consciousness, self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate an indefinite variety of types of messages, or the presence of self-concepts. [1] Michael Tooley argued that in order to be a person, an entity must have

self-consciousness, in the sense of having a concept of oneself as a continuing subject of experiences. [2] They then concluded that, because human embryos have none of these mental functions, human embryos are not persons.

Such arguments of course have some plausibility. It seems obvious that it is morally permissible to kill some things (such as lettuce, vicious dogs) but not others. Where does one draw the line between those things it is permissible to destroy or kill, and those it is not? A long tradition says that the line should be drawn at persons. But what is a person, if not a thing which has self-consciousness, rationality, and the ability consciously to direct his own life?

[re infants, comatose?]

However, this argument is gravely mistaken. It implicitly identifies the human person with a concsiousness which uses or inhabits a body, whereas in fact we human persons are particular kinds of physical organisms. Their argument is that, yes, the human organism comes to be at conception, but you and I, the human person, comes to be only much later, say, when something with self-consciousness appears. But if this human organism came to be at one time, but I came to be at a later time, it follows that I am one thing and this human organism is another thing.

We are not consciousnesses that possess or inhabit bodies. Rather, we are living bodily entities. First, I think that we have, at least on one level, an immediate awareness of the truth that we are living bodies. When I take a shower I say that I am washing myself. If you strike my face I do not say, “You hit my body,” but: “Why did you hit me?” If while walking past a vase on a coffee-table I accidentally knock it to the floor and it shatters, I do not say, “My body did that,” but: “I am so sorry, I accidentally broke your vase.”

Second, we can see that you and I are physical organisms by examining the kinds of actions that must be attributed to us. So, if a thing performs bodily actions, then it is a body. If a living thing performs bodily actions, then it is a physical organism. Now, those who want to deny that we are physical organisms think of themselves, what each of them refers to as “I”, as the subject of acts of understanding and willing, that is, what many philosophers, myself included, would say are non-physical acts. Now here’s the argument: First, sensation is a bodily action. The act of seeing, for example, is an act that an animal performs with his eyeballs and his optic nerve, just as the act of walking is an act that he performs with his legs. But, secondly, it is clear in the case of human individuals that it has to be the same thing, the same single subject of actions, that performs the act of sensing and that performs the act of understanding. (And remember, it is the subject of acts of understanding that everyone, including those who deny that they are bodily entities, refers to as “I”.) When I know, for example, that That is a tree, it is by my understanding, or an intellectual act, that I apprehend what is meant by "tree" apprehending what it is (at least in a general way). But the subject of that proposition, what I refer to by the word "That," is apprehended by sensation or perception. What one means by "That" is precisely that which is perceptually present to one. But, clearly, it must be the same thing—the same I—which apprehends the predicate and the subject of a unitary judgment. So, it is the same thing, the same agent, which understands and which senses or perceives. Thus, what each of us refers to as “I” is identically the physical organism which is the subject both of bodily actions such as perceiving, and of nonphysical actions, such as understanding. Hence the thing that I am, and the thing that you are—what you and I refer to by the personal pronouns “you” and “I”—is in each case a human, physical organism (but also with nonphysical capacities). [3] Therefore, since you and I are essentially physical organisms, we came to be at conception, we once were embryos, then fetuses, then infants, and so on.

So, how should we use the word “person”? Are human embryos persons or not?

Well, people may stipulate different meanings for the word “person”, but I think it is clear that what we normally mean by the word “person” is that entity that is referred to by personal pronouns –“I” “you” “he” “she” and so on. And I would say that the following is what we should present as explicating the meaning of the word “person”: A person is: a subject with the natural capacity to reason and make free choices. But that subject, in the case of human beings, is identical with the human organism, and therefore that subject comes to be when the organism comes to be, even though it will take her several months to actualize the natural capacities to reason and make free choices, natural capacities which are already present.



III. We are Intrinsically Valuable in Virtue of What We Are. What is valuable is what we are.



Another attempt to deny the intrinsic value of human embryos is to deny Step 3 in the argument I gave above. This attempt concedes that you and I once were human embryos, and so proponents of this view do not identify the self or the person with a non-physical consciousness. What they say is that “person” is an accidental attribute. That is, it is similar to “basketball player.” Just as you come to be at one time, but become a basketball player only much later, so, they say, you and I came to be when these physical organisms came to be, but we became persons only at some time later. [4] Thus, unlike the first objectors, they admit that you and I once existed in our mothers’ wombs. They admit that the thing referred to by “I” or “you” is a physical organism. What they deny is that this entity was intrinsically valuable at every stage of its duration. On Tooley’s view I am not the same entity as the physical organism that once existed in my mother’s womb. According to Tooley, one thing came to be at conception, and a distinct thing came to be much later. But, according to Thomson, Dworkin and others, you and I did come to be in our mothers’ wombs, but we became intrinsically valuable only at a later time. We could express the difference between the two positions this way: The first objectors disagree with the pro-life position on an ontological issue, that is, on what kind of thing the unborn human embryo or fetus is. This second objection disagrees with the pro-life position on an evaluative, or ethical, position.

Judith Thomson argues for this position by comparing the right to life with the right to vote. Thomson argues that, “If children are allowed to develop normally they will have a right to vote; that does not show that they now have a right to vote.” So, according to this position, it is true that we once were embryos and fetuses, but they argue that we came to be at one point, but then acquired the right to life only much later during our life. [5]

My reply is as follows. First of all, The comparison between voting rights and the right to life is relevant only if one assumes that all rights are of the same sort, which is simply not true. Some rights vary with respect to place, circumstances, and talents; other rights do not. We recognize that one’s right to life does not vary with place, as does one’s right to vote. Moreover, some rights and entitlements accrue to individuals only at certain times, places, or situations, but surely others do not. The basic right to life is the same as having moral status at all, that is, being the sort of entity that can have rights or entitlements to begin with. And so it is to be expected that this right would differ in further, and fundamental ways, from other rights, such as a right to vote. In particular, it is reasonable to expect that having moral status at all, as opposed to having a right to perform this or that type of action in this or that type of situation, should be based on the type of thing (or substantial entity) something is. And so, just as this right does not vary with respect to place or situation, so it does not accrue to someone because of an acquired skill or disposition. Rather, this right belongs to a person, a substantial entity, at all times that she exists, not just during certain stages of her existence, or in certain circumstances, or in virtue of additional, accidental attributes.

Secondly I reply that we are intrinsically valuable in virtue of what we are, not of in virtue of some attribute that we acquire some time after we have come to be. Well, obviously, proponents of this view cannot maintain that the accidental attribute required to be intrinsically valuable (additional to being a human individual) is an act or an actual behavior. They of course do not wish to exclude from personhood people who are asleep or in reversible comas. So, the additional attribute will have to be a capacity or potentiality of some sort. Thus, they will have to concede that sleeping or reversibly comatose human beings will be persons because they have the potentiality or capacity for mental functions.

But there is a sense in which human embryos and fetuses also have a capacity or potentiality for such mental functions as soon as they come to be. Human embryos and fetuses cannot of course immediately perform such acts. Still, they are related to such acts differently than, say, a canine or feline embryo is. They are members of a natural kind—a biological species—whose members, if not prevented by extrinsic causes, in due course develop the immediately exercisable capacity for mental functions. The fact that they do shows that members of this species come to be with whatever it takes to develop that immediately exercisable capacity, and that only the adverse effects on them of other causes will prevent it. So, from the moment they come to be they have within themselves the internal resources necessary to actively develop themselves to the point where they will perform such acts. [6]

So, we must distinguish two sorts of capacity or potentiality for mental functions that a substantial entity might possess: first, an immediately exercisable capacity, that is, one that the entity will immediately perform in response to a stimulus; [7] second, a capacity to develop oneself to the point where one does perform such actions. [8] But on what basis can one require the first sort of potentiality—as do proponents of this second objection—which is an accidental attribute, and not just the first, which is possessed as part of what one is?

There are, at least, two reasons against requiring the first sort of capacity. First, the difference between these two types of potentiality or capacity is merely a difference between stages along a continuum. The more proximate capacity for higher mental functions is only the development of an underlying potentiality that the entity has simply because it is the kind of thing it is. The capacities for reasoning and making free choices are gradually developed, or brought towards maturation, through gestation, childhood, adolescence, and so on. But the difference between a person and a non-person, or that which has value as a subject of rights and that which does not, cannot consist only in the fact that, while both have some feature, one has more of it than the other. A mere quantitative difference (having more or less of the same feature, such as the development of a natural capacity) cannot by itself be the basis for why we should treat different entities in radically different ways. [9] Between the ovum and the approaching thousands of sperm on the one hand and the embryonic human being on the other hand, there is a clear difference in kind. But between the embryonic human being and that same human being at any stage of her maturation, there is only a difference in degree.

A second reason against holding that personhood is, or is grounded in, an accidental attribute, is as follows. Being a certain kind of thing, that is, having a specific type of substantial nature, is an either/or matter—a thing either is or is not a human being. But the accidental qualities that could be proposed as criteria for personhood come in varying and continuous degrees: there is an infinite number of degrees of the relevant developed abilities or dispositions, such as for self-consciousness or intelligence. So, if persons were valuable as subjects of rights only because of such accidental qualities, and not in virtue of the kind of things they are, then, since such qualities come in varying degrees, basic rights would be possessed by human beings in varying degrees. The proposition that all human beings have equal rights would be simply an outmoded superstition. For example, if developed self-consciousness bestowed rights, then, since some people are more self-conscious than others (that is, have developed that capacity to a greater extent than others), some people would be “more equal” than others. This would follow no matter which of the accidental qualities proposed as qualifying for personhood were selected. Will Stretton, Thomson and others agree with Joseph Fletcher, who years ago argued that human individuals with an Intelligence Quotient below 20, or perhaps also those with an IQ below 40, should not be treated as persons? [10] But if they will not agree, why not? Can they give any principled reason for their disagreement? And can they give any principled reason for disagreement with someone who might say that the cut-off point should be 50, or 60, or 70? Clearly, they cannot: their proposed criterion is an arbitrarily selected degree of development of a capacity that all human beings possess, from conception on through until their death as physical organisms. By contrast, though human beings differ immensely with respect to talents, accomplishments, in short, degrees of development of their basic natural capacities, they all are equal in having the same nature. The are all equally human beings, with the same basic natural capacities, though developed in varying degrees.

In sum. I have presented a basic argument for the proposition that what is intrinsically valuable as a subject of rights comes to be at conception—or monozygotic twinning, or cloning should that ever occur—that is, from the zygote stage onward. I have defended the argument against various attempts to evade its conclusion.

The main evidence for #4: at conception, or whenever there is the full complement of genes plus activation in some way so that there is an actively developing zygote—at that point we can see that there is a distinct center of organization and active self-development, an internally self-directed organism developing itself toward the mature stage of the human organism.

The main evidence for #3 (that is, we are physical organisms): sensation is a bodily act, but it is the same I, the same subject, which performs the act of sensing and the act of understanding – so the thing that understands is identical with the thing that understands.

The main evidence for #2 (that is, we are valuable in virtue of what we are): if they’re going to say it is an accidental characteristic that makes you valuable, then it will have to be a potentiality, for example, a potentiality for consciousness. But human embryos and fetuses do have a basic, natural capacity for consciousness, and so they will have to say that what is required is some degree of development of that capacity of consciousness. But a.) the difference between the development of a basic capacity and the basic capacity itself is only a difference of degree, and the radical and dramatic difference between how we treat person vs how we treat nonpersons cannot, in justice, be based on a mere difference in degree. b.) if we were valuable in virtue of some accidental characteristic, say, a development of consciousness—rather than in virtue of the kind of thing we are—then, since there are different degrees of the development of consciousness they will have to conclude that some people are more valuable than others. And c.) their selection of the particular degree of development will necessarily be arbitrary. Instead, I argued that we are intrinsically valuable as subjects of right in virtue of the kind of thing we are, namely a person, which I—following the tradition—define as an individual substantial entity which has the basic, natural capacity to reason and make free choices, even though it may take some time for this person to actualize those capacities.


Source: http://www2.francisc...du/plee/pro.htm

[Fiat_Voluntas_Tua]

Per chance did you take logic and nature with a Jim Madden? I think he is the only one at BC who would teach JJ Thomson and Tooley.