Trintarian Warfare theodicy

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myles I didnt notice u replied before me..let me wait on ur answer..i need to get motivated for greek. But your answer is close, but not working in the right concepts. Remmeber, we are not arguing God as much as arguing what time is. and that is based on a former view of platonic time, where as now we have a better understanding that time is man-made and doesnt really exist as a dimension. So there is no past, there is no future there is only now and how things continue.

friend, Im gonna take up alot of space and post a quick overview of opentheism. For a better understanding read one of Boyds books that talk about it. But this is the document I went over with my priest and him with the bishop this summer when they said it was Ok within catholic teaching

[rkwright]

[quote name='Myles' date='Dec 2 2005, 02:36 AM']One quick point rkwright. God the Son exists from eternity because God is irreducibly Trinitarian. The Son's existence does not depend on creation. Hence my object to the terms 'creator, redeemer, sanctifier'. God is eternally Trinity.

Phatmass wont let me quote Jesus' prophesy about Peter's denials. Gotta love it! 
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[/quote]

ah no doubt I seem to have gotten ahead of myself and placed too much emphsis on the role of the persons of the Trinity.

ok so scratch #1 and #2... but how about 3? or Peter's denial as Myles hinted at?

actually Myles quote on Peter from Jesus is way better than any prophet. Jesus speaks the truth, only... there is no way for this event to not happen? If Peter did not deny Jesus, Jesus would have lied? Or similarily, when Jesus tells the others that someone will betray him - if no one betrayed him then we have a major problem in Jesus and truth.

Edited December 2, 2005 by rkwright

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rkwright,

1-Good answer on this one myles...but also, Christ could fullfill the role of salvation, but I doubt that is the reason entirely why he was begotten. Remember, God is love, and love needs someone else. So within the trinity God needed more than 1 essence to properly have love.

2- Knowing all the possibilities perfectly allows God to prepare for all possibiliites perfectly.

3- prophets: In open theism God does settle some things btw, also knowing the outcomes God can work with the possibilities to determine an outcome. heck, he is God.

[quote] Is Revelation nothing more than a possible outcome of our actions? [/quote]
-is there any part of revelations that demands our free willed choice? Not really, it will happen no matter what choice we make. Think of it as a video game, right now we are playing the game according to the rules, but if Mom comes by and pushes the power button than the game is over. Right now it is a game of the will and Gods desire to know our wills, but to have a undetermined choice of love he can not demand the will.

plus revelations is a mystery to most still. I can ask a different person from 10 different denoms and they would all swear by their take on it. And one of them would make rapture threats and then we would need to see Kurt Cameron act and none of us wants that

[quote]That would actually unprove most of the Bible, all of revelation has a 'possibility' of not being true.  And for the old testament, it would mean that when it was written it was not 'truth' it was a mere possibility. [/quote]
how so? it happened. it is settled. I dont understand your point here? Scripture is the love story of God and us, the trials and tribulations the ups and downs, it is settled and perfect. Whats the problem

[quote]Through the actions of men we made it truth, through our choices we fufilled the prophets; but that would mean that at that point the old testament wasn't true until we made it true, and that all of revelation is not true until we choose to make it true.[/quote]

no...but take a deep breath. This is a new concept and really, a new worldview. I am going to post an open theism 411 overview hopefully it helps otherwise there are some books that assist also.

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WHAT IS OPEN VIEW THEISM?

Open view theists believe that the future exists partly as actualities (future events which God sovereignly determines to bring about) and partly as possibilities (aspects of the future which God sovereignly allows his creatures to bring about). They base their conviction on biblical, philosophical, and experiential evidence. Even recent scientific developments which demonstrate that many aspects of reality are not fixed are causing people to rethink the nature of the future.

The Open view has many pragmatic implications for believers, particularly regarding the problem of evil and the power of prayer. In his book, God of the Possible (Baker Books, 2000), Greg Boyd explores these implications and demonstrates the biblical basis for this view. As evangelical Christians, the biblical basis for any view is the most compelling evidence for its truthfulness. At this time, that is the majority of what is offered in this site.
BIBLICAL SUPPORT FOR THE OPEN VIEW
Verses which explicitly describe God’s knowledge of future events do not entail that the entire future is exhaustively foreknown (and/or predestined) by God. Likewise, verses which explicitly describe God’s response to a future which is open to possibilities do not entail that the future is exhaustively open. Exegetical (and philosophical) problems only arise when we insist that the future is either exhaustively settled (as in the classical view of foreknowledge) or exhaustively open (as in Process thought).

The Open view embraces both biblical motifs by describing the future as partly open and partly settled. God’s sovereignty enables him to predetermine whatever future events need to transpire in order to accomplish his will (such as Christ’s death and resurrection). God’s sovereignty also enables him to give his creatures the capacity for love, which requires the ability to decide some of the future for themselves. We hope that the links below will be a helpful resource for those who are interested in examining the biblical references to God’s foreknowledge.
PASSAGES THAT REFLECT A PARTLY OPEN FUTURE
Introduction


The following Scriptures suggest that the future is partly open. The verses are listed in the order they occur in Scripture. After each verse or passage, I offer a brief comment as to why I believe it contradicts the the view that the future is exhaustively settled and that God eternally foreknows it as such.

Rather than providing a scholarly discussion of the exegetical issues surrounding each passage but to strive for simplicity and succinctness, my goal is to simply appeal to the common sense of the reader. I encourage you to prayerfully study and consider each passage.
Gen. 2:19 | Gen. 6:5–6 | Gen. 22:12 | Exod. 3:18–4:9 | Exod. 4:10–16 | Exod. 13:17 | Exod. 16:4 | Exod. 32:14 | Exod. 32:33 | Exod. 33:1–3, 14 | Num. 11:1–2 | Num. 14:11 | Num. 14:12–20 | Num. 16:20–35 | Num. 16:41–48 | Deut. 8:2 | Deut. 9:13–14, 18–20, 25 | Deut. 13:1–3 | Deut. 30:19 | Judg. 2:20–3:5 | Judg. 10:13–15 | 1 Sam. 2:27–31 | 1 Sam. 13:13–14 | 1 Sam. 15:10 | 1 Sam. 15:35 | 1 Sam. 23:9–13 | 2 Sam. 24:12–16 | 2 Sam. 24:17–25 | 1 Kings 21:27–29 | 2 Kings 13:3–5 | 2 Kings 20:1–7 | 1 Chron. 21:7–13 | 1 Chron. 21:15 | 2 Chron. 7:12–14 | 2 Chron. 12:5–8 | 2 Chron. 32:31 | Psalm 106:23 | Isa. 5:3–7 | Isa. 38:1–5 | Jer. 3:6–7 | Jer. 3:19–20 | Jer. 7:5–7 | Jer. 18:7–11 | Jer. 19:5 | Jer. 26:2–3 | Jer. 26:19 | Jer. 32:35 | Jer. 38:17–18, 20–21, 23 | Ezek. 12:1–3 | Ezek. 20:5–22 | Ezek. 22:29–31 | Ezek. 33:13–15 | Hosea 8:5 | Hosea 11:8–9 | Joel 2:13–14 | Amos 7:1–6 | Jonah 1:2; 3:2, 4–10; 4:2 | Matt. 25:41 | Matt. 26:39 | Acts 15:7 | Acts 21:10–12 | 2 Pet. 3:9–12 | Rev. 3:5 | Rev. 22:18
 
PASSAGES THAT REFLECT A PARTLY SETTLED FUTURE
 
Introduction


The verses listed below are frequently used to support the view that the future is exhaustively settled. Consider whether they explicitly teach or logically require us to believe that the future is exhaustively settled or whether they simply require us to believe that the future is partly settled and is known by God as such.

I shall offer brief explanations as to how people who hold to a partly open future might interpret each of the following verses. In many cases there are a number of possible interpretations which are consistent with the Open view but for the sake of time I shall only offer the one or two which seem most compelling to me. Also, rather than providing a comprehensive exegesis of each passage, my goal is to show as clearly as possible why these passages do not require us to believe that the future is exhaustively settled.


Gen. 3:15 | Gen. 15:13–15 | Gen. 16:12 | Gen. 25:23 | Num. 23:19 | Deut. 30:16–23 | 1 Kings 13:2–3 | Psalm 139:16 | Isa. 44:28–45:1 | Isa. 46:9–11 | Isa. 48:3–5 | Isa. 53:9 | Jer. 1:5 | Jer. 25:8–12 | Jer. 29:10–11 | Ezek. 26:1–21 | Dan. 2:31–45 | Zech. 12:10 | Mal. 3:6 | Matt. 16:21 | Matt. 20:17–19 | Matt. 21:1–5 | Matt. 24:1–44 | Matt. 26:36 | Mark 14:13–15 | John 6:64, 70–71 | John 13:18–19; 17:12 | John 21:18–19 | Acts 2:23 | Acts 4:27–28 | Acts 13:48 | Rom. 8:29 | Gal. 1:15–16 | Gal. 3:8 | Eph. 1:4–5 | 2 Thess. 2:3–4 | 1 Tim. 4:1–3 | 2 Tim. 1:9–10 | 1 Pet. 1:1–2 | 1 Pet. 1:20 | The Book of revelations
 
PHILOSOPHICAL SUPPORT FOR OPEN THEISM

Introduction


I believe that sound philosophical arguments support the open view in which God doesn’t foreknow the future free decisions of humans. My main reasons for holding this view are biblical and theological, but since truth is one we should expect that the truths of Scripture and the truths of reason will arrive at the same conclusion—if we interpret Scripture accurately and reason correctly.

I shall offer several arguments that it is logically impossible to affirm that God possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge (EDF) while also affirming that humans or angels are free in the sense that they can determine what they are going to do within parameters.

(This is called “libertarian” or “self-determining” freedom. Some argue that creatures are free if they are simply able to choose what they want, though God determines their wants. But this much would be true if we were hypnotized to want something and were simply not prevented from choosing it. We are only free in a significant sense—in the “libertarian” or “self-determining” sense—to the extent that we determine our being, our desires, and our choices.)
The impossibility of changing the past


I believe the impossibility of changing the past is one of the strongest philosophical arguments showing the incompatibility of libertarian free will and EDF. Let three things be granted:
a) the past by logical necessity cannot be changed;

b) we are not free in relation to what we cannot change; and

c) we cannot change God’s knowledge (which, by definition, is perfectly accurate).
According to the classical view, from these three premises it follows that humans can be no more free regarding any future event (including their own chosen actions) than they are regarding any past event. For, if God possesses EDF, among the totality of things at any given moment in the past which we cannot change are the facts of all our future actions.

So, for example, I obviously can’t alter the fact that (say) a young Jewish girl named Zosia was tortured by Nazi soldiers on August 15, 1943, and hence I am not free to save her from this tragedy. Equally obvious is the fact that all determinate facts that constitute reality on August 15, 1943, are beyond the scope of my freedom. Since the past can no longer be other than it is, I am not free to alter it and thus cannot be held responsible to alter it.

But, assuming God possesses EDF, among all the unalterable determinate facts that comprised reality on August 15, 1943 is the determinate fact that (say) I shall marry my wife on August 18, 1979. The unimprovable definiteness of this truth was “there”—in God’s ever-contemporary EDF—among all the other determinate facts that constituted reality on August 15, 1943. In other words, if God were to catalog the contents of his omniscient mind in a volume entitled All the Unalterable Facts Known by the Omniscient Mind on August 15, 1943, my marriage on August 18, 1979 would be among them.

Thus it follows that I could be no more free to determine who I’d marry or when I’d marry her, than I was to determine the fate of Zosia. Both were part of the totality of reality of August 15, 1943, a reality I had nothing to do with even though it seemed like I did in 1979. Indeed, since I can change nothing about the past, and the book of All the Unalterable Facts Known by the Omniscient Mind is in the unalterable past, and on the EDF view this book contains the my entire future, it seems that I can be no more free with regard to any of my future than I am with regard to anything in the past because if EDF is true then my whole future is actually in the past!

Conversely, if assume that I do self-determine aspects of my future, it follows that what I shall end up doing could not be contained in God’s hypothetical book of unalterable facts in 1943. If I genuinely self-determined who I married and when I married her, then it could not have been a determinate fact 36 years before I chose it (and 14 years before I was even born) that I would marry my wife August 18, 1979.

In other words, for my future to be free it must partly consist of a genuine “possibly this or possibly that,” rather than exhaustively consisting of “certainly this and certainly not that.” I am only genuinely free to do x or y if it genuinely lies within my power to do x or y. But if God possesses EDF, then the entire history of the world—past, present, and future—is cataloged as “certainly this and certainly not that” in God’s omniscient mind. And in this case it cannot lie within my power to do other than God’s book said I would do before I was born. Hence, it seems that if God possess EDF, I cannot be genuinely free.
The meaning of self-determination
P1) Self-determination means that the self determines its actions, or it has no clear meaning. Regarding any genuinely free act, in other words, by definition the free agent ultimately determined that an action within the category of possibilities (“possibly this or possibly that”) would become something within the category of actualities (“certainly this and certainly not that.”)

P2) Retroactive causality does not occur.

P3) Hence, the determinateness given to an action by a self-determining agent cannot precede that agent’s self-determination (let alone eternally precede it!).
Conclusion: The determinateness of the acts which an agent self-determines cannot exist before the agent gives these acts determinateness. Hence the determinateness of such acts are not there to be known by God or anyone else as anything other than possibilities prior to the agent’s act of self-determination (let alone an eternity prior!).

Comment: Unless premise 2 is rejected and retroactive causation is granted—something few western philosophers have historically been willing to grant—then this conclusion is unavoidable. Either the determinateness of my actions comes from me, in which case I am self-determining, or it does not, in which case I am not self-determining. This much is tautology. If the determinateness eternally precedes me, it does not come from me. If, in other words, a given action of mine was in the category of determinate things (“certainly this and certainly not that”) an eternity prior to my making it so, then I did not make it so. For I am not an eternity old. Yet on the view that God possesses EDF, all future actions are eternally within this category. Hence no created being can be the originator of the determinateness of their actions—viz. no created being is self-determining. Conversely, if we grant that created beings are in fact self-determining, then God cannot possess EDF.
The distinction between possibility and actuality
P1) The fundamental distinction between possibility and actuality is that of indefiniteness and definiteness.

P2) Self-determination is the power to change possibility into actuality, thus indefiniteness into definiteness.

P3) If EDF is the case, then every event is definite before it occurs.

P4) There is no indefiniteness to the future.
Conclusion: The self has no power to change possibilities into actuality, indefiniteness into definiteness. That is, the self has no self-determination.

Comment: If the distinction between actuality and possibility is not that of definiteness and indefiniteness, then what is it? And if self-determination is not the ability to render possibilities actual, then what is it? If both P1 and P2 are granted, however, the possibility of affirming that the content of God’s foreknowledge is exhaustively definite while affirming self-determination is undermined. Unless the future is to some degree ontologically (not just epistemologically) open (viz. partly constituted by indefinite possibilities) then agents can’t turn possibilities into actualities and thus posess self-determination. Despite protests to the contrary, I do not see that classical-philosophical theism allows for real possibilities.
EDF and actual occurrences
P1) If God possesses EDF, the definiteness of all events eternally precedes their actual occurrence.

P2) Actuality is distinct from possibility in that actuality is characterized by definiteness, while possibility is characterized by indefiniteness.

P3) Thus, all events are actual before they are actual.
Conclusion: It is absurd to say that an event is actual before it is actual, thus (reductio ad absurdem) God does not possess EDF.

Comment: This argument raises the question, What does the actual occurrence of x add to God’s foreknowledge of x so as to distinguish the actual occurrence of x from the mere foreknowledge of x? If God’s experience of the actual occurrence adds anything to God’s foreknowledge, then God’s foreknowledge cannot be exhaustively definite. God learned what it was to experience x even if we concede that prior to this God had perfect propositional knowledge about x. If God’s experience of the actual occurrence of x adds nothing to God’s knowledge, however, then it becomes utterly impossible to render intelligible the distinction between a thing’s actual “occurrence” and its being “merely” foreknown.

In other words, if experience is the highest form of knowledge (and it most certainly is), then an exhaustively definite knowledge of x entails an unsurpassably perfect experience of x. Hence too, an exhaustively definite foreknowledge of x must entail an unsurpassably definite experience of x an eternity before x occurs.

To salvage EDF, then, we must either grant retroactive causation or grant divine timelessness. Whether these concepts are either philosophically or biblically defensible is questionable.
The cause of eternal definiteness
P1) Nothing contingent is uncaused.

P2) The definiteness of the actual world is contingent.

P3) The definiteness of the world is caused (from P1).

P4) If God possesses EDF, the world was perfectly definite (in God’s mind) an eternity before the world existed.

P5) The world can’t be the cause of its own definiteness, for it did not exist from eternity.

P6) God must be the sole cause for the world’s definiteness, or the world is not contingent.
Conclusion: I cannot be the cause of the definiteness of my own actions: I cannot be self-determining.

Comment: Two consistent views regarding the future and EDF are the Calvinist view of absolute predestination, and Spinoza’s view of a wholly necessary world. The future is eternally definite either because an eternal being willed it from eternity to be what it is, or because it is logically impossible, and thus eternally impossible, for it to be other than it is.

As theological determinists argue, the classical Arminian view, which affirms EDF while also affirming self-determination, is inconsistent. As Luther argued, “If God foreknows things, that thing necessarily happens. That is to say, there is no such things as free choice” (Bondage of the Will). Conversely, if one grants free choice, one must deny EDF.

The logic here is straightforward. On one hand, free agents determine their own actions. On the other hand, the definiteness of their actions is held to be eternal (in God’s EDF) though the free agent is not eternal. But how can a temporal cause produce an eternal effect?

Aquinas (following Aristotle) was more consistent in arguing that what is eternal cannot be contingent, for what is eternal could not have been other than it is. Hence Aquinas construes God as being the eternal cause of the temporal contingent world (though both he and Aristotle were less than consistent in working out the omni-deterministic implications of this view). It seems, then, that the cause of the eternal definiteness of God’s EDF regarding the totality of contingent world history cannot be the temporal, contingent world history itself.

One could perhaps argue that there is no cause to the eternally definite content of God’s foreknowledge. The knowledge is “just there” as an attribute of God’s omniscient nature. It’s not clear how this view improves matters, however.

If world history is exhaustively definite from all eternity, why is supposedly contingent reality eternally this way as opposed to eternally that way? The Calvinist view in which God is the explanation undermines creaturely self-determination, as Arminians argue. The Arminian view in which the future world itself is the explanation assumes either retroactive causation or divine timelessness, and both of these assumtions are highly problematic. But concluding that there is no cause doesn’t salvage the intelligibility of the position.

For one thing, postulating an uncaused fact denies the principle of sufficient reason. For another, construing the definiteness of my future as eternally uncaused is no more compatible with me possessing self-determining freedom than is construing it as eternally God caused. The problem with compatiblist freedom is the supposition that the future is definite before I make it so: how it became definite is in this respect inconsequential.

Thus, I argue that there is no way to render intelligible the EDF view that every aspect of my life is definite prior to my choosing it so, though I am free and morally responsible for the way I choose my life. Consequently, if one wishes to affirm libertarian freedom, they must deny that God possesses EDF in order to be logically consistent.

Edited December 2, 2005 by Revprodeji

[Laudate_Dominum]

I must first say that I don't fancy myself an expert on open theism. Yet, my limited exposure to it has left me with a bitter taste in my mouth. It goes against all of the theological sensibilities; it is, in other words, repulsive to me.

That said, I must further say that I am appreciative of this opportunity to actually discuss it with a real live person, instead of just reading about it and forming judgments. Perhaps your defense on this thread will soften me up a bit.

I can't at this moment give a complete account of the many problems I have with open theism, but I will at least mention what is perhaps my main point of contention.

It seems quite clear that open theism is an attempt to make God diastemic. I see it as in many ways connected with certain developments in modern philosophy. Basically, to my mind, the transcendence of God is threatened and open theism strikes me as yet another idol of philosophy.

When I have more time I shall read this thread entirely and attempt to contribute more thoroughly and constructively. This should at least give a taste of where I will be coming from.

God bless you.

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NEO-MOLINISM and the INFINITE INTELLIGENCE OF GOD


Introduction

One of the most frequent and most emotionally charged objections to the open view of the future is that, if God doesn’t know with certainty all that shall come to pass, he cannot ensure that his purposes for a individual’s life or for world history will be accomplished. As Bruce Ware puts it, the open view of God posits a “limited, passive, hand-wringing God” who can do little more than hope for the best.[1] In his view, what is “lost in open theism is the Christian’s confidence in God.” And he continues:
When we are told that God...can only guess what much of the future will bring...[and] constantly sees his beliefs about the future proved wrong by what in fact transpires....Can a believer know that God will triumph in the future just as he has promised he will?[2]
Both on a scholarly and popular level, this concern seems to fuel much of the passion with which some evangelicals have recently come against the open view. It permeates Bruce Ware’s book, God’s Lesser Glory and is found throughout other recent polemics against the open view.

In this paper I shall demonstrate that this concern is unfounded. Indeed, I shall show that the concern itself is rooted in a thoroughly anthropomorphic view of God, for it is premised on the assumption that God’s intelligence is limited, just as human intelligence is. My claim is that if we consistently think through the implications of infinite intelligence, we will see that a being who possesses this attribute loses no providential control because he knows a partly open, partly settled future rather than one that is exhaustively settled.

Of course, a being who exhaustively controlled the future would possess more providential control of what comes to pass than a being who did not. Any view that admits that agents possess libertarian freedom has to sacrifice exhaustive divine control. But in this case we are debating predestination, not foreknowledge. Whatever could be argued against open theists on this account could also be argued against classical Arminians. The issue I’m concerned with in this essay is foreknowledge. And the question I’m asking is, Does God lose any providential advantage by knowing some of the future as composed of possibilities rather than knowing it as exhaustively certain? My argument shall be that, if we grant that God is infinitely intelligent, the only conclusion we can come to is that he does not.

To argue my case, I shall first compare the open view with that form of Arminianism that has ascribed to God the most providential control: namely, Molinism (§1). Whereas advocates of simple foreknowledge affirm that God knows all that shall come to pass, including what free agents will do, the Molinist argues that, to a significant degree, God chooses what shall come to pass but without sacrificing libertarian freedom. This view thus ascribes to God far more providential control than simple foreknowledge. I shall argue that the open view can be thought through in such a way that it ascribes to God roughly the same level of providential control as Molinism. Indeed, I shall argue that the open view is so close to Molinism that it could (and perhaps should) accurately be labeled “neo-Molinism.” For the purposes of this paper, I shall use “open theism” and “neo-Molinist” interchangeably.

The neo-Molinist perspective differs from classical Molinism in only one respect—though it is a very significant respect. Neo-Molinism modifies the standard Molinist understanding of God’s middle knowledge by maintaining that it includes “might-counterfactuals” (viz. knowledge of what agents might or might not do in given situations) as well as “would-counterfactuals” (viz. knowledge of what agents would do given situations). This modification, I shall argue, allows open theism to avoid four major objections that have been raised against classical Molinism.

Second, I shall apply the neo-Molinist account of God’s knowledge to the issue of God’s infinite intelligence (§2). I shall argue that for a being who knows all “might-counterfactuals” as well as all “would-counterfactuals,” there is no loss of providential control. God can anticipate from all eternity “might-counterfactuals” as perfectly as he does “would-counterfactuals”—indeed, as perfectly as he does future certainties (what shall occur).

Finally, I shall apply this argument explicitly to the different ways Molinists and neo-Molinists conceive of God working in the world (§3). I shall here argue that all but one of the reasons one could give for arguing that Molinism offers God a providential advantage over the open view of God is misguided. I shall thus argue that the neo-Molinist construal of the open view of God presents a model of God’s relationship to the world that has most of the providential advantages of classical Molinism, but without the attendant difficulties. At the very least, the providence control ascribed to God by open theists is far greater than that ascribed by simple foreknowledge Arminians. And thus, if successful, I will have shown that the neo-Molinist view presents an understanding of God that is as far from a “limited, passive, hand-wringing God” as any Arminian view could be.

Notes

1. B. Ware, God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism (Wheaten, Ill.: Crossways Books, 2000), 216.
2. Ibid., 20–21.

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The Open View as Neo-Molinism


God’s “Middle Knowledge”

In the sixteenth century Jacob Molina proposed that between God’s knowledge of all logical possibilities, on the one hand, and God’s factual knowledge of what shall come to pass, on the other, we should posit another category of knowledge: God’s knowledge of what would come to pass in any conceivable set of circumstances. This he called God’s “middle knowledge,” for it is “acquired” in the logical moment between God’s knowledge of logical possibilities and God’s knowledge of facts (what shall come to pass).

There are three primary arguments for God’s middle knowledge. First, Scripture depicts agents as free and morally responsible on the one hand, while depicting God as sovereignly in control of the world on the other. The best way to render these two facts compatible, argue middle knowledge theorists, is to assume that God possesses counterfactual knowledge of creaturely free acts. In their view, God knows what every agent would do in every possible world and then creates that world which best achieves his creational objectives.

Second, Scripture gives a number of examples of God claiming to know what various people would do in different situations (e.g. 1 Sam. 23:6–10; Jer. 38:17–18). This further suggests that God possesses counterfactual knowledge.

And third, since God is omniscient, he must by definition know from all eternity the truth-value of all propositions. Hence he must eternally know the truth-value of all counterfactual propositions, including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.

This position, it is argued, has an advantage over Calvinism, for in affirming libertarian freedom it avoids all the paradoxes that attend to compatibilism. But it also has an advantage over the simple foreknowledge position, for God doesn’t simply know what is going to take place: he chooses what is going to take place on the basis of his middle knowledge. To be sure, as noted above, God does not have exhaustive control over what transpires, as in Calvinism, but he has much more control over what transpires than if he simply “found out,” as it were, how creatures were going to choose to freely act in the future. The view doesn’t allow God to always get his way—no view that affirms libertarian freedom can. But it does allow God to choose that “possible world” in which his creational objectives are best achieved, given that he chose to create agents who possess libertarian freedom.

Difficulties with Classical Molinism

Despite its advantages, there are a number of problems with the classical Molinist position, four of which may be mentioned presently.

First, many have argued that it is difficult to render the Molinist account of middle knowledge philosophically plausible. In this view, every possible decision any possible free agent might ever make in any possible world is an eternal fact. From all eternity, the facticity not only of the future world, but of all possible worlds, exists. It is an unalterable fact that agent x shall do y in situation z, but would do a, b or c in situations u, w and x.

Rendering this eternal facticity intelligible is no easy matter, however. It is a contingent facticity, but it is not clear what brings it about. It cannot be brought about by God’s will, for that would constitute determinism, something Molinists want to avoid. But neither does it seem that this eternal facticity can be brought about by created agents, for created agents are not eternal, and Molinists (and most others) generally deny retroactive causation. What is more, unactualized would-counterfactuals cannot be said to be brought about by created agents for the simple reason that they are facts that agents don’t choose.

We are left then with the unappealing alternative of denying that anything grounds the eternal facticity of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. From all eternity the fact of what every conceivable free agent would do in every possible situation was simply there—without anything bringing it about. Though it is supposed to be contingent, it exists as an eternal metaphysical surd. This position, many argue, is at best counter-intuitive. It could also be charged with being dualistic, for the facticity of the world, and of every possible world, is construed as an uncreated definite reality that eternally co-exists alongside of God. For all intents and purposes, it occupies the status of an essential attribute of God. Yet it is supposed to be contingent.

Along the same lines, many have argued that it’s not clear that the middle knowledge position is consistent in its view of libertarian freedom, and this is the second potential problem with this position. On most Arminian accounts, an agent can be said to possess morally responsible libertarian freedom if it lies within their power to do otherwise, given the exact same set of antecedent conditions. But how then can we meaningful say that an agent could have done otherwise if all they shall ever do, and all they would have ever done in any possible world, is a groundless unalterable fact an eternity before they even exist?

Stated otherwise, how can an agent be said to be self-determining when they don’t ground the eternal facticity of what they shall do, and ever would have done in different circumstances? How can we meaningfully say that it is possible for an agent to act otherwise when it has from all eternity been impossible for them to act otherwise in a given possible world? The facticity of all their acts eternally precedes them, brought about by nothing, as we have seen. If agents possess self-determining or libertarian freedom, it seems they must be the ones who resolve possibilities into facts. And to accomplish this, it seems they must exist.

Third, in at least one important respect, Molinism seems to have a more difficult task in confronting the problem of evil than either the simple foreknowledge view or the open view of God. In Molinism, it seems God could refrain from creating people he is certain will use their freedom to beaver dam themselves to hell. If God always strives for maximal goodness, then we must conclude either that it is better for damned individuals to exist in hell than not to exist at all, or that the cosmos as a whole is better for including damned individuals. For a variety of reasons, neither is an attractive alternative.

Yet a fourth possible criticism may be raised, though it has not to date been part of the standard critique of Molinism. There is certainly some scriptural warrant for holding that God knows would-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, as Molinist have point out. But there is, I would argue, an even greater wealth of Scripture which warrants the conclusion that God knows might-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom as well.

For example, Scripture frequently depicts God as speaking and thinking of the future in terms of what might or might not happen (e.g. Exod. 4:8–9; Exod. 13:17; Ezek. 12:3; Jer. 26:3; Matt. 26:39 ).[1] Since God is the only one in a position to know with certainty the nature of the future, this should serve as a reliable indicator that some of the future consists of possible events that might or might not take place. Similarly, God frequently changes his mind, even after he’s explicitly declared his intentions. This too suggests that some of his particular intentions are “maybes” until they are acted upon (e.g. Exod. 32:10–14; Deut. 9:13–29; 1 Chron. 21:15; Jer. 18:7–10; 26:2–3, 19; Jonah 3:10, cf. 4:2; Joel 2:12–13).

Along similar lines, God often “tests” people in order to find out what they will decide to do, suggesting that their future actions are “maybes” until he tests them (Gen. 22:12; Exod. 16:4; Deut. 8:2; 13:1–3; Judges 2:22; 2 Chron. 32:31; ). Scripture also frequently depicts God as experiencing regret (Gen. 6:6; 1 Sam. 15:10, 35), disappointment, frustration, and unexpected outcomes (Exod. 4:10–15; Jer. 3: 6–7, 19–20; Ezek. 22:29–31; Isa. 5:1–5), again suggesting that the future is to this extent composed of possibilities rather than certainties. Its more difficult to conceive of God experiencing such things if the future is exhaustively settled in his mind than if it is in part composed of possibilities.[2]

Would-Counterfactuals and Might-Counterfactuals

While some open theists follow Aristotle and others in maintaining that future tensed contingent statements are neither true or false, I personally suspect that this is a mistake. I am in agreement with the Molinists view that propositions expressing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom have an eternal truth-value, and thus that the omniscient God eternally knows this truth-value. However, I see no reason to embrace the classical Molinist assumption that counterfactuals are exclusively about what agents would or would not do. For these do not exhaust he logical possibilities of counterfactual propositions, and thus do not exhaust the content of the counterfactual propositions an omniscient being would know.

On a counterfactual square of oppositions, the logical antithesis of the statement, “agent x would do y in situation z” is not the statement, “agent x would not do y in situation z.” This is a contrary proposition, not a contradictory proposition. The logical antithesis of “agent x would do y in situation z” is rather the statement, “agent x might not do y in situation z.” This latter statement also has an eternal truth-value and hence must be known by an omniscient being.

The point is that would-counterfactuals do not exhaust the category of counterfactuals: there are also might-counterfactuals. Propositions about both categories of counterfactuals have an eternal truth-value that must be known by God. Hence I see no reason to restrict God’s middle knowledge to knowledge of would-counterfactuals, or, what comes to the same thing, to conclude that all might-counterfactuals are false.

If we include might-counterfactuals in God’s middle knowledge, we arrive at the following neo-Molinist position. Between God’s pre-creational knowledge of all logical possibilities and God’s pre-creational factual knowledge of what will come to pass is God’s “middle knowledge” of what free agents might or might not do in certain situations as well as of what free agents would do in other situations. Each might and would counterfactual is indexically referenced to a possible world. If it is true that agent x might or might not do y in situation z, it is false that agent x would do y in situation z, and vice versa. On the basis of this knowledge, God chose to have actualized the possible world that best suited his creational objectives. If the world God creates is a world in which some might-counterfactuals are true (as I argue is in fact the case) then this world must by definition contain open possibilities. It is, in short, a world in which there are some things free agents might and might not do.

To speak more precisely, this world would actually be a delimited set of possible worlds, any one of which might be actualized, depending on the choices free agents make. In such a world, God’s knowledge of what will be and what would be would not exhaust what God knows: God would also know what might or might not be. In short, the future, in such a world, would be partly open.

To the best of my knowledge, Molinism never developed this possibility. It was assumed that would-counterfactuals exhausted the category of God’s counterfactual knowledge. By logical necessity, all propositions expressing might-counterfactuals were assumed to be false. With the bulk of the classical traditional, Molinists assumed that omniscience logically entailed exhaustively definite foreknowledge. To this classical assumption they simply added the claim that God has exhaustively definite knowledge of what would come to pass in all other possible worlds.

Our discussion above reveals the arbitrariness of this assumption. Unless might-counterfactuals are self-contradictory, they cannot be false by definition, and thus God’s omniscience cannot by definition consists only of facts and would-counterfactuals. As paradoxical as it sounds, the standard charge that the open view of the future diminishes God’s omniscient is tantamount to saying that God’s omniscience is somehow diminished by virtue of the fact that in this view he knows some might-counterfactuals to be true. But unless it can be shown that might-counterfactuals are by definition false, it cannot be argued that God’s knowledge by definition rules them out. Hence, so far as I can see, we have no reason to conclude that the sovereign God could not create a world in which some might-counterfactuals were true if he wanted to.

The Open View as Neo-Molinism

The contention of open theists is that we have good reasons to believe that God decided to create a world in which some might-counterfactuals were true. If accepted, we arrive at a neo-Molinist perspective that has all the explanatory power of classical Molinism, ascribes to God most of the providential advantages of classical Molinism, but which avoids the four common objections that have plagued classical Molinism.

Before considering how the neo-Molinist view is able to ascribe most of the providential advantages of classical Molinism, let us briefly consider how it avoids the objections to classical Molinism.

First, if we accept that some might-counterfactuals are eternally true, we no longer have the problem of an ungrounded eternal facticity to possible worlds that include libertarian freedom, and there is no longer any problem accounting for libertarian freedom itself. Determinate aspects of any possible world are grounded in God’s will. For any possible world God might create, there may be things that he decides would certainly come to pass if he were to create them, and thus things that shall come to pass in the world God decides to create. Insofar as any possible world includes might-counterfactuals, there simply is no eternal facticity that needs to be accounted for. There are only eternal possibilities of what these agents might or might not do in various situations.

Second, because it allows that propositions expressing might-counterfactuals have a truth-value, the neo-Molinist account has no problem accounting for libertarian freedom. Agents themselves transition possibilities into facts. Hence, insofar as they are free, their actions are brought about by their own free agency. We thus do not have to wrestle with an ungrounded eternal facticity that precedes their own free decision.

Does this entail that would-counterfactuals cannot also be true of creatures who possess libertarian freedom? Not at all. It simply means that would-counterfactuals cannot be the only truth that applies to creatures who possess libertarian freedom. Insofar as would-counterfactuals apply to future free agents, they do so because the actions of these agents flow either from the determinate character God has given them (habitus infusus), in which case they are not morally responsible for them, or from the determinate character they will freely acquire (habitus acquisitas) if they choose to pursue a certain possible course of action, in which case they are responsible for them.

In either case the would-counterfactuals are not ungrounded, as in classical Molinism. Rather, they are indexically referenced to a possible world in which God and/or the agent herself brings them about. From all eternity God knows that, if he chooses to create free agent x, she will have the basic characteristics of a, b and c (habitus infusus). And from all eternity God knows that if agent x freely follows a certain possible life-trajectory, she will become the kind of person who would do x in situation z (habitus acquisitas). In other worlds, the would-counterfactuals for which agent x is morally responsible are contingent upon the might-counterfactuals for which she is morally responsible. Where the would-counterfactuals are true of an agent, the might-counterfactuals are false, and vice versa.

Third, if we accept that the eternal destiny of people is a “might-counterfactual,” we do not have to account for why God creates people whom he knows will end up in hell. God creates beings he knows might put themselves in hell, but their fate is not settled at the moment of their creation. From the neo-Molinist perspective, it is only this “might” that allows for the possibility of a loving, morally responsible choice to accept God’s grace. This also explains why throughout Scripture God is depicted as genuinely hoping for and striving for the salvation of all people, and why he is deeply grieved when certain people refuse to yield to his saving influence.

Finally, if we accept that some might-counterfactuals are true, we can now easily account for those passages of Scripture that either specifically attribute to God or imply that he faces a future partly composed of possibilities, not certainties. In this view, God thinks and speaks of the future in terms of what may or may not happen simply because the future is partly composed of events that may or may not happen. So too, God truly changes his intentions because his intentions were conditioned upon what might or might not come to pass. He tests people “to know” their heart because their character and actions are genuinely unsettled relative to the issue he is testing them on. And he genuinely regrets things, experiences disappointment, frustration or unexpected outcomes because the future was not exhaustively settled an eternity beforehand.

Notes

1. For a more thorough presentation of the openness motif, see G. Boyd, God of the Possible (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2000).
2. While defenders of classical theism explain these depictions as anthropomorphic or phenomenological, the passages themselves read like straightforward narrative. Moreover, it is not at all clear what passages that depict (say) God changing his mind are anthropomorphic depictions of—if in fact God doesn’t change his mind. If there is paradigm that allows us to accept the straightforward meaning of the text, then, all other things being equal, I submit it should be embraced, especially if it can affirm maximal divine control with undermining libertarian freedom. I shall argue that the neo-Molinist model of God and the world allows us to do just this.

[N/A Gone]

Neo-Molinism and the Infinite Intelligence of God


The neo-Molinist model of God’s knowledge and relationship to the world clearly gives God a much greater providential advantage than does the simple foreknowledge model. Instead of simply knowing what shall come to pass, God to a large extent chooses what will come to pass on the basis of his middle knowledge. But does it give God as much of an advantage as the classical Molinist account? If God chooses to create a class of possible worlds, any one of which might come to pass, is he not significantly less in control of the world than if he chooses to create one possible world in which everything that shall come to pass is certain to him ahead of time?

Divine Control and Libertarian Freedom

It is important to first get clear on what kind of control we are talking about in asking this question. Both classical Molinism and neo-Molinism ascribe libertarian freedom to agents. Hence we are not talking about control as “power to exhaustively control free agents.” Rather, the kind of providential control we are talking about is God’s “power to integrate the decisions of agents into his sovereign plan for the world.” We are talking about God’s ability to perfectly anticipate and plan an ideal response for every decision every free agent might ever make. We are, in short, talking about God’s ability to ensure that his objectives for world history will be maximally realized, given that agents possess libertarian freedom.

Classical Molinism clearly ascribes to God this sort of control. Though God knows that there is no feasible (as opposed to merely logical) possible world in which free agents choose exactly as he would wish, he knows and chooses to create that one possible world in which he knows he can most effectively respond to the decisions of agents to achieve his creational objectives. By knowing exactly what agents would choose in every possible circumstance, he decides what agents will choose in the circumstance in which he places them, and thus he can perfectly anticipate how he will respond to their choices as a means of maximally achieving his will.

Can the neo-Molinist model ascribe to God this level of providential control? Because she affirms that God creates a world that includes might-counterfactuals, the neo-Molinist clearly cannot affirm that God knows in every instance what an agent will choose in every possible circumstance. But does this entail that God cannot perfectly anticipate how he will use each agent’s free decisions as a means of maximally achieving his will, as in the classical Molinist account? Does it entail that God “can only guess what much of the future will bring” or that he is a “limited, passive, hand-wringing God” who can do little more than hope for the best? The answer, I submit, is that it does not.

The Infinite Intelligence of God

We must consider the implications of ascribing to God infinite intelligence, something all orthodox Christians assume to be true. Simply put, all orthodox Christians believe there is no limit to God’s intelligence.

Now, we humans are more confident when we only have to prepare for one forthcoming event than we are when we have to prepare for a multitude of possible forthcoming events because we possess finite intelligence. Our intelligence gets spread thin the greater the number of possibilities we must confront. Hence our ability and confidence to respond ideally to a possible future event is lessened in proportion to the number of alternative possibilities we have to consider alongside this event.

If God were limited in this fashion, the neo-Molinist model would certainly provide God with much less providential advantage than the classical Molinist model. Indeed, given the innumerable might-counterfactuals that characterizes our world, we might be inclined to conclude that such a God could indeed “ only guess what much of the future will bring” and that he must be worrisome, “limited... hand-wringing God” who can only hope for the best. But if God is not limited in this fashion, this inference is altogether unfounded.

If God is not limited in intelligence, he doesn’t have to divide up his intelligence between possibilities he is facing the way humans do. If his intelligence is infinite, it doesn’t get “spent” as he considers various possibilities. Indeed, he can attend to each of any number of possibilities as though each one was the only possibility he had to consider. All of his infinite intelligence is fixed on each and every possibility equally. Hence, God can be as perfectly anticipate and be prepared for any possible future event as he is for any certain future event. In other words, for a God of infinite intelligence, there is no distinction that can be made between possibilities and certainties in terms of providential advantage. Any view that denies this thereby concedes that it doesn’t presuppose that God is infinitely intelligent.

In the neo-Molinist model, then, we may say that from all eternity God planned his perfectly wise response to what he knows shall occur as well as to what he knows may occur. And because of his infinite intelligence, his response to the latter is not one iota less perfect than his response to the former. Whatever comes to pass, the neo-Molinist may say with confidence that “from all eternity, God was preparing for just this event,” whether the event was certain to occur or was simply a possibility. Indeed, with classical Molinists, neo-Molinist may conceive of God sovereignly choosing the world he created on the basis of his middle knowledge of creaturely free acts as well as his knowledge of how he could responsively weave these acts into his sovereign plan. The only difference is that the neo-Molinist does not exclude might-counterfactuals from God’s middle knowledge. But he is as perfectly prepared for the might-counterfactuals as he is for the would-counterfactuals as well as the future certainties. For an infinitely intelligent being, there is no difference in terms of preparedness in any of these categories of events.

Clearly, the criticism that God must worry and can only guess at what the future will bring if the future includes might-counterfactuals is predicated on a limited, anthropomorphic view of God.
Classical Molinism, Neo-Molinism, and Maximal Providential Control


God’s Providential Control

It should now be clear why the neo-Molinist model can claim to offer God much greater providential control than does the simple foreknowledge view. Not only does it allow God a greater capacity to choose what comes to pass on the basis of his middle knowledge, it empowers God to perfectly affect what comes to pass as it is unfolding on the basis of his infinite intelligence. But does the neo-Molinist account grant God anything like the level of providential control as the classical Molinist account?

Prima facia, it may seem that it can not. Since in the neo-Molinist model the world God chooses to create is actually a set of possible worlds, God can’t ensure that the world that comes to pass will best suit his providential purposes. Agents may choose courses of action from within the options God gives them in each situation which are non-ideal, not just relative to God’s ideal, but relative to other choices they could have made in the exact same situation. Yes, in neo-Molinism God can respond perfectly to whatever comes to pass. But there will be always be possibilities that agents could have actualized, rather than the ones they did in fact actualize, which would have better suited God’s providential purposes.

It thus seems that a God who knew ahead of time what agents would do in every conceivable situation (any “possible world”) would have a distinct advantage over a God who knew some of the future as a “maybe.” It seems the God of Molinism can select which combination of all conceivable situations to actualize on the basis of how they fit into his providential plan, something that cannot be said for the God of neo-Molinism.

Though the argument may initially sound compelling, I shall offer several considerations that suggest that it is largely misguided.

Would-Counterfactuals and Might-Counterfactuals

It is of course true that in neo- Molinism there will be possibilities that agents could have actualized, rather than the ones they in fact actualized, that would have better suited God’s providential purpose. But this much is true of classical Molinism as well. Both models affirm libertarian freedom. Hence both models affirm that it is the agent and the agent alone who reduces all possible actions down to one in a given conceivable situation with their decision. Both models therefore contend that God must respond to non-ideal decisions in working to bring about the maximal achievement of his will.

Both models therefore further affirm that the world God creates could have, and should have, been better than it is, for agents could have and should have made different decisions. But both models also contend that the world that comes to pass is the best possible, given the non-ideal decisions agents make. God has as much providential control as is logically possible in a world populated with free agents, for he eternally knows as certain, or as though certain, not only all that shall come to pass, but all that would or might have come to pass in different circumstances. And he created this world from among all possible worlds with this knowledge in mind.

The points on which the two models differ do not affect their views on the scope of God’s providential control. The classical Molinist maintains that God’s middle knowledge knows only “would-counterfactuals,” while the neo-Molinist argues that his middle knowledge must also include “might-counterfactuals.” For the neo-Molinist, God’s knowledge of “would-counterfactuals” that were once “might-counterfactuals” is acquired as agents themselves transition “maybes” into facts. But note, because of God’s infinite intelligence, God’s eternal knowledge of “would- counterfactuals” does not increase his providential control over “might-counterfactuals.”

In the neo-Molinist view, God eternally knows and perfectly prepares for all counterfactuals, whether “might-counterfactuals” or “would-counterfactuals,” as though they were certainly going to come to pass. And because God is infinitely intelligence, there is no difference between these two classes of counterfactuals in terms of his ability to perfectly prepare for them. Hence, this difference in the two models does not grant the classical Molinist model greater providential advantage.

Unilaterally Actualizing a Possible World

Still, the classical Molinist maintains that God is able to unilaterally reduce all feasible possible worlds down to one actual world, while the neo-Molinist can only maintain that, insofar as agents possess libertarian freedom, God can only reduce all possible worlds down to a set of possible worlds. Does this not give God greater assurance of maximally achieving his creational objectives in the world? I believe that several further considerations suggest that the answer is no.

First, we must again remember that in both models it is ultimately the agent alone who is responsible for transitioning a set of possible actions to one actual action in a given situation (assuming the agent possesses libertarian freedom in the situation). In both models the actual decision the agent makes may end up being non-ideal compared to other decisions the agent could have, and should have made. And in both models, God is nevertheless in control, for he created this particular world with an eternal view to how he would ideally respond to this decision and incorporate it into his sovereign plan.

The fact that the neo-Molinist holds that it was genuinely possible for the agent to choose differently at the time he made the decision to act as he did, while the Molinist holds that the agent ruled out these possibilities in eternity, before the agent existed, is irrelevant. For both models grant that in this particular situation the agent didn’t choose differently. And this actual decision reveals the fact that in this situation the agent wouldn’t choose differently. The fact that the neo-Molinist maintains that this “wouldn’t” was (perhaps) preceded by a “might” or “might not” doesn’t put God at any providential disadvantage, for as we have seen, there is no distinction for an infinitely intelligent being between “maybes” and “certainties” in terms of his providential control. The neo-Molinist can therefore affirm, just as strongly as the Molinist, that God created this world, as opposed to any other possible world, with an eternal view toward how he would respond to the way (it turns out) an agent would act in a particular situation.

Open Sets and Possible World Sets

But, someone might yet argue, in the Molinist account God chooses to actualize any particular situation with the certainty that an agent would choose as it turns out they do, whereas in neo-Molinism God’s knowledge is only of what the agent might or might not choose in a particular situation. This seems to empower God to select all the best situations, together with the decision agents make in those situations, which God knows he can most effectively integrate into his providential plan. Because he knows some of the future as composed of might-counterfactuals, however, the God of neo-Molinism isn’t empowered in this fashion. Though he restricts possible worlds down to a set of possible worlds, he’s nevertheless stuck with this set. He can’t choose which from among this set to actualize. And this again seems to give classical Molinism a providential advantage.

The problem with this argument is that, in point of fact, Molinism does not empower God to select all the best situations in creating the actual world. The root of this mistake is confusing logically possible worlds with feasible worlds. Logically, God can piece together any logically possible combination of behaviors he chooses. But the class of possible worlds God must consider as he prepares to create the world is the class which contain libertarian free agents who in fact act in particular ways in particular situations. These alone are the feasible possible worlds out of which God can create the actual world.

Hence, God can’t simply piece together a world he wants to actualize by selecting all the best situations and choices agents make in various situations. In classical Molinism, God must rather consider all the counterfactuals that actually characterize a possible world as a whole. The world which includes agent x making a great choice in situation z is also the world in which agent x makes a very poor choice in situation q. Though there is no logical necessity that z and q go together with agent x, in the feasible possible worlds in which agent x exercises libertarian freedom they may. Hence God can’t select z without also selecting q. God must consider the total combination of choices agents make in each feasible possible world as he contemplates which world to actualize. It is this move which gives Molinism a significant advantage over Calvinism in coming to terms with the problem of evil.

It should be clear from the above that we cannot compare Molinism to neo-Molinism on a situation-by-situation basis, as it were. We have to take a total world perspective in comparing the two, and on this score it seems neither view offers a providential advantage over the other. In both models God is “stuck with” working with sets of decisions, some of which are non-ideal relative to other decisions the agent could have and should have made in each particular situation.

The difference between the two models is that classical Molinism holds that God interacted with each feasible set of decisions in eternity, as it were, whereas neo-Molinism holds that God also interacts with a sub-set of possible decisions agents face in each situation as the situation unfolds. The classical Molinist conceives of the feasible world sets being resolved in eternity, and then actualized, while the neo-Molinist goes further and conceives of a sub-class of these feasible sets being resolved in time, as they are actualized. But in both models God is “stuck with” non-ideal sets and, in any given situation, with actualized decisions that are part of these sets that are non-ideal. Yet, since God is as perfectly able to prepare from eternity an ideal response to possible decisions made in time just as perfectly as he is a decision purportedly made in eternity, there is no providential advantage to be had by thinking he does one rather than the other.

Is There a Better Feasible World?

In the end, the disagreement between the two models amounts to a speculative disagreement about whether there existed a better feasible world that could have been actualized had God possessed knowledge of how agents would act in every conceivable situation. The Molinist might argue that, on the open theists’ account, there could be feasible worlds in which the total set of decisions free agents make is better than the ones they end up making in the actual world. At the very least, it seems that if God has to prepare for a variety of possible responses to a set of possible choices, the resources available to him as he prepares this response will be less than if he knew with certainty what exactly free agents will choose in the future. Yes, God’s intelligence is unlimited in the open view, and so he can eternally prepare a response to whatever comes to pass. But he has to do this for a large number of possible responses, and this seems to compromise the effectiveness of his response to any one of them. To be sure, God doesn’t have to spread his intelligence thin, but he does have to spread his resources thin in preparing a possible response. Hence, it seems the set of choices that God must work with in classical Molinism is less detrimental to God’s providential control than the set God must work with in the neo-Molinist account.

At present, I’m inclined to agree with this. This may be the one area where Molinism offers a providential advantage over neo-Molinism. If in fact it were logically possible for God to know what classical Molinism claims God knows, it may be that he would have this providential advantage. This concession would still warrant the conclusion that neo-Molinism ascribes to God far greater providential control than simple foreknowledge. But it would admit that neo-Molinism offers less providential control than the classical Molinist view.

Still, the issue isn’t quite as clear cut as it may first appear, which is why I concede only to being inclined to accepting this conclusion. Two closely related points are relevant.

First, its exceedingly difficult to argue about what non-actualized worlds were and were not feasible, for we have no clear way of distinguishing between merely logically possible worlds and feasible worlds. That is to say, we have no way of discerning whether a possible total set of counterfactuals of creaturely free actions were genuinely feasible, or merely logically possible. Hence, even in the classical Molinist framework, its not self-evident that there existed a feasible world in which God could more effectively utilize resources better than he does in the world on the neo-Molinist account. It is possible that the set of decisions God must work with in this world prevents more optimal lines of preparation. Of course a better set is conceivable. But how can we decide that it’s feasible?

Second, the ambiguity involved in arguing about non-actualized worlds is clearly revealed in the fact that this argument has been turned against classical Molinism. As noted earlier, if any non-actualized world seems feasible and seems better than the one that is instantiated, it is one that rules out people using their free will to beaver dam themselves. This forces the question of why God didn’t refrain from creating people he knew on the basis of his middle knowledge would beaver dam themselves to hell?

The only answer a Molinist can give is that God couldn’t do this without loosing other important values which belong to the total world set in which these individuals are damned. This is a difficult, though not impossible, supposition to accept. But it at least points to the difficulty of arguing against someone’s position on the grounds that their view precludes a better feasible world.

The neo-Molinist has a parallel answer to why God didn’t create a world in which he only had to prepare a response for what was going to come to pass rather than a world that included a set of things that could come to pass. The answer is simply that he couldn’t do so without loosing other important values which belong to this world. Unlike the Molinist response to their challenge, however, the neo-Molinist is able to specify what value would be lost if God were to rule out might-counterfactuals. It is the value of libertarian freedom. And it is precisely this answer which allows the neo-Molinist to avoid the difficulty of explaining why God creates individuals he knows will go to hell.

The classical Molinist of course insists that a feasible world need not include might-counterfactuals in order to include libertarian freedom, but this is just another way of saying that we disagree about what worlds are and are not feasible. To the neo-Molinist, the feasible world they hold over us as an example of the greater providential control their view offers God is simply not feasible.

Hence, while I concede the possibility that a God who possessed would-counterfactual knowledge of all future agent decisions might have a providential advantage over a God who knew their future decisions as might-counterfactuals, there is no way a Molinist can demonstrate this is so, since they already concede that any feasible world confronts God with non-ideal sets of decisions. But, even more fundamentally, the neo-Molinist sees no reason to accept that such a world is genuinely feasible.
Conclusion


We have seen that Molinism and neo-Molinism both share the conviction that God possesses middle knowledge and that this grants God maximal providential control over a world inhabited by agents possessing libertarian freedom. In both models, God has as much control as is logically possible, given his decision to create a world in which agents possess libertarian freedom.

The two views differ in that the neo-Molinist supplements the classical Molinist view that God knows the truth-value of all propositions expressing would-counterfactuals with the supposition that God also knows the truth-value of all might-counterfactuals. Because God is infinitely intelligent, however, his ability to anticipate might-counterfactuals is no less perfect than his ability to anticipate would-counterfactuals. Though this may entail that God cannot as effectively utilize the world’s resources in preparing for a future response, it may nevertheless be concluded that the neo-Molinist can in principle ascribe to God the same level of providential control as the classical Molinist.

Even if the neo-Molinist concedes that Molinism affords God this providential advantage—purchased, according to neo-Molinist, by regarding an impossible world as feasible—it nevertheless stands that the neo-Molinist account affords God far more providential advantage than the simple foreknowledge view. Hence, it should be clear that the caricature of the God of open theism as a “limited, passive, hand wringing God” who can only “guess...what the future may bring” can no more be applied to neo-Molinism than it can to classical Molinism. In both models God is the sovereign creator and governor of this world who, because of his middle knowledge and infinite intelligence, is able to perfectly anticipate all that shall and all that may comes to pass.

From my vantage point, the distinct advantage of neo-Molinism over classical Molinism is that the neo-Molinist can affirm all this while avoiding the philosophical and biblical difficulties that attend to classical Molinism.

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SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT FOR THE OPEN VIEW
If a position is true, every avenue of reflection ought to point in its direction. What follows are two more “pointers” to the view that the future is at least partly open (indefinite, composed of possibilities). I’ll first consider an argument from quantum physics, followed by a pragmatic argument regarding what we ordinarily assume to be true in our actions.

Quantum physics suggests that Einstein was mistaken in his classical-philosophical conclusion that the distinction between the past, present and future is an illusion. Nothing short of an empirically groundless, metaphysically mechanistic assumption kept him, and some other physicists, from affirming that the apparent indeterminacy of reality at a quantum level is in fact real (viz. ontological).

But this means that time is real and thus that the “apparent” distinction between the past as a realm of definite realities and the future as a realm of indefinite probabilities is real. Prior to a “quantum event” (viz. the observed behavior of a quantum particle in an experimental situation) there is only a range (“wave packet”) of possibilities: during the quantum event the wave packet collapses down to one. After “the event” there is one definite outcome which could not have been predicted with certainty ahead of time.

If this is true of reality, it must be true of God’s knowledge of reality as well, for God’s omniscience is by definition exhaustive and perfectly accurate. In this view, the unpredictability of the future and the unchangeability of the past constitute two sides of the same metaphysical coin: they are both necessary facts. Scientist-theologian John Polkinghorne summarizes this well in his book Science and Providence when he notes that considerations of the role of indeterminacy in quantum physics emphasize how different time is from space [and] how seriously we must take its unfolding as a process of genuine becoming. The future is not already formed ahead of us, waiting to reveal itself to our exploration, as the fixed contours of a valley reveal themselves to the traveler who makes his ways through them. The future is in part our creation: its shape is responsive to our molding, as the clay is formed by the sculptor to create his irreducibly new thing, which is his work of art. If even the omnipotent God cannot act to change the past, it does not seem any more conceivable that the omniscient God can know with certainty the unformed future
It could be argued that science is forever changing and thus what seems like a certain conclusion today might be revised by new discoveries tomorrow. True enough. Too much should not be wagered on the vicissitudes of scientific discovery. At the same time, we can’t ignore the findings of science on this account. At the very least, any who would want to continue to hold to the eternal definiteness of the future (in the mind of God) and thus to the non-ontological nature of quantum indeterminacy must now bear the scientific burden of proof.

The contemporary quantum physical paradigm of reality is reinforced by our common experience. Indeed, I would argue that the complementarity of determinacy and indeterminacy is a metaphysical principle, and thus is universally instantiated. Every event seems to exemplify it. From quantum particles to molecular structures and from the behavior of single-celled organisms to the spontaneous movements of insects, birds, mammals, including human beings, we find a dimension of individual indeterminacy within a broader parameter of determinacy. Sociology has taught us, for example, that group behavior is remarkably predictable, though the behavior of any individual within that group is not. So it is with most animal behavior.

This suggests that the indeterminacy we observe in quantum physics is not illusory: it is ontological. As humans, we assume this conclusion in all our behavior. Philosophical or theological determinists may believe that reality is exhaustively predetermined, but they cannot consistently behave according to this conviction. We all must live as if the future (in contrast to the past) is partly indefinite and partly definite. Exhaustive determinism (as well as exhaistive indeterminism) are both unlivable doctrines.

More specifically, every self-determining decision we make assumes that we believe things really hang upon what we do. But every self-determining decision we make also presupposes that many if not most things about tomorrow are fixed. We assume, for example, that the laws of nature shall not change. The earth and sun shall remain roughly the same tomorrow as they were today. The character of people I know shall remain more or less the same tomorrow as it is today, etc.

Thus, if the future was totally fixed, we could not think and act in a self-determining fashion. If the future was totally open, however, we again could not think and act in a self-determining fashion. Yet we do think and act in a self-determining fashion. Hence we evidently assume that the future is in reality partly indefinite and partly definite. And in doing so, I argue, we are simply acting consistently with the truth about everything in so far as we can know it. Determinacy and indeterminacy are complementary principles.

When on top of all this we discover that there are scriptural and philosophical reasons for accepting the indefiniteness of the future as ontological, the case for the open future grows all the stronger.
RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS OF THE OPEN VIEW
While many Christians have found the Open view of the future to be the most helpful and accurate view of God’s foreknowledge of the future based on biblical, philosophical, and experiential evidence, others have criticized the view as unorthodox and even heretical. The following response is based on documents that Dr. Boyd presented to the Baptist General Conference for review.

Even if critics are not persuaded to share our view, we hope that with fair and thoughtful consideration of this response as well as the biblical evidence offered in this site, these opponents may come to permit it just as other views of God’s foreknowledge have come to be permitted (i.e. simple and middle knowledge) within evangelical Christianity

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OUTLINE OF THE OPEN VIEW
Prepared by Dr. Greg Boyd for the Baptist General Conference


I unequivocally affirm that God possesses every divine perfection, including the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience. I believe that God is the sovereign Creator and Lord, leading history toward his desired end, yet granting freedom to his creatures as he wills. He knows and can reveal all that he has determined about the future, thus declaring “the end from the beginning” (Isa. 46:10). I believe that God is perfectly wise and knows all reality exactly as it is.

The issue concerning the “openness of the future” is not about the infallibility or fallibility of God’s foreknowledge, but rather about the nature of the future which God infallibly foreknows. Is it exclusively foreknown and predetermined by God, or does God determine some aspects of the future and sovereignly allow other aspects to remain open?

Many passages of Scripture depict God as foreknowing and/or predetermining certain things about the future. Many passages also suggest that some of the future is open (not determined) and is known by God as such.

Some examples of these Scriptures include:
The Lord frequently changes his mind in the light of changing circumstances, or as a result of prayer (Exod. 32:14; Num. 14:12–20; Deut. 9:13–14, 18–20, 25; 1 Sam. 2:27–36; 2 Kings 20:1–7; 1 Chron. 21:15; Jer. 26:19; Ezek. 20:5–22; Amos 7:1–6; Jonah 1:2; 3:2, 4–10). At other times he explicitly states that he will change his mind if circumstances change (Jer. 18:7–11; 26:2–3; Ezek. 33:13–15). This willingness to change is portrayed as one of God’s attributes of greatness (Joel 2:13–14; Jonah 4:2).
Sometimes God expresses regret and disappointment over how things turned out—sometimes even including the results of his own will. (Gen. 6:5–6; 1 Sam. 15:10, 35; Ezek. 22:29–31).
At other times he tells us that he is surprised at how things turned out because he expected a different outcome (Isa. 5:3–7; Jer. 3:67; 19–20).
In several passages the Lord explicitly states that he did not know that humans would behave the way they did (Jer. 7:31; 19:5; 32:35).
The Lord frequently tests his people to find out whether they’ll remain faithful to him (Gen. 22:12; Exod. 16:4; Deut. 8:2; 13:1–3; Judges 2:20–3:5; 2 Chron. 32:31).
The Lord sometimes asks non-rhetorical questions about the future (Num. 14:11; Hos. 8:5) and speaks to people in terms of what may or may not happen (Exod. 3:18–4:9; 13:17; Jer. 38:17–18, 20–21, 23; Ezek. 12:1–3).
 
Classical theologians often consider only the passages that demonstrate that the future is settled either in God’s mind (foreknowledge) or in God’s will (predestination) as revealing the whole truth about God’s knowledge of the future. They interpret passages (such as the above) which suggest that God faces a partly open future as merely figurative. I do not see this approach as warranted on either exegetical or theological grounds. I am therefore compelled to take both sets of passages literally and thus draw the conclusion that the future which God faces is partly open and partly settled.
BRIEF RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS
 
Prepared by Dr. Greg Boyd for the Baptist General Conference
 
 
Objection 1. The Open view undermines God’s omniscience |
Dr. Boyd’s Response: I affirm (because Scripture teaches) that God is absolutely all knowing. There is no difference in my understanding of God’s omniscience and that of any other orthodox theologian, but I hold that part of the reality which God perfectly knows consists of possibilities as well as actualities. The difference lies in our understanding of the nature of the future, not in our understanding of God’s omniscience.

2. The open view undermines God’s Omnipotence | I affirm (because Scripture teaches) that God is omnipotent. He is Creator of all things and thus all power comes from him. As with all Arminians, I also hold that God limits the exercise of his own power by giving free will to those whom he has created in his own image.

3. The open view undermines out confidence in God’s ability to accomplish his purposes | I affirm (because Scripture teaches) that God can and has guaranteed whatever he wants about the future, since he is omnipotent. I also affirm (because Scripture also teaches) that God created us with the capacity to love, and thus empowered us to decide some matters for ourselves. Within the parameters set by the Creator, parameters which guarantee whatever God wants to guarantee about the future, humans have some degree of self-determination. This means that concerning the fate of particular individuals things may not turn out as God desires. If we deny this, we must accept that God actually desires some people to go to hell. Scripture denies this (1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9).

4. The open view undermines God’s perfection | I affirm (because Scripture teaches) the absolute perfection of God. I do not see, however, that Scripture teaches that the future must be predetermined either in God’s mind or in God’s will for God to be perfect. Rather, I believe that God’s perfection is more exalted when we understand him to be so transcendent in his power that he genuinely gives free will to morally responsible agents.

5. The open view undermines the power of prayer | I affirm (because Scripture teaches) that petitionary prayer is our most powerful tool in bringing about the Father’s will “on earth as it is in heaven.” Indeed, because my view allows for the future to be somewhat open, I believe it makes the best sense out of the urgency and efficaciousness which Scripture attaches to prayer.

6. The open view cannot account for biblical prophecy | I affirm (because Scripture teaches) that God can and does determine and predict the future whenever it suits his sovereign purposes to do so. But I deny that this logically entails, or that Scripture teaches, that the future is exhaustively determined. God is wise enough to be able to achieve his purposes while allowing his creatures a significant degree of freedom.

7. The open view is incoherent | Some argue that it is logically impossible for God to guarantee aspects of the future without controlling everything about the future. This objection has been raised by Calvinists against Arminians for centuries and is no more forceful against the Open view than it is against classical Arminians. Everything in life, from our personal experience down to the quantum particles, points to the truth that predictable stability does not rule out an element of unpredictably.

8. The Scripture used to support the open view may be interpreted as phenomenological anthropomorphisms | This asserts that these passages are a human way of speaking about things as they seem to be, not as they really are. However, nothing in the context of these Scriptures, covering a variety of audiences, authors, and contexts, suggests they are. There is no justification for reading into these descriptions of God’s actions anything other than their most natural explanation. How can reports about what God was thinking be phenomenological (Jer. 3:6–7; 19–20; Exod. 13:17)? And of what would they be regarded as anthropomorphic?

9. The open view demeans God’s sovereignty | On the contrary, it exalts God’s sovereignty. After describing impending judgment, the prophet Joel states, “‘Yet even now,’ says the Lord, ‘return to me with all your heart, with fasting, with weeping, and mourning: and rend your hearts and not your garment.’ Return to the Lord, your God, for he is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, abounding in steadfast love, and repents of evil. Who knows whether he will not turn and repent, and leave a blessing behind him...” (Joel 2:12–14).
Answers to COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE OPEN VIEW

Answers to COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE OPEN VIEW
Doesn’t the open view demean God’s sovereignty?


Many have come to agree that the Open view of God is actually more sovereign than the view our critics hold—a God whose sovereignty is not threatened by empowering his creatures with self-determining freedom. While this freedom gives creatures the capacity to love, it also gives them the capacity to sin, thus making redemption the heart of God’s unfolding plan as revealed in Scripture.

The Open view demeans God’s sovereignty only if “sovereignty” is equated with “meticulous control.” Defenders of the open view of the future believe that the biblical portrayal of God’s sovereignty consists of much more than mere control and includes dynamic qualities such as flexibility, spontaneity and creativity. These aspects of God’s sovereignty are meaningless if the future is exhaustively settled.

The God of Open theism is free to determine some aspects of the future according to his will and to anticipate and address his creatures’ choices within the parameters he has established for them, to cultivate real, meaningful and transforming relationships with them, to respond to their fervent and effectual prayers, and even to empty himself and become one of them in the person of Jesus Christ so that they could be reconciled to him. God’s sovereignty is not threatened by these things—rather, it is amplified all the more.
 
Isn’t it true that God doesn’t know the future in the open view?


This is perhaps the most common misconception about the Open view. Open theists and Classical theists disagree about the nature of the future, not about God’s exhaustive foreknowledge of it. While Classical theists believe that the future consists entirely of settled realities, Open theists believe that the future is partly settled and partly open to possibilities, and thus that God perfectly foreknows it as such.

Critics who accuse Open theists of denying God’s foreknowledge of the future (or of demeaning God’s sovereignty) are sadly misrepresenting the view rather than acknowledging the common ground both views share. In addition to God’s foreknowledge of the future and God’s absolute sovereignty, the common ground these views share includes the incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ; the authority of Scripture; and the doctrine of the Trinity; among many other core Christian beliefs
Isn’t the open view outside historic orthodoxy?


Advocates of the Open view are found throughout Church history. According to some African American church leaders, it has been the predominant view in the African American Christian tradition (e.g. in The Color of God: The Concept of God in Afro-American Thought [Mercer Press, 1987], Major Jones argues that the African Christian experience of oppression has enabled them to seize a dimension of the biblical portrait of God which the classical western tradition missed because of its overemphasis on control and its indebtedness to platonic philosophy).

More research needs to be done on the history of the Open view, but our research thus far has found advocates as far back as the fourth century (e.g. Calsidius). This view has also been articulated by a number of noted 19th century western church leaders such as G. T. Fechner, Otto Pfeiderer, Jules Lequier, as well as the great Bible commentator Adam Clarke, the popular Methodist circuit preacher Billy Hubbard, and the renowned Methodist professor and chancellor of Ohio Weslyean University, L. D. McCabe. We hope to include some examples on this site in the near future.

While it is true that the classical view of God’s foreknowledge has historically been the predominant view of the western church, as protestants, our criteria for testing theological truth has always been Scripture, not tradition. The reformers and our pietist forefathers and foremothers were also accused of wrongly breaking tradition. We now agree they were right. The Open view must be tested by Scripture, just like any other theological system.
How can people who believe the open view trust a God who doesn’t control the future and doesn’t know for sure what will happen?


It’s true that according to the Open view things can happen in our lives which God didn’t plan or even foreknow with certainty (though he always foreknew they were possible). In this view, trusting in God provides no assurance that everything that happens to us will reflect his divine purposes, for there are other agents who also have power to affect us, just as we have power to affect others. This is admittedly a scary thought. But several considerations will put this fear in perspective.

First, how is the scariness of a view relevant to whether or not it is true? There is no reason to conclude that something is true to the extent that it conforms to our wishes. Indeed, in this case the fact that the Open view doesn’t conform to what we might wish were true actually provides one more reason for thinking that it is true, for as a matter of fact reality rarely conforms to our wishes. If we are honest, our core belief about the world—manifested not by what we say but by what we do—is that this world is sometimes a scary place. Whatever view of God people might embrace they still lock their doors at night.

Second, I do not see how affirming an all-controlling God provides any real comfort in the face of the frightening aspects of the world. Suppose there has been a string of assaults in your neighborhood. You are understandably concerned about your safety and the safety of your children. How does believing that every aggravated assault was ordained by God help you cope with this fear? It would still be a good idea to buy a padlock for your door and bars for your windows. You still know at the core of your being that the world is just as scary with your belief as without it. So what advantage is your belief?

I submit that your belief actually makes the world a scarier place, for two reasons. First, if God controls criminals and these criminals victimize godly and ungodly people alike, then it just might be that God has decided to have one of these criminals victimize you and your family. And if God has ordained their brutality toward you, there is nothing you can do about it. Secondly, if God is the sort of God who is capable of ordaining such evils, then what is the basis of your trust in God?

If God doesn’t control all things, however, then there is something you can do about it. As a morally responsible free person you can make choices which maximize your safety and minimize your vulnerability against other people who choose to do evil. The world is perhaps still scary, but less so than if the Creator himself had the kind of character which made him willing to ordain aggravated assaults and the power to ensure that what he ordains will certainly be accomplished.

Finally, and most importantly, in the face of a scary world, the Open view offers the same comfort the Bible offers. The Open view affirms that God’s character is unambiguously loving and thus he doesn’t ordain evil. The Open view affirms that regardless of what happens to you, your eternal relationship with the Lord is secure (Rom. 8:31–39). The Open view affirms that Christ will provide peace that passes understanding no matter what your circumstances may be. The Open view affirms that whatever happens God will work with you to bring a redemptive purpose out of the event (Rom. 8:28). And, precisely because the Open view holds that the future is in part not settled, it can affirm that God can foresee future possibilities that are evil and do something about them.

[argent_paladin]

My first question is why is it called trinitarian warfare theodicy when it doesn't seem to have much to do with the trinity or warfare? Where does the name come from?

[Laudate_Dominum]

Sorry, after I posted something caught my eye and I must respond briefly.
[quote name='Revprodeji' date='Dec 2 2005, 01:47 AM']rkwright,

1-Good answer on this one myles...but also, Christ could fullfill the role of salvation, but I doubt that is the reason entirely why he was begotten. Remember, God is love, and love needs someone else. So within the trinity God needed more than 1 essence to properly have love. 
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If there are three essences in "God" there are in fact three gods, not one true God. The dogmatic concept of homoousious clarifies this point. Not only is this perspective dogmatically decreed, but it is the clear Biblical point of view as well. For example, the prologue to John's Gospel, when examined closely in the Greek, makes no sense unless one supposes homoousious. Namely, three hypostases/persons which are of one Essence. There are other examples, but I would say John 1 is the clearest refutation of Arianism and Sabellianism in the Bible.

Or maybe I'm understanding you incorrectly and you're suggesting that the creation of contingent essences is necessary for God to be God?

[quote name='Revprodeji' date='Dec 2 2005, 01:47 AM']2- Knowing all the possibilities perfectly allows God to prepare for all possibiliites perfectly.
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This articulation strikes me as anthropomorphic because the verb, "to prepare", is a temporal category. How is one to understand this statement analogically? I see this as another symptom of the diastematization intrinsic to this way of thinking.

[Laudate_Dominum]

Its funny how open theism so often reminds me of medieval Islamic philosophy. I guess I actually have this experience with a lot of protestant theology.

[Laudate_Dominum]

[quote name='argent_paladin' date='Dec 2 2005, 01:55 AM']My first question is why is it called trinitarian warfare theodicy when it doesn't seem to have much to do with the trinity or warfare? Where does the name come from?
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I wonder that too. The term theodicy leads me to speculate that perhaps the theory was born of an attempt to solve the problem of evil. Perhaps the problem was framed in the context of war? Or perhaps reality was described as a kind of warfare? And maybe the attempt was based on an appeal to a trinitarian perspective.

I'm totally speculating, but I'd be interested to learn the facts as well.

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myles...I like pickles, but they dont crow.. silly brits


[quote name='Laudate_Dominum' date='Dec 2 2005, 02:49 AM'][quote]I must first say that I don't fancy myself an expert on open theism. Yet, my limited exposure to it has left me with a bitter taste in my mouth. It goes against all of the theological sensibilities; it is, in other words, repulsive to me.[/quote]

honestly friend, this is a huge debate in the evangelical community because it smacks calvin in the face. the problem is the calvinists produce more useless sinful literature than Hefner. So the average theologian has bad info on this debate. Like Ive joked with, it is like someone using jack chick as a source for marian dogmas

[quote]That said, I must further say that I am appreciative of this opportunity to actually discuss it with a real live person, instead of just reading about it and forming judgments. Perhaps your defense on this thread will soften me up a bit. [/quote]

I am appreciative of posters like myles and others who are working thru this and now jumpin on a soapbox and throwing old quotes at me, forcing me to use the bishop card on them. Which, made me leave their site.

btw, if anyone wants to AIM me or email, or pm, im always up for it. Intellegent catholic fellowship was the main appeal to joining this site.

[quote]I can't at this moment give a complete account of the many problems I have with open theism, but I will at least mention what is perhaps my main point of contention.[/quote]

dang, you really dont like me, um..it, um me..um, it..yea

[quote]It seems quite clear that open theism is an attempt to make God diastemic. I see it as in many ways connected with certain developments in modern philosophy. Basically, to my mind, the transcendence of God is threatened and open theism strikes me as yet another idol of philosophy.[/quote]

As fluff(joeyo) can tell you, im not the best on philosophy terms, Im a theologian, an ecumenical theologian at that. So, im gonna look into this and perhaps even contact Boyd on it. cause my desire is to explain this, and I dont understand what you mean...but on the bright side..you made me go "ooohhhh" like christimas lights cause dictionary.com didnt know the word

[quote]When I have more time I shall read this thread entirely and attempt to contribute more thoroughly and constructively. This should at least give a taste of where I will be coming from.[/quote]

well, i just posted a 411 novel, so that should give u a taste sir.

God bless you.
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