Apotheoun Posted May 12, 2006 Posted May 12, 2006 [quote name='Revprodeji' post='979038' date='May 11 2006, 09:00 PM'] Hey, could it be ok if I understand the word ekporeusis as procession? Is that ok? [/quote] The word [i]ekporeusis[/i] is used in connection with the Holy Spirit's hypostatic procession from the Father alone, i.e., it concerns the Spirit's procession of origin; while the word [i]proeinai[/i] concerns the Spirit's manifestation from the Father through the Son, not as person ([i]hypostasis[/i]), but as energy (i.e., as grace).
Laudate_Dominum Posted May 12, 2006 Posted May 12, 2006 In an attempt to avoid being polemical, I'm just going to ask you questions: Am I correct in assuming that your view is that the eastern and western understandings can coexist despite the tension between the two and they're both valid expressions of the faith within their respective theological traditions? And further, are you of the view that a reconciliation of these two perspectives is unnecesary or even misguided? I'm curious because for whatever reason this is my suspicion. If I'm correct, what do you make of people such as Bishop Ware, Yves Congar, Avery Dulles, etc.. who believe that the issue is ultimately semantic and that a formulation is conceivable which would be acceptable to east and west? Just curious.
Laudate_Dominum Posted May 12, 2006 Posted May 12, 2006 And I recall you once saying that you consider the filioque to be a theologoumenon of the latins. And I know that there have been many gestures since Vatican II by Rome which almost suggest that she is backing away from the filioque. But prior to the council, and for nearly a thousand years, the filioque has been considered de fide by the latins. And also, if the filioque can be given the old theologoumenon write off, I don't see why the same could not be done for the ousia/energeiai construct which is popular in much of Orthodox theology. And the proposed solution that you put forth regarding the manifestation of the Spirit through the Son in the Uncreated Divine Energies also strikes me as a theologoumenon. Can you substantiate this theological idea as being an explicit part of Orthodox theology prior to the 13th century? Or is it possibly a theologoumenon of the east? And I know there are things in Orthodox Liturgy that could be invoked to establish a dogmatic status for this distinction, but could not the same be said about the Filioque? And also perhaps conciliar decrees such as Constantinople IV (I believe) in reference to Christ having two wills and two "energies", but the same sort of things can be done with the filique even apart from invoking Florence. I mean, are you sure that this is considered to be a definitive doctrine of the Apostolic Faith in the East? I ask because I've read things by Orthodox theologians which at least implicitly reject such a notion. For example, I recall reading a polemic against the filioque which concluded that the only way the Spirit can be said to be manifest through Christ is the oikomia of the Church, and even this was put forward as though merely speculative. I'm sort of playing devil's advocate, but I am curious to know how you might debunk the assertion that the ousia/energeiai doctrine is an eastern theologoumenon given an undue status by the likes of men such as St. Gregory Palamas, Vladimir Lossky, etc.. Many thanks.
Laudate_Dominum Posted May 12, 2006 Posted May 12, 2006 Oh, and for the record I interpret the filioque in a fashion more akin to the ekporeusis/proeinai qualification you outlined above but perhaps for different reasons. I think that understanding the filioque as a description of God's inner dynamic, or sort of the "what" and "how" of God's Trinitarian life in se is false simply because subject matter of that sort is outside the scope of human thought and mental representation. The epistemological limits of human thought, and the limits of man's created personhood make such inquiry an absurdity. One might respond by pointing out that this doctrine is revelation, not something that we can get at by reason alone, but this misses the point. A revealed truth of the Faith is a noetic positive in relation to God's activities and manifestations, but a negative (apophatikos), or antinomy (antinomos) in relation to the nexus of Divine activity. Thus descriptions of intra-Trinitarian life, and attempts to formally describe the nature of Divine hypostatic procession are at best vague shadows and at worst falsehoods.
Apotheoun Posted May 12, 2006 Posted May 12, 2006 First it should be noted that the word [i]homoousios[/i] itself, which was used by the First Council of Nicea to describe the relationship that exists between the Father and the Son, is a term which indicates a relation of dependence; in other words, the term [i]homoousios[/i] involves a recognition that the Son receives His hypostatic existence from the Father and is dependent upon the Father for His co-essential nature. St. Athanasios understood this and used this idea, along with the distinction between essence and will (the will being a natural energy of a [i]hypostasis[/i]), in order to refute the heresy of Arius. In [i]Ad Serapionem[/i] St. Athanasios speaks of the energy of the Trinity, and refers to the Spirit in relation to creation as the [i]energeia[/i] of the Son. His understanding of the divine energy is that it comes from the Father, through the Son, and rests upon creation in the power of the Spirit. Thus, St. Athanasios makes a distinction between things natural to the Father (e.g., the generation of the Son, and the spiration of the Spirit), and things which are a result of the divine will and energy, i.e., the created order. In addition, if you read the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers (e.g., St. Basil's [i]Adversus Eunomium[/i], and his [i]Letters[/i] 234, 235, etc., and his treatise [i]On the Holy Spirit[/i]; St. Gregory of Nyssa's [i]Contra Eunomium[/i], his treatise [i]On Not Three Gods to Ablabius[/i]; and St. Gregory Nazienzen's [i]Orations[/i], etc.), you will see that they never speak of a "procession" from the Son; moreover, they explicitly deny causality to the Son within the inner life of the Trinity, holding instead that the Father is the sole principle (Greek: [i]monarche[/i]) of origin for the Son and the Spirit. I would add to this the fact that the distinction between essence and energy is fundamental to understanding the Cappadocian arguments against Eunomius, and if one fails to make this distinction, the result is an inexorable tendency to Eunomian essentialism. In addition to the Cappadocian Fathers, St. Maximos and St. John Damascene make the distinction between essence and energy, and both of them also deny any causal power to the Son within the Trinity. Now of course, following in line with the teaching of St. Maximos the Confessor and the Cappadocian Fathers, the Sixth Ecumenical Council of Constantinople III taught that there is a distinction between essence, energy, and hypostasis, because -- as the council decreed -- in Christ there are two natures, two natural wills and energies, and to say otherwise is to fall into the heresies of Monophysitism and Monothelitism. Thus, to fail to make this distinction leads to problems in both Triadology and Christology. Thus in conclusion, I do hold that this distinction is a dogma, and it is a dogma of the first millennium, and not simply of the second millennium. Moreover, in response to your comment that for one thousand years the West has recited the creed with the [i]filioque[/i], I would simply point out that for more than one thousand six hundred years the East has not recited it that way, and that the [i]filioque[/i] is not to be found in the original version of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, which the Holy See itself has declared to be normative and irrevocable for the whole Church. So the fact that a Pope, after more than four hundred years of papal resistance to the pressure to add the [i]filioque[/i] to the creed, finally gave in to the pressure of the German Emperor Henry II to add it, does not make it normative for the whole Church; in fact, as I have already pointed out, the Vatican itself (in the mid 1990s) has indicated that it is not normative, and this decision is even reflected in the document [i][url="http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000806_dominus-iesus_en.html"]Dominus Iesus[/url][/i], which was issued without the [i]filioque[/i] by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith back in August of 2000.
OLAM Dad Posted May 12, 2006 Posted May 12, 2006 This thread has gone far afield of the original post and question. But it's a cool discussion, nonetheless. The eastern church is in many ways similar to the SSPX, only an older version. Like the SSPX they are unwilling to accept the teaching of the Vicar of Christ and are therefore in schism. Catholics can receive the Eucharist in eastern churches under the same rules that you can receive in an SSPX chapel. If no Catholic church is available you can attend one of these alternatives. You're correct. It is very sad.
Era Might Posted May 12, 2006 Posted May 12, 2006 There are two important distinctions between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the SSPX. 1. The Eastern Orthodox Churches are truly and properly distinct "Churches". There is no pretended obedience to the Roman Pontiff, whereas the SSPX does not consider itself a "Church", but a "Society". It professes allegiance to the Roman Pontiff, although there is no actual obedience (hence the schism). This is an important point, because the Orthodox, as non-Catholic Christians, are not bound to Canon Law, whereas those who associate with the SSPX are. The East-West divide is no longer truly a "schism" in the sense that it was originally. Schism implies willful and obstinate disobedience on the part of a Catholic, but the Orthodox have not been Catholic for over a millenia. The SSPX Bishops, the society itself, and all who formally adhere to the Society's disobedience, however, still consider themselves Catholic, and are in the first generation of a true schism. Catholic/Orthodox relations fall under the realm of ecumenism. Catholic/SSPX relations fall under the realm of Canon Law and internal obedience. 2. The Church discourages the faithful from association with the SSPX and its Liturgies, for the reasons mentioned above. On the other hand, she strongly encourages fraternal association with the Eastern Orthodox Churches. Their Liturgical life is not considered illicit or disobedient (because they are not properly "Catholic"), and so there is no stigma attached.
Myles Domini Posted May 12, 2006 Posted May 12, 2006 [quote name='Apotheoun' post='979207' date='May 12 2006, 05:16 PM'] First it should be noted that the word [i]homoousios[/i] itself, which was used by the First Council of Nicea to describe the relationship that exists between the Father and the Son, is a term which indicates a relation of dependence; in other words, the term [i]homoousios[/i] involves a recognition that the Son receives His hypostatic existence from the Father and is dependent upon the Father for His co-essential nature. St. Athanasios understood this and used this idea, along with the distinction between essence and will (the will being a natural energy of a [i]hypostasis[/i]), in order to refute the heresy of Arius. In [i]Ad Serapionem[/i] St. Athanasios speaks of the energy of the Trinity, and refers to the Spirit in relation to creation as the [i]energeia[/i] of the Son. His understanding of the divine energy is that it comes from the Father, through the Son, and rests upon creation in the power of the Spirit. Thus, St. Athanasios makes a distinction between things natural to the Father (e.g., the generation of the Son, and the spiration of the Spirit), and things which are a result of the divine will and energy, i.e., the created order. In addition, if you read the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers (e.g., St. Basil's [i]Adversus Eunomium[/i], and his [i]Letters[/i] 234, 235, etc., and his treatise [i]On the Holy Spirit[/i]; St. Gregory of Nyssa's [i]Contra Eunomium[/i], his treatise [i]On Not Three Gods to Ablabius[/i]; and St. Gregory Nazienzen's [i]Orations[/i], etc.), you will see that they never speak of a "procession" from the Son; moreover, they explicitly deny causality to the Son within the inner life of the Trinity, holding instead that the Father is the sole principle (Greek: [i]monarche[/i]) of origin for the Son and the Spirit. I would add to this the fact that the distinction between essence and energy is fundamental to understanding the Cappadocian arguments against Eunomius, and if one fails to make this distinction, the result is an inexorable tendency to Eunomian essentialism. In addition to the Cappadocian Fathers, St. Maximos and St. John Damascene make the distinction between essence and energy, and both of them also deny any causal power to the Son within the Trinity. Now of course, following in line with the teaching of St. Maximos the Confessor and the Cappadocian Fathers, the Sixth Ecumenical Council of Constantinople III taught that there is a distinction between essence, energy, and hypostasis, because -- as the council decreed -- in Christ there are two natures, two natural wills and energies, and to say otherwise is to fall into the heresies of Monophysitism and Monothelitism. Thus, to fail to make this distinction leads to problems in both Triadology and Christology. Thus in conclusion, I do hold that this distinction is a dogma, and it is a dogma of the first millennium, and not simply of the second millennium. Moreover, in response to your comment that for one thousand years the West has recited the creed with the [i]filioque[/i], I would simply point out that for more than one thousand six hundred years the East has not recited it that way, and that the [i]filioque[/i] is not to be found in the original version of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, which the Holy See itself has declared to be normative and irrevocable for the whole Church. So the fact that a Pope, after more than four hundred years of papal resistance to the pressure to add the [i]filioque[/i] to the creed, finally gave in to the pressure of the German Emperor Henry II to add it, does not make it normative for the whole Church; in fact, as I have already pointed out, the Vatican itself (in the mid 1990s) has indicated that it is not normative, and this decision is even reflected in the document [i][url="http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000806_dominus-iesus_en.html"]Dominus Iesus[/url][/i], which was issued without the [i]filioque[/i] by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith back in August of 2000. [/quote] Hey ya Todd can you please outline the Triadological and Christological problems that a failure to make the essence/energies distinction entails? Thanks -M-
Apotheoun Posted May 12, 2006 Posted May 12, 2006 [quote name='Myles Domini' post='979269' date='May 12 2006, 10:41 AM'] Hey ya Todd can you please outline the Triadological and Christological problems that a failure to make the essence/energies distinction entails? Thanks -M- [/quote] The following Triadological and Christological (and even Soteriological) problems arise from the failure to make the necessary distinctions between essence ([i]ousia[/i]), energy ([i]energeia[/i]), and [i]hypostasis[/i]: (1) The failure to make a distinction between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] in the Trinity leads to Sabellian modalism, because if the divine [i]hypostaseis[/i] are identified with the divine essence ([i]ousia[/i]), one necessarily confounds the persons of the Trinity. In other words, if the [i]hypostasis[/i] of the Father is the divine essence ([i]ousia[/i]), it follows that the divine essence ([i]ousia[/i]) is the hypostatic characteristic of "paternity," now since the Son also possesses the divine essence ([i]ousia[/i]), which -- because of a failure to distinguish between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] -- is identical with the hypostatic property of paternity, it follows that the Son possesses paternity, and, as a consequence, He is the Father. The same holds with each of the [i]hypostaseis[/i] in the Trinity, because if the divine essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and Sonship are identical, it follows that the Father, who possesses the divine essence ([i]ousia[/i]), is also the Son, etc. (2) The failure to make a distinction between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and energy ([i]energeia[/i]) in Triadology -- depending upon the particular case -- leads to Arianism or Eunomianism, because there is no distinction between the generation of the Son, which is natural to the Father, and the creation of the world, which is an act of the divine will and energy ([i]energeia[/i]). Arius held that the divine energy (and in particular the divine will) is identical with the divine essence, and in doing this, he concluded that the Son is a product of the Father's will, and as such the Logos (Son) is a creature and cannot be very God of very God. Now, in order to avoid this error, St. Athanasios made a distinction between the divine energy ([i]energeia[/i]) and power ([i]dynamis[/i]) -- including the divine will -- and the divine essence ([i]ousia[/i]) or nature ([i]physis[/i]). That being said, in St. Athanasios' theology the Son is generated by the Father, and generation (and procession as well) is a hypostatic act natural to the Father, which cannot be reduced to an act of the divine will, and as a consequence of this, the Son is [i]homoousios[/i] with the Father, i.e., the Son is not a creature. The Cappadocian Fathers -- building upon the theology of St. Athanasios -- made this same distinction in order to refute the heresy of Eunomius, who taught that the Son was a product of the divine energy ([i]energeia[/i]) of the Father, and because He was "willed" by the Father into existence, the Son was a created being. Responding to this heresy, the Cappadocians -- like St. Athanasios before them -- taught that the Son was generated by the Father, and not created through an act of the divine will and energy ([i]energeia[/i]), and so, for the Cappadocians, the Son is fully divine and [i]homoousios[/i] with the Father. These same doctrinal distinctions were applied by the Cappadocian Fathers to the Holy Spirit, who derives His hypostatic origin from the [i]hypostasis[/i] of the Father, and not through the divine will and energy ([i]energeia[/i]), but by an act natural to the Father. Thus, the Spirit is not a creature, but is fully divine and uncreated. The distinction between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and energy ([i]energeia[/i]) also helps the Cappadocian Fathers to avoid the heresy of pantheism, because the world is a product of the divine will and energy ([i]energeia[/i]), and not of the divine essence (or nature), which means that it is created, i.e., it comes into being out of nothing through an act of the will of God. Now, to fail to make this distinction leads to difficulties in distinguishing the hypostatic origin of the Son and the Spirit, from the creation of the world. (3) The failure to make a distinction between [i]hypostatis[/i] and the enhypostatic energies causes confusion in connection with the gifts of the Spirit given through the sacraments. First it needs to be noted that two [i]hypostaseis[/i] can never be one subsistence, and so there cannot be a "blending" of the created [i]hypostasis[/i] of man with the uncreated [i]hypostasis[/i] of the Holy Spirit. Second, one [i]hypostasis[/i] cannot participate in another [i]hypostasis[/i], because to be a [i]hypostasis[/i] involves -- of its very nature -- distinct subsistence. Thus, salvation involves man's participation in the enhypostatic energies of the Trinity, and not in the divine essence ([i]ousia[/i]) itself (which would involve the heresy of pantheism) nor in the [i]hypostasis[/i] of any one of the three divine [i]hypostaseis[/i]. (4) Only the Son and Spirit can be [i]homoousios[/i] with the Father, and to hold any other position on this matter by its very nature involves the heresy of pantheism. Man, even after he has been deified by grace, remains [i]heteroousios[/i] in relation to the Trinity, and nothing can change that, because -- as St. Gregory of Nyssa pointed out -- there is an essential gap between the uncreated and the created, and so salvation does not involve an essential or a hypostatic change in man; instead, it involves a real participation in the uncreated divine energies. The divine energies unidirectionally transgress the [i]adiastemic[/i] boundary between created and uncreated essence, giving man a real participation in God's uncreated life and glory, but not in the divine essence ([i]ousia[/i]) itself, which always remains transcendent. As St. Basil said in reference to man's ability to know and participate in the divine, "The operations [energeiai] are various, and the essence [ousia] simple, but we say that we know our God from His operations [energeiai], but do not undertake to approach near to His essence [ousia]. His operations [energeiai] come down to us, but His essence [ousia] remains beyond our reach." [St. Basil, [i]Letter 234[/i], no. 1] I have to give a lecture on the sacraments to my students in about an hour, so I will have to continue this post at a later date. Steven Todd Kaster, Th.M.
Laudate_Dominum Posted May 12, 2006 Posted May 12, 2006 [quote name='Apotheoun' post='979207' date='May 12 2006, 10:16 AM'] First it should be noted that the word [i]homoousios[/i] itself, which was used by the First Council of Nicea to describe the relationship that exists between the Father and the Son, is a term which indicates a relation of dependence; in other words, the term [i]homoousios[/i] involves a recognition that the Son receives His hypostatic existence from the Father and is dependent upon the Father for His co-essential nature. St. Athanasios understood this and used this idea, along with the distinction between essence and will (the will being a natural energy of a [i]hypostasis[/i]), in order to refute the heresy of Arius. In [i]Ad Serapionem[/i] St. Athanasios speaks of the energy of the Trinity, and refers to the Spirit in relation to creation as the [i]energeia[/i] of the Son. His understanding of the divine energy is that it comes from the Father, through the Son, and rests upon creation in the power of the Spirit. Thus, St. Athanasios makes a distinction between things natural to the Father (e.g., the generation of the Son, and the spiration of the Spirit), and things which are a result of the divine will and energy, i.e., the created order. In addition, if you read the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers (e.g., St. Basil's [i]Adversus Eunomium[/i], and his [i]Letters[/i] 234, 235, etc., and his treatise [i]On the Holy Spirit[/i]; St. Gregory of Nyssa's [i]Contra Eunomium[/i], his treatise [i]On Not Three Gods to Ablabius[/i]; and St. Gregory Nazienzen's [i]Orations[/i], etc.), you will see that they never speak of a "procession" from the Son; moreover, they explicitly deny causality to the Son within the inner life of the Trinity, holding instead that the Father is the sole principle (Greek: [i]monarche[/i]) of origin for the Son and the Spirit. I would add to this the fact that the distinction between essence and energy is fundamental to understanding the Cappadocian arguments against Eunomius, and if one fails to make this distinction, the result is an inexorable tendency to Eunomian essentialism. In addition to the Cappadocian Fathers, St. Maximos and St. John Damascene make the distinction between essence and energy, and both of them also deny any causal power to the Son within the Trinity. Now of course, following in line with the teaching of St. Maximos the Confessor and the Cappadocian Fathers, the Sixth Ecumenical Council of Constantinople III taught that there is a distinction between essence, energy, and hypostasis, because -- as the council decreed -- in Christ there are two natures, two natural wills and energies, and to say otherwise is to fall into the heresies of Monophysitism and Monothelitism. Thus, to fail to make this distinction leads to problems in both Triadology and Christology. Thus in conclusion, I do hold that this distinction is a dogma, and it is a dogma of the first millennium, and not simply of the second millennium. Moreover, in response to your comment that for one thousand years the West has recited the creed with the [i]filioque[/i], I would simply point out that for more than one thousand six hundred years the East has not recited it that way, and that the [i]filioque[/i] is not to be found in the original version of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, which the Holy See itself has declared to be normative and irrevocable for the whole Church. So the fact that a Pope, after more than four hundred years of papal resistance to the pressure to add the [i]filioque[/i] to the creed, finally gave in to the pressure of the German Emperor Henry II to add it, does not make it normative for the whole Church; in fact, as I have already pointed out, the Vatican itself (in the mid 1990s) has indicated that it is not normative, and this decision is even reflected in the document [i][url="http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000806_dominus-iesus_en.html"]Dominus Iesus[/url][/i], which was issued without the [i]filioque[/i] by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith back in August of 2000. [/quote] We've clearly read a lot of the same stuff. But per my prior point, a defense of the filioque could be made with equal stature. There are patristic sources and councils and creeds and documents, etc.. And Dominus Iesus was one of the things that I had in mind when I mentioned the Church's apparent "backing off" of the filioque. But many see this stuff as bending over backwards for the Orthodox Churches, or even false ecumenism. I'm not quite a rad trad of the sort that would accuse the Pope of Rome of something as vile as that, but I do think focusing on actions that have more to do with current Church policy and ecumenical compromise is a bit unfair in the context of this discussion. We all know that Rome is willing to kiss Constantinople's hiney, but I also know that Rome is not going to say that an article of the Creed that its been proclaiming for a millennia is heretical. Anyway, I'm on my way out.. I'll try to pontificate some more later..
Laudate_Dominum Posted May 13, 2006 Posted May 13, 2006 [quote name='Myles Domini' post='979269' date='May 12 2006, 11:41 AM'] Hey ya Todd can you please outline the Triadological and Christological problems that a failure to make the essence/energies distinction entails? Thanks -M- [/quote] This weekend I'd like to outline the Triadological and Christological problems that the essence/energies distinction brings about (assuming someone doesn't beat me to it). The point is that you won't find a theological synthesis that has no problematics (and the validity of Todd's problems outlined above is yet to be discussed). Historically east and west have grossly misunderstood and misjudged each others theological traditions. If a latin critiques eastern theology the canned answer seemed to be that "they don't understand it in the first place". I'd say this can go both ways. Many orthodox seem to think that Catholic theology is still in the 13th century and that the theological problematics they bring to the table are somehow beyond anything a western theologian, stuck in the shackles of Aristotle, had ever have conceived. Ok, I'm done being snide.. and I'm out of here for real this time.. I just had to come back for a second.. (btw, I'm only doing this because I miss your posts Todd.. yer the man. )
Apotheoun Posted May 13, 2006 Posted May 13, 2006 The continuation of [url="http://www.phatmass.com/phorum/index.php?s=&showtopic=52356&view=findpost&p=979371"]Post number 29[/url]: (5) The failure to make a distinction between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] in Christology can -- depending upon the case -- lead to Nestorianism or Monophysitism and Monothelitism. Now, if one posits the idea that [i]hypostasis[/i] and essence ([i]ousia[/i]) are identical, it follows that because Christ has both a human nature and a divine nature He would also be two [i]hypostaseis[/i], and this of course is the heresy of Nestorius. In opposition to this idea the Church at Chalcedon taught that Christ is one divine [i]hypostasis[/i] in two natures, and -- as a result of this teaching -- it follows that essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] cannot be identical. Now, as I pointed out in an earlier post in this thread, one [i]hypostasis[/i] cannot participate in another [i]hypostasis[/i], because that would involve the destruction of one or both of the [i]hypostaseis[/i], or the "creation" of some kind of hybrid [i]hypostasis[/i]. But in the decree of the Council of Chalcedon, the holy Fathers taught that the one divine and uncreated [i]hypostasis[/i] of the eternal Logos assumed from the Holy Theotokos a full and complete human nature, but without becoming a human [i]hypostasis[/i] at the same time, because this would involve falling into the heresy of Nestorius. That being said, if essence and [i]hypostasis[/i] are really identical, it follows that the union of the two natures in Christ would be reduced to a mere union of grace no different from that which is received by a follower of Christ, and -- as I noted above -- this is simply another form of the Nestorian heresy. Now, the failure to make a distinction between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] can also lead to the heresy of Monophysitism, because if one identifies essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] the union of the two natures in Christ cannot occur in the [i]hypostasis[/i] of the eternal Logos, but must somehow occur in the essence (or nature) of the Logos and the human nature assumed by Him. This of course would involve a blending of the two natures, which involves the bizarre notion of some type of "composite" nature that is both divine and human at that same time. Thus the failure to distinguish between [i]hypostasis[/i] and essence ([i]ousia[/i]) involves the absorption of Christ's human nature by His divine nature; and as a consequence, Christ is not fully human, because His humanity would be a mere phantasm or appearance absorbed into His divine nature, while He would also not be fully divine, because He would have a mixed human and divine nature, and that would mean that His divine nature -- as altered by this substantial mixing -- would be different from the divine nature of the Father and the Holy Spirit. Thus, this Christological error leads also to a Triadological error, because it makes the Son of God less than and essentially different from the Father and the Holy Spirit. (6) The failure to make a distinction between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] in Christ has the additional difficulty of making human nature itself somehow "essentially" corrupt after the ancestral sin of Adam. Sin -- by definition -- is a personal (hypostatic), not a natural or essential reality, but if one fails to distinguish between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] sin must be held to be natural to man, i.e., it must be held to be a part of his nature, rather than being a defect present within his hypostatic mode of willing. This distinction highlights the fact that essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and energy ([i]energeia[/i]) are also distinct, because the will -- as a capacity -- is an essential energy of a nature, while the "mode of willing" is proper only to a [i]hypostasis[/i], i.e., the "mode of willing" is an enhypostatic enactment of that natural capacity. Moreover, a nature (or essence) never wills anything, only a person ([i]hypostasis[/i]) can will to do something or not do something. Now in Christ there are -- as the Sixth Ecumenical Council taught -- two natural (or essential) wills and energies corresponding to His two natures, but of course if energy is identical with [i]hypostasis[/i] it follows that the human nature assumed by Christ in the incarnation would become sinful, because sin would be a property of the hybrid human nature / [i]hypostasis[/i] composite. But as St. Maximos pointed out, sin is found only in the "mode of willing," i.e., in the [i]hypostasis[/i] of man, while it is not to be found in the will as a capacity of nature, and this means that Christ, in assuming human nature, does not assume sin itself (which as I noted earlier is found only within the hypostatic "mode of willing"), and so, Christ -- as the Chalcedonian decree (quoting scripture) says -- is like us in all things except sin. This section can be summarized in the following manner: [a] If essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] are identical, it follows that -- if one emphasizes the reality of the two natures in Christ -- the incarnation would involve not only the assumption of human nature, but also the assumption of a human [i]hypostasis[/i], and this is simply a form of the Nestorian heresy. [b] If essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] are identical, it can also lead -- as ironic as it may sound -- to the heresy of Monophysitism, because if one emphasizes the reality of the unity of Christ's [i]hypostasis[/i], without distinguishing between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i], it follows that Christ's human nature, since it has no connatural human [i]hypostasis[/i], would be absorbed into His divine nature, and as I already noted above, that is simply the heresy of Eutyches, which is called Monophysitism. [c] If energy ([i]energeia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] are really identical it follows that Christ must have only one will, because He is only one [i]hypostasis[/i], and this is simply the heresy of Monothelitism, i.e., the heresy of positing only one will and natural energy in Christ after the incarnation. I will deal with some of the Soteriological problems that result from the failure to make distinctions in connection with essence ([i]ousia[/i]), energy ([i]energeia[/i]), and [i]hypostasis[/i] in a future post. Steven Todd Kaster, Th.M.
Laudate_Dominum Posted May 13, 2006 Posted May 13, 2006 Dude, you're writing a paper.. I really appreciate the effort you put into your posts.. That's so awesome.
Myles Domini Posted May 13, 2006 Posted May 13, 2006 I concur with L_D's sentiments Appy thank you for summarising your misgivings with Occidental Theology in such a clear and concise manner. It makes it much easier to absorb exactly what it is you find troublesome about the West's formulation of the Trinitarian doctrine. As an exercise in deductive logic your presentation is flawless and accordingly I am thankful that it is not an accurate representation of the way the West generally conceives of the Trinity but, in the word of Aidan Nichols OP: [quote]of an alternative tradition of thought moving from Anselm via Aberlard to Peter Lombard. In these...theologies, what we call 'the Persons' are relations all right, but these relations are so presented as, apparently, to issue from the essence, or even belong to it as quasi-attributes thereof: [b]an approach which would merit the strictures of the Christian East[/b] (my emphasis) and finds exemplification in a statement in Aberlard's De Unitate: to say God consists of three Persons is to say that the divine substance is at once powerful, good, and wise.--Nichols A., Discovering Aquinas p 67[/quote] The Trinitarian tradition most Latin theologians are rooted in arose, of course, in the work of St Thomas Aquinas foreshadowed at the Medieval school of St Victor. All of the problems you've cited both Theological and Christological could only arise if the West had accepted the kind of thinking that the Victorines and Aquinas divorced themselves from. It is however easy to misread St Thomas as being a member of this issing from the essence stable: [quote]This is perhaps because, in the prologue to this topic in the great [i]Summa[/i] - namely, question 27 of the [i]Prima Pars[/i] - so as to link his theology of the Holy Trinity to what he has said of God in his unique being, knowing and willing, Thomas considers first the divine procession - that is, the origins of the Persons; next, the divine relations; and only in last place, the Persons themselves. He pleads that this is, in context, a good pedagogical order. But it can lead the student to misrepresent the strongly personalist cast of his Trinitarian thinking. --Nichols A., op cit p 67[/quote] Looking to St Thomas himself we can see that the credal clause 'God from God' only makes intelligble sense when God in this instance refers to the Father and not to the Divine essence: [quote]Hence as this word "God" signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man" signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person,--Sum.Theol.1.38.4.[/quote] The keywords to note here wherein the distance between St Thomas and a thinker like Peter Lombard become clear are 'more truly', 'proper sense' and of course 'person'. In these words we can see that: [quote]in Thomas theology, the notion of the divine nature -- subtly different in his usage from that of the divine essence -- is a basis for a more fully personalised theology of the Trinity...the concepts of nature, on the one hand, (and) essence on the other, overlap but do not coincide. 'Nature' has to do with the active life of the essence, and hence, in the context of the treatise on God, already carries a tacit reference to personality since, in the maxim of Thomas...'actions belong to subjects'. In the origination of the Holy Trinity the role of the divine essence is simply that of an operative principle by which a subject acts. The actual acts of generation and spiration, terminating as they do in the unique reality of Son and Spirit, can only arise from a Person --Nichols A., op cit 69[/quote] Thomas' tri-une personalism makes the Persons their relations. He speaks of relations in two ways the first is 'relation as relation', that is, as a formal notion, which logically pressuposes a procession but also of 'relation as constitutive of (a) divine person' which logically precedes procession. Herein the relation of filiation or spiration produces the Person in the actualisation of the divine nature signified by its name. Keeping in mind that Aquinas' concept of personhood includes Richard of St Victor's teaching of what is 'incommunicable by nature' then in is in their relations to each other that the Father, Son and Spirit are irreducibly personal. I'd say more but a) Mass starts soon and b) I think that what I've said is enough to illustrate that the West does not roll together nature, person and the like in such a way that it would cause the serious problems of Theology that you outlined. I can understand your misgivings and indeed you can point out the thinkers Fr Nichols highlights as having taken Trinitarianism in the wrong direction but that was before Aquinas. Nowadays there isnt the need for such worries.
Apotheoun Posted May 13, 2006 Posted May 13, 2006 My misgivings about the West's philosophically based doctrine of the Trinity are connected to the Sabellian modalism inherent in its reduction of the [i]hypostaseis[/i] to mere "relations of opposition" within the divine essence. Instead of a theory of "relational opposition" the Eastern Fathers teach that the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Trinity are truly subsistent and distinct by their particular hypostatic "mode of origin" ([i]tropos hyparxeos[/i]). Let me put it this way, in the [u]Summa Theologica[/u] (Prima Pars, Q. 39, A. 1 and A. 2; and Q. 40, A. 1), St. Thomas denies that there is a real distinction between essence (or nature) and [i]hypostasis[/i]; thus, the [i]hypostasis[/i] of the Father is identical with the divine essence (or nature), and the same holds with the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Son and the Spirit. As a consequence, the essence of God is the Father, but since the Son and the Spirit possesses the same divine essence as the Father, it follows that they are both the Father as well, since the divine essence is identical with the hypostatic property of paternity. That being said, the subsistent reality of the Father is also undermined, because He possesses the divine essence too, and since the divine essence is held in the Scholastic theory to be identical with the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Son and the Spirit, it follows that the Father is also the Son, while He is simultaneously the Spirit; and so, the triad of divine [i]hypostaseis[/i] collapses into a monad. As Christopher Hughes puts it in his critique of the Scholastic theory of the Trinity: "Surely if (a) the essence of x = the essence of y, and (b) the essence of x = x, and the essence of y = y, it follows as the night does the day that x = y. And Aquinas maintains both that the divine persons are not distinct from their essences, and that they all have the same essence." [Christopher Hughes, [u]On a Complex Theory of a Simple God[/u], (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), page192] In other words, the Father (x) is the Son (y), and the Son is the Father, and the same holds in relation to the Spirit. Now it should be noted that the first point (a) of Aquinas' theory conforms to the teaching of the Cappadocian Fathers, but that the second point (b) does not; in fact, the second point conforms to the teaching of Sabellius and not to the theological doctrine of the Cappadocian Fathers. Moreover, the Scholastic error on this issue is confirmed by what St. Basil the Great said in [i]Letter 236[/i], where he called those who fail to distinguish between essence (or nature) and [i]hypostasis[/i] in God, "Sabellians"; for as St. Basil said, "On the other hand those who identify essence ([i]ousian[/i]) or substance and [i]hypostasis[/i] are compelled to confess only three [i]prosopa[/i], and, in their hesitation to speak of three [i]hypostaseis[/i], are convicted of failure to avoid the error of Sabellius, for even Sabellius himself, who in many places confuses his notions, yet, by asserting that the same [i]hypostasis[/i] changed its form to meet the needs of the moment, does endeavour to distinguish [i]prosopa[/i]." [St. Basil, [i]Letter 236[/i]] The Scholastics, in certain sense, are even more modalistic than Sabellius, because Sabellius could at least admit that there are prosopic distinctions in God, while the Scholastic theory of divine simplicity does not admit of any real distinctions, because the Scholastics saw all real distinctions as necessarily dialectical in nature.
Laudate_Dominum Posted May 13, 2006 Posted May 13, 2006 I'm very sleepy at this moment but I'll try to keep polemics to a minimum (even though they're fun). In fact, I'll stick to question asking as its a fun discipline. Ok, I'm aware of the neo-palamite bag (Lossky, Ware, Meyendorff, etc..) and I have certain suspicions and impressions which you might be interested in addressing. I have yet to see anyone convincingly demonstrate that what the pre-palamite theologians had in mind with the essence/energies distinction is really the same thing that Palamas has in mind. For one thing, the categories of "real" distinction vs. "notional" distinction are scholastic and while I certainly admit that Palamas clearly make this distinction I find it hard to believe that the sense of the Cappadocians' philosophical underpinnings is quite the same and thus many of the quotes that are often thrown out there have anachronistic baggage included if you know what I mean. That quote from one of Basil's letters falls particularly flat with me whenever I see you use it. It has absolutely no value in my eyes as a charge against Thomas. The context and content is radically foreign to the discussion of Thomas' theology. But anyway, I'd prefer to stay away from engaging you on all that just yet. So what do you make of the various criticisms of Palamism by both Catholic and Orthodox scholars? Fresh on my mind is Wendenbourg.. For example, against the claim that Palamas is simply a completion of the Greek Fathers it has been noted that the sense in which the fathers distinguish essence and energies is quite different in many essential ways (no pun intended.. ok it was intended a little bit). The big example to me being that the Cappadocian fathers do not anchor the oikonomia in an intradivine distinction between essence and energies. Byzantine theologian Endre von Ivanka actually holds that a "real" distinction of essence and energies contradicts the thought of the Greek Fathers. I believe the reasoning pertains to the Cappadocians intent to avoid formulations which suggest that the creature participates in God's being by virtue of a Neo-Platonic emanationism, which is precisely what some in the east have viewed Palamism to be. Palamism is a reversion to the Platonic idea of participation by the creature in successive levels of God's being. And interestingly, unlike Palamas, when the Cappadocians speak about the divine energies they do not talk at all about the trinitarian persons but remain completely within the field of the classical problem of the one and the many. One interesting result of the alleged neo-platonic emanationism of Palamas is that now the opera ad extra of God pertain to the divine energies and not the divine persons, the proprium of each person, and of the Holy Spirit in particular as the one who deifies, fades into the background. Wendenbourg says that in the end Palamism is strongly reminiscent of Augustine’s theology because the economy of redemption ceases to be the place where the uniqueness of the divine persons, as well as their taxis with respect to each other—from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit—is revealed. This is particularly far removed from the thought of St. Maximos as well. Palamas utterly and hopelessly divides theologia and oikonimia. Cardinal Schonborn also views Palamism as destructive of the Patristic and authentic triadology and soteriology in that the divine persons are denied distinctive roles in the oikonomia. He cites from the Capita in which Palamas explains that the act by which God is related to the world does not belong to God’s essence but God’s energies. He then goes on to elucidate how this is a radical departure from the standard doctrine within patristic thought regarding the Father’s monarchy. Schonborn’s conclusion is that the Trinitarian relations in Palamas' thought belong to an unknowable sphere quite beyond the oikonomia. This neglect of the differentiation within the oikonomia of salvation according to the divine persons is perhaps the greatest scandal of Palamism. Podskalsky raises the question of how it is then possible for us to have knowledge of the innertrinitarian relations if not from the acts of the Father, Son and Spirit in the economy of salvation. And why do people often act as though Palamas is this pillar of truth? If his thought is really the pinnacle of Orthodoxy then why was he all but forgotten after the fourteenth century? As I understand it it wasn't until the 20th century that people started paying attention to him, and there were camps for and against his thought, there was controversy. Now all of a sudden anything the guy said is dogma. Orthodox often criticize the latins for doing this sort of thing with Thomas, or Augustine.. Seems like a double-standard. Just some thoughts/questions if you'd be interested in clarifying.. These are just points/objections that I've encountered.. Plenty more where that came from if you actually enjoy doing this. Peace. P.S. Regarding my first paragraph, the sense I have with the Cappadocians that I've read is that they have a different flavour of apophatic methodology. This strikes me as the basis of safeguarding against neo-platonic emanationism, not the ousia/energeia distinction in itself. It's one thing to recognize a distinction between ousia and energeia, but it is another things altogether to construct a somewhat scholastic framework which claims to describe "real" ontological distinctions within God's being. Palamas himself even admitted a certain irreconcilable antinomy in his system of thought.. But I wonder.. when does an antinomy simply become an absurdity, or a falsehood? I'm still weary of Palamas because his system says too much about God and in the same breath stresses the via negativa in a way that strikes me as more akin to the neo-platonists. The Cappadocians were wise to not bury their theology in a scholastic distinction.
Laudate_Dominum Posted May 13, 2006 Posted May 13, 2006 [quote name='Apotheoun' post='979782' date='May 13 2006, 02:34 AM'] My misgivings about the West's philosophically based doctrine of the Trinity are connected to the Sabellian modalism inherent in its reduction of the [i]hypostaseis[/i] to mere "relations of opposition" within the divine essence. Instead of a theory of "relational opposition" the Eastern Fathers teach that the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Trinity are truly subsistent and distinct by their particular hypostatic "mode of origin" ([i]tropos hyparxeos[/i]). Let me put it this way, in the [u]Summa Theologica[/u] (Prima Pars, Q. 39, A. 1 and A. 2; and Q. 40, A. 1), St. Thomas denies that there is a real distinction between essence (or nature) and [i]hypostasis[/i]; thus, the [i]hypostasis[/i] of the Father is identical with the divine essence (or nature), and the same holds with the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Son and the Spirit. As a consequence, the essence of God is the Father, but since the Son and the Spirit possesses the same divine essence as the Father, it follows that they are both the Father as well, since the divine essence is identical with the hypostatic property of paternity. That being said, the subsistent reality of the Father is also undermined, because He possesses the divine essence too, and since the divine essence is held in the Scholastic theory to be identical with the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Son and the Spirit, it follows that the Father is also the Son, while He is simultaneously the Spirit; and so, the triad of divine [i]hypostaseis[/i] collapses into a monad. As Christopher Hughes puts it in his critique of the Scholastic theory of the Trinity: "Surely if (a) the essence of x = the essence of y, and (b) the essence of x = x, and the essence of y = y, it follows as the night does the day that x = y. And Aquinas maintains both that the divine persons are not distinct from their essences, and that they all have the same essence." [Christopher Hughes, [u]On a Complex Theory of a Simple God[/u], (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), page192] In other words, the Father (x) is the Son (y), and the Son is the Father, and the same holds in relation to the Spirit. Now it should be noted that the first point (a) of Aquinas' theory conforms to the teaching of the Cappadocian Fathers, but that the second point (b) does not; in fact, the second point conforms to the teaching of Sabellius and not to the theological doctrine of the Cappadocian Fathers. Moreover, the Scholastic error on this issue is confirmed by what St. Basil the Great said in [i]Letter 236[/i], where he called those who fail to distinguish between essence (or nature) and [i]hypostasis[/i] in God, "Sabellians"; for as St. Basil said, "On the other hand those who identify essence ([i]ousian[/i]) or substance and [i]hypostasis[/i] are compelled to confess only three [i]prosopa[/i], and, in their hesitation to speak of three [i]hypostaseis[/i], are convicted of failure to avoid the error of Sabellius, for even Sabellius himself, who in many places confuses his notions, yet, by asserting that the same [i]hypostasis[/i] changed its form to meet the needs of the moment, does endeavour to distinguish [i]prosopa[/i]." [St. Basil, [i]Letter 236[/i]] The Scholastics, in certain sense, are even more modalistic than Sabellius, because Sabellius could at least admit that there are prosopic distinctions in God, while the Scholastic theory of divine simplicity does not admit of any real distinctions, because the Scholastics saw all real distinctions as necessarily dialectical in nature. [/quote] Very briefly, my understanding of Thomas as well as latin dogma renders the central premises of this critique absurd. For example, Thomas and presumably neo-scholasticism fail to distinguish Essence and Hypostasis? To clarify, the relations are said to be only mentally or notionally distinct from the Divine Essence, but these are not the persons or hypostases. It is in fact dogma per the fourth lateran council, with which Thomas agrees, that the subject of of the Divine Processions are the Divine Persons, not the Divine Essence. In other words it is the Father who generates, not the Divine Essence, etc.. This dogma is at odds with your claim about the west collapsing everything into the Essence. But this isn't really the heart of the matter. I think the real issue is the meaning of a virtual distinction with regard to the persons of the Trinity and the Divine Essence. For starters what Thomas is saying there is not that there is a notional distinction. And it wouldn't be fair to say that the meaning of virtual distinction in this context is some ambiguous intermediary between a real distinction and a notional distinction. My understanding of what Thomas is trying to say is informed by the Organon, Boethius and Augustine.. I'm not trying to convince you of Thomas' position I'm merely trying to clarify it so that we are being fair here. Thomas is essentially developing Aristotle's categories and importing a bit of insight from Boethius. Again, I'm rusty but perhaps I can put it in my own words. In the categories Aristotle lists the accidentals (quantity, quality, time, etc..) among them he lists relation. Aquinas is borrowing from Boethius when he reflects upon something akin to relation as a transcendental. I am absolutely certain that Thomas is not saying that the persons are only notionally or logically distinct. My understanding is that he is trying to say, like Boethius, that in contingent being relation is an accidental and as such is refers to a substance outside of that in which it adheres, however, in the case of God, if one chooses to reflect upon it in this matter, we cannot say that there is a separate substance toward which an intradivine relation refers since God is one. Therefore, all he is really saying is that the persons are distinct but without being separate. We are dealing with a transcendent sort of relationality. Call it absolute or substantial relationality. Hence, to say it is merely a mental distinction is false, but also to say it is an actual distinction would be false for Thomas because the sense of this would imply more than one substance based on Aristotle's categories. Therefore it is a virtual distinction, they are truly distinct in their relations, but there is a certain apophatic dimension here in that it is not relationality as we are capable of comprehending it. It is in fact the pure perfection of relationality. I see absolutely not collapsing of the Persons into some sort of monad here. That's not how I understood Thomas years ago before I was even aware of these issues either. I simply don't believe that he is saying what you're suggesting. See also: Summa Theologica (Prima Pars, Q. 28, A. 2) Besides Aristotle and Boethius, Thomas is very much developing Augustine. To be honest, I think your assessment of Thomas is quite the opposite of the truth. The really specific stuff is in other words besides the Summa, such as De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino. For Thomas the self-subsistent reality of God is not only supremely actual and simple, but He is supremely personal and relational. And certainly Thomas differentiates between the Persons. In fact, relationality is the supreme ontological predicate for Aquinas. In Thomas' though God's relation to us is a logical or notional relation. Our relation to God is actual or real. In profoundly elucidating these points Thomas in fact sets the stage for the bomb that he drops in establishing the metaphysical basis for intratrinitarian relations which is an intrinsic relatedness, not an accidental relatedness or a notional type thing. This is actually at the heart of Thomas' theological reflections on God's freedom in creating the cosmos. Thomas says that if the Persons of the Trinity were merely derived from logical relations then the Persons would be accidents of the Divine Essence. Divine simplicity precludes accidents in God, therefore relations are identical with the Divine Essence. Also (I wish I had quotes handly), he explains precisely how the Persons are NOT merely different manifestations of the Essence because this would be Sabellianism. The persons are of one substance and they are distinct subsistences or hypostases. And De Potentia Dei has some useful stuff for grasping what Thomas is trying to say about God.. There are some cool quotables too such as "the more simple, the more relational". He completely blows away the assertion that he does away with hypostasis to preserve some kind of monad god. What he's actually saying is pretty much the opposite of that. Your claim that Thomas reduces the Trinity to some kind of monad couldn't be further from the truth. And I've looked at Hughe's book before and from what I've seen its outrageous. What's funny is that in some ways Zizioulas seems like a Thomist to me.. Anyway, I don't want to annoy you too much. As you know Thomas' thought is pretty far removed from Palamas and I'm not going to pretend that they're compatible. Like I said I'm not trying to convince you to become a Thomist, I just think that the accusation of modalism or whatever is way off, to say the least.
Laudate_Dominum Posted May 13, 2006 Posted May 13, 2006 And my reading of Aquinas doesn't ask anymore than the Eastern position you defend. Namely that we cannot understand procession, etc. but we know that the Persons are distinct. Similarly, my reading of Aquinas is like that, it explains to a point, but then one must accept that we cannot grasp how it is so. Hughe's goofy syllogism is just capitalizing on the fact that God's inner life is beyond logical representation. If we could wrap our minds around substantial relationality I suppose we'd be Divine.
Laudate_Dominum Posted May 13, 2006 Posted May 13, 2006 [quote name='Apotheoun' post='979782' date='May 13 2006, 02:34 AM'] My misgivings about the West's philosophically based doctrine of the Trinity are connected to the Sabellian modalism inherent in its reduction of the [i]hypostaseis[/i] to mere "relations of opposition" within the divine essence. Instead of a theory of "relational opposition" the Eastern Fathers teach that the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Trinity are truly subsistent and distinct by their particular hypostatic "mode of origin" ([i]tropos hyparxeos[/i]). [/quote] The latins teach that the hypostases of the Trinity are truly subsistent and distinct but to call it "mere" relations of opposition is to betray a lack of appreciation for the richness of the west's ponderings on this mystery. Quite frankly the Paternity, Sonship, Spiration approach that the west takes includes the mode of origin but is a better foundational metaphor for describing the mystery because it is more personalistic and isn't married to a temporal or sequential motiff. As Bonaventure says it is the more spiritual and the more proper of God who is Love. [quote name='Apotheoun' post='979782' date='May 13 2006, 02:34 AM']Moreover, the Scholastic error on this issue[/quote] There are quite a few scholastics and they are all pretty different. This is an outlandish statement. There were scholastics who weren't far from Palamas in some regards. And I still utterly reject the idea that Sabellian modalism is a fair characterization of Thomas or scholastic triadology in general. If one was looking for things to pick at perhaps they could come up with that, but if one was being fair I don't think this is a realistic assessment. Many of the scholastics were extremely conservative and well aware of the doctrinal controversies of the past so I think it could be surprising to discover in fact that they critique Sabellianism and certainly were no oblivious to the issues you are bringing up. Their syntheses were not the system that you're down with, and their solutions to the problems may not be to your liking, but the accusation of heresy is a bit presumptuous if I may say so. And let's assume for a second that Thomas' theology lends itself toward modalism. Ok, since when is Thomas the latin Church? To restrict one's critique of Roman Catholic theology to the 1200's is absurd. What about Congar, Von Balthasar, De Lubac, Rahner, La Grange, Longergan, Danielou, Bouyer, and so on.. from our times alone. Do you really think that Catholic theology for the past 800 years has simply been parroting Thomas? I don't think the Scotists would appreciate that. If you really want to "debunk" Roman Catholic triadology it'll have to take into account the current state of theological developments and great theologians. Heck, some of the greats of the 20th century were buddies with your guy Lossky, so I imagine they aren't completely oblivious to the final word in theology that is Palamas.
Myles Domini Posted May 13, 2006 Posted May 13, 2006 [quote name='Laudate_Dominum' post='979819' date='May 13 2006, 01:42 PM'] Very briefly, my understanding of Thomas as well as latin dogma renders the central premises of this critique absurd. For example, Thomas and presumably neo-scholasticism fail to distinguish Essence and Hypostasis? To clarify, the relations are said to be only mentally or notionally distinct from the Divine Essence, but these are not the persons or hypostases. It is in fact dogma per the fourth lateran council, with which Thomas agrees, that the subject of of the Divine Processions are the Divine Persons, not the Divine Essence. In other words it is the Father who generates, not the Divine Essence, etc.. This dogma is at odds with your claim about the west collapsing everything into the Essence. But this isn't really the heart of the matter. I think the real issue is the meaning of a virtual distinction with regard to the persons of the Trinity and the Divine Essence. For starters what Thomas is saying there is not that there is a notional distinction. And it wouldn't be fair to say that the meaning of virtual distinction in this context is some ambiguous intermediary between a real distinction and a notional distinction. My understanding of what Thomas is trying to say is informed by the Organon, Boethius and Augustine.. I'm not trying to convince you of Thomas' position I'm merely trying to clarify it so that we are being fair here. Thomas is essentially developing Aristotle's categories and importing a bit of insight from Boethius. Again, I'm rusty but perhaps I can put it in my own words. In the categories Aristotle lists the accidentals (quantity, quality, time, etc..) among them he lists relation. Aquinas is borrowing from Boethius when he reflects upon something akin to relation as a transcendental. I am absolutely certain that Thomas is not saying that the persons are only notionally or logically distinct. My understanding is that he is trying to say, like Boethius, that in contingent being relation is an accidental and as such is refers to a substance outside of that in which it adheres, however, in the case of God, if one chooses to reflect upon it in this matter, we cannot say that there is a separate substance toward which an intradivine relation refers since God is one. Therefore, all he is really saying is that the persons are distinct but without being separate. We are dealing with a transcendent sort of relationality. Call it absolute or substantial relationality. Hence, to say it is merely a mental distinction is false, but also to say it is an actual distinction would be false for Thomas because the sense of this would imply more than one substance based on Aristotle's categories. Therefore it is a virtual distinction, they are truly distinct in their relations, but there is a certain apophatic dimension here in that it is not relationality as we are capable of comprehending it. It is in fact the pure perfection of relationality. I see absolutely not collapsing of the Persons into some sort of monad here. That's not how I understood Thomas years ago before I was even aware of these issues either. I simply don't believe that he is saying what you're suggesting. See also: Summa Theologica (Prima Pars, Q. 28, A. 2) Besides Aristotle and Boethius, Thomas is very much developing Augustine. To be honest, I think your assessment of Thomas is quite the opposite of the truth. The really specific stuff is in other words besides the Summa, such as De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino. For Thomas the self-subsistent reality of God is not only supremely actual and simple, but He is supremely personal and relational. And certainly Thomas differentiates between the Persons. In fact, relationality is the supreme ontological predicate for Aquinas. In Thomas' though God's relation to us is a logical or notional relation. Our relation to God is actual or real. In profoundly elucidating these points Thomas in fact sets the stage for the bomb that he drops in establishing the metaphysical basis for intratrinitarian relations which is an intrinsic relatedness, not an accidental relatedness or a notional type thing. This is actually at the heart of Thomas' theological reflections on God's freedom in creating the cosmos. Thomas says that if the Persons of the Trinity were merely derived from logical relations then the Persons would be accidents of the Divine Essence. Divine simplicity precludes accidents in God, therefore relations are identical with the Divine Essence. He gets into this in his commentary on the Gospel of John. Also in his commentary on John (I wish I had quotes handly), he explains precisely how the Persons are NOT merely different manifestations of the Essence because this would be Sabellianism. The persons are of one substance and they are distinct subsistences or hypostases. And De Potentia Dei has some useful stuff for grasping what Thomas is trying to say about God.. There are some cool quotables too such as "the more simple, the more relational". He completely blows away the assertion that he does away with hypostasis to preserve some kind of monad god. What he's actually saying is pretty much the opposite of that. Your claim that Thomas reduces the Trinity to some kind of monad couldn't be further from the truth. And I've looked at Hughe's book before and from what I've seen its outrageous. What's funny is that in some ways Zizioulas seems like a Thomist to me.. Anyway, I don't want to annoy you too much. As you know Thomas' thought is pretty far removed from Palamas and I'm not going to pretend that they're compatible. Like I said I'm not trying to convince you to become a Thomist, I just think that the accusation of modalism or whatever is way off, to say the least. [/quote] And that phamily is how a real Church Scholar answer questions. Thanks L_D you said everything I did...just better : (gotta love it). From L_D's post and my citations from Aidan Nichols I think its clear that you're attributing to St Thomas the school of thought that he was fighting against in line of the Victorine tradition. The citations you've given from Q39 of the 1st part, for instance, need to be read in light of the way St Thomas conceives of essence and nature in subtly different ways which has the result as L_D (deftly) illustrated of making the relations natural, irreducible and insperable and eternally so. However, in spite of the fact I believe you're misinterpreting St Thomas lets not move the goal posts too much. Whilst I'm very comfy talking about St Aquinas this discussion is not about him primarily. Its about Latin Theology en general. Even if hypothetically your critique of St Thomas were true (and I dont think it is) what would that mean? Even were your understanding of Thomas right and Aidan Nichols' incorrect what difference would it make so long as the Latin Church actually teaches the interpretation of Doctor Angelus that doesn't fall into the problems you outlined? As it stands I cannot see, for instance, how L_D's presentation of Thomas' thought would be rightly censured by the Christian East. Forgetting for a second that I believe that it does accurately reflect what St Thomas was trying to do even if it doesn't all that is important is that L_D's presentation of the Trinity according to St Thomas is en general how Latinity has recieved it. As much as I love St Aquinas I see no reason to get sucked into a debate about him alone since we're not discussing him alone. So what if hypothetically Thomas' Trinitarian thought was not entirely accurate if subsequent Latin theologians took the portrait he drew and cleaned it up so that it could take on the form L_D has presented to you today? Even if St Thomas was unsound (and I dont think it can be argued he was but even were that the case) the fact is what the Latin Church presents about the Trinity is not unsound. Her account (and I would and have argued St Thomas' with her) as summarised by L_D does not and cannot reduce the persons to pseudo-attributes of the essence. Lastly, as interesting as I am finding this thread I would ask why there is even a need to raise the charge that Latin theology is errant in its Trinitarian and Christological understanding. Nobody here is arguing that Palamas should be condemned (though L_D has cited authors who believe he could be). From where I am sitting the rest of the Phamily were quite happy to have you back--myself included--and we're equally happy to have you be a Palamite and to profess the aforesaid understanding of the Trinity is it too much to ask you to extend the same courtesy to us? Since, I do not believe that any conclusive proof of error can be shown (an error which if true would make the Roman Catholic Church basically heretical or at least responsible for canonising heretic after heretic) why can you not bring yourself to believe the best of us? Why are you so seemingly determined to ignore the very straightforward responses given to you as to how Latin Theology (whilst admittedly at one stage through the Anselmian variant) did see certain figures e.g. Aberlard fall into error managed to overcome the difficulties you outlined. I really cannot see anything fundamentally wrong with the citations I provided from Nichols or the in depth answer given by L_D so why has this discussion taken on such a darkended tone? I certainly cannot see the Sabellianism in L_D and since Holy Mother Church allows us both to hold different doctrinal formulations of the Trinitarian Dogma why the need for argument? I'm all for a light hearted discussion--which is why I started out my post with all those light hearted remarks about L_D (not that I didnt mean 'em dude )--but if this is going to turn into something else I dont want to be part of it and that is the reason I left it so long to say anything in the first place and tried to be as diplomatic as possible when I did finally say something. In spite of the fact I thought you were being unfair to St Thomas I tried to empathise with your standpoint by admitting there were Latin theologians of note and merit in the past who had been guilty of the charges you listed. Indeed, I have tried to do the same thing now. Is it too much to ask for you to show us the same empathy especially since I really cannot see what is wrong with the doctrinal presentation of the Trinity presented by the Latins exemplified in the citations from Nichols and the detailed response given by L_D? As members of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church are we not able to agree to disagree within the bounds that the Church allows us to?
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