Abortion To Save The Live Of The Mother

[CatherineM]

BTW, that woman in Ireland did not die because she didn't get an abortion. That was a misstatement that the media source involved quietly retracted. Retractions are often done quietly for some reason.

[Kevin]

That may be so, but in any case, I'm tired of the whole thing. It honestly doesn't even effect me, so I'm just going to be glad I'll probably never have to make such a decision.

 

Also, I hope I didn't come off as dismissive or rude of your response. I do disagree, but I thank you for you comments.

[CatherineM]

<blockquote class='ipsBlockquote'data-author="Kevin" data-cid="2525261" data-time="1355842578" data-date="Today, 07:56 AM"><p>
That may be so, but in any case, I'm tired of the whole thing. It honestly doesn't even effect me, so I'm just going to be glad I'll probably never have to make such a decision.<br />
<br />
Also, I hope I didn't come off as dismissive or rude of your response. I do disagree, but I thank you for you comments.</p></blockquote>

I'm used to being disagreed with since I'm a pro-life Democrat. You are very right to say you will probably never have to make the decision. You and every other human on the planet.

[Lil Red]

With all due respect to the responder, this sounds to me like a lot of Just-So-Story. There was a case in Ireland just a few months ago where this scenario happened and the woman died. If doctors are so unreliable, why do we even bother going to them at all? Why don't we simply rely on prayer to heal every illness we get? Isn't going to a doctor showing we don't trust God?

 

http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/not-one-single-irish-abortion-in-uk-to-8216save-the-life-of-the-mother8217

 

http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/breaking-reporter-who-broke-savita-story-there-may-have-been-no-request-for

 

DUBLIN, December 3, 2012 (LifeSiteNews.com) – Kitty Holland, the Irish Times reporter who broke the story about the death of Savita Halappanavar that launched a global crusade against Ireland’s pro-life laws, has admitted that the story of Mrs. Halappanavar asking for an abortion may have been a little bit “muddled” in the retelling, and there may have been no such request after all.

 

Holland later told the state broadcaster RTE that her coverage in the Irish Times “never suggested” that an abortion might have saved Mrs. Halappanavar’s life.

 

Coleman also queried Holland about discrepancies in her Times report compared to her later reporting in the Observer. After her initial article in the Irish Times on November 14th, Holland three days later wrote in the Observer the disclaimer, “The fact that Savita had been refused a termination was a factor in her death has yet to be established”.

[Kevin]

<blockquote class='ipsBlockquote'data-author="Kevin" data-cid="2525261" data-time="1355842578" data-date="Today, 07:56 AM"><p>
That may be so, but in any case, I'm tired of the whole thing. It honestly doesn't even effect me, so I'm just going to be glad I'll probably never have to make such a decision.<br />
<br />
Also, I hope I didn't come off as dismissive or rude of your response. I do disagree, but I thank you for you comments.</p></blockquote>

I'm used to being disagreed with since I'm a pro-life Democrat. You are very right to say you will probably never have to make the decision. You and every other human on the planet.

 

I'm not completely sure of the import of the last line of your post. If you are suggesting that God alone has the right to judge, I would agree, which I why I think it is really counterproductive for the Church to make the public excommunications it has for scenarios like this.

 

But what I meant was I simply was saying that I am glad I am neither a medical professional nor a potential parent (for the foreseeable future), because if I was put in a scenario where the child had basically no chance for survival (and I do believe doctors can establish this) and the mother of my own child or my patient was almost certain to die if she tried to deliver the child, and removing the uterus or fallopian tube or some other "indirect" method of saving the mother's life was not available, I would undoubtedly advocate a direct abortion, excommunicate myself, and unlike some of the cases I have read about, I would never be able to convince myself I was wrong, that it was worth letting a mother die for a child who could never be born, that 0>1, so I would remain excommunicated for the rest of my life, and I would probably have to become an Anglican or God knows what, which is the last thing I want to do.

 

Perhaps just by thinking this, I've already excommunicated myself, but luckily I'm not a not a South American peasant girl but a reasonably well off, college-educated white guy, so I doubt the Church will take much notice of me.

Edited December 18, 2012 by Kevin

[CatherineM]

I meant what I said. You will never face this scenario, and neither will anyone else. That doesn't mean people won't try to convince someone that the scenario is real. Women do die in childbirth. That's been happening since the dawn of primates. That does not mean an abortion would have saved a single life.

[Papist]

With an abortion, it is certain that a life will die.

 

You cannot do evil, not even to achieve a good.

[Kevin]

With an abortion, it is certain that a life will die.

 

You cannot do evil, not even to achieve a good.

 

I have found a quote from the Standford Encyclopedia on Double Effect that clarifies my position a bit:

 

For example, if the soldier who throws himself on the grenade in order to shield his fellow soldiers from the force of an explosion acts permissibly, and if the permissibility of his action is explained by double effect, then he must not intend to sacrifice his own life in order to save the others, he must merely foresee that his life will end as a side effect of his action. But many have argued that this is an implausible description of the soldier's action and that his action is permissible even if he does intend to cause his own death as a means to save the others. Shelly Kagan points out that if someone else were to shove the soldier on the grenade we would certainly say that that the harm to the soldier was intended by the person who did the shoving. Equally, Kagan argues, we should say that it is intended in this case (p. 145). The same kind of argument can be made for cases of killing in self-defense.

 

Those who take this view can claim that what is often called the proportionality condition associated with double effect is really doing all of the explanatory work: it is because the end is judged to be worthy that the harmful means is considered to be permissibly brought about. Those who reject double effect for this reason may still maintain that there is a morally significant difference between self-sacrifice of this sort and suicide, but that the difference depends on a difference in the agent's motives and ends, not a difference in the means adopted.

 

This kind of criticism about the explanatory reach of the principle of double effect might also be associated with the worry that we will be inclined to describe a harm as a merely foreseen side effect if we believe that it is permissibly brought about in the course of pursuing a good end, and, similarly, we will tend to describe a harm as one that is intended as part of the agent's means if we believe that it is not permissibly brought about in the course of pursuing a good end. Disputes about the permissibility of killing a fetus in order to save the life of a pregnant woman have often been thought to take this form. Those who say that it would be impermissible to perform an abortion to save the life of a pregnant woman say that this is because this would involve intending the death of the fetus. However, if it is also maintained that a hysterectomy may be performed on a pregnant woman with uterine cancer because the death of the fetus would be a merely foreseen side effect of surgery, it is hard to find a principled ground for drawing this distinction that could serve as a guide to moral judgment...

 

In general, the article has many points relating directly to this issue and shows that there are problems with the concept that cannot be easily dismissed.

[Papist]

I have found a quote from the Standford Encyclopedia on Double Effect that clarifies my position a bit:

 

For example, if the soldier who throws himself on the grenade in order to shield his fellow soldiers from the force of an explosion acts permissibly, and if the permissibility of his action is explained by double effect, then he must not intend to sacrifice his own life in order to save the others, he must merely foresee that his life will end as a side effect of his action. But many have argued that this is an implausible description of the soldier's action and that his action is permissible even if he does intend to cause his own death as a means to save the others. Shelly Kagan points out that if someone else were to shove the soldier on the grenade we would certainly say that that the harm to the soldier was intended by the person who did the shoving. Equally, Kagan argues, we should say that it is intended in this case (p. 145). The same kind of argument can be made for cases of killing in self-defense.

 

Those who take this view can claim that what is often called the proportionality condition associated with double effect is really doing all of the explanatory work: it is because the end is judged to be worthy that the harmful means is considered to be permissibly brought about. Those who reject double effect for this reason may still maintain that there is a morally significant difference between self-sacrifice of this sort and suicide, but that the difference depends on a difference in the agent's motives and ends, not a difference in the means adopted.

 

This kind of criticism about the explanatory reach of the principle of double effect might also be associated with the worry that we will be inclined to describe a harm as a merely foreseen side effect if we believe that it is permissibly brought about in the course of pursuing a good end, and, similarly, we will tend to describe a harm as one that is intended as part of the agent's means if we believe that it is not permissibly brought about in the course of pursuing a good end. Disputes about the permissibility of killing a fetus in order to save the life of a pregnant woman have often been thought to take this form. Those who say that it would be impermissible to perform an abortion to save the life of a pregnant woman say that this is because this would involve intending the death of the fetus. However, if it is also maintained that a hysterectomy may be performed on a pregnant woman with uterine cancer because the death of the fetus would be a merely foreseen side effect of surgery, it is hard to find a principled ground for drawing this distinction that could serve as a guide to moral judgment...

 

In general, the article has many points relating directly to this issue and shows that there are problems with the concept that cannot be easily dismissed.

 

The principle of double effect in the Church’s moral tradition teaches that one may perform a good action even if it is foreseen that a bad effect will arise only if four conditions are met: 1) The act itself must be good. 2) The only thing that one can intend is the good act, not the foreseen but unintended bad effect. 3) The good effect cannot arise from the bad effect; otherwise, one would do evil to achieve good. 4) The unintended but foreseen bad effect cannot be disproportionate to the good being performed.

 

In your example, the procedure is a hysterectomy to remove the cancer, not an abortion to kill the baby. The double effect of the hysterectomy is that the baby dies as an effect of that procedure. The primary objective of an abortion is to kill the baby. Killing the baby cannot be the purpose of the procedure. 

[Kevin]

The principle of double effect in the Church’s moral tradition teaches that one may perform a good action even if it is foreseen that a bad effect will arise only if four conditions are met: 1) The act itself must be good. 2) The only thing that one can intend is the good act, not the foreseen but unintended bad effect. 3) The good effect cannot arise from the bad effect; otherwise, one would do evil to achieve good. 4) The unintended but foreseen bad effect cannot be disproportionate to the good being performed.

 

In your example, the procedure is a hysterectomy to remove the cancer, not an abortion to kill the baby. The double effect of the hysterectomy is that the baby dies as an effect of that procedure. The primary objective of an abortion is to kill the baby. Killing the baby cannot be the purpose of the procedure. 

 

Yes, and as you can see from the quote, the principal is highly questionable. I strongly encourage you to read the entire article. I think there is a strong case, and a much stronger case than the contrary, that the supposed difference between a direct abortion and the hysterectomy to remove the cancer is a fiction. Actually, I will just quote a little further:

 

The historical origins of double effect as a tenet of Catholic casuistry might provide a similar explanation for the unity of its applications. If one were to assume that it is absolutely prohibited to cause the death of a human being, then it would not be permissible to kill an aggressor in self-defense, to sacrifice one's life to protect others, to hasten death as a side effect of administering pain-relieving medications, or to endanger non-combatants in warfare. If one were to assume instead that what is absolutely prohibited is to cause the death of a human being intentionally, then these exceptional cases can all be classified as cases of non-intentional killing.

 

Critics of double effect might then claim that a better way of explaining what these cases have in common is to point out that they are exceptions to the prohibition on causing the death of a human being, and that the pattern of justification that they share requires that the agent acts in order to promote a good end and shows adequate respect for the value of human life in so acting. What the critics of double effect emphasize is that the distinction between what is intentional and what is foreseen does not explain the permissibility of these exceptions.

 

T.M. Scanlon (2008) has recently developed this kind of criticism by arguing that the appeal of double effect is, fundamentally, illusory: an agent's intentions are not relevant to the permissibility of an action in the way that the proponents of the principle of double effect would claim, though an agent's intentions are relevant to moral assessments of the way in which the agent deliberated. That an agent intended to bring about a certain harm does not explain why the action was impermissible, but it can explain what is morally faulty about the agent's reasoning in pursuing that line of action.

[add]

http://www.phatmass.com/phorum/topic/125706-planned-parenthood-changes-its-stripes/page-5
See post # 92

[Papist]

Yes, and as you can see from the quote, the principal is highly questionable. I strongly encourage you to read the entire article. I think there is a strong case, and a much stronger case than the contrary, that the supposed difference between a direct abortion and the hysterectomy to remove the cancer is a fiction. Actually, I will just quote a little further:

 

The historical origins of double effect as a tenet of Catholic casuistry might provide a similar explanation for the unity of its applications. If one were to assume that it is absolutely prohibited to cause the death of a human being, then it would not be permissible to kill an aggressor in self-defense, to sacrifice one's life to protect others, to hasten death as a side effect of administering pain-relieving medications, or to endanger non-combatants in warfare. If one were to assume instead that what is absolutely prohibited is to cause the death of a human being intentionally, then these exceptional cases can all be classified as cases of non-intentional killing.

 

Critics of double effect might then claim that a better way of explaining what these cases have in common is to point out that they are exceptions to the prohibition on causing the death of a human being, and that the pattern of justification that they share requires that the agent acts in order to promote a good end and shows adequate respect for the value of human life in so acting. What the critics of double effect emphasize is that the distinction between what is intentional and what is foreseen does not explain the permissibility of these exceptions.

 

T.M. Scanlon (2008) has recently developed this kind of criticism by arguing that the appeal of double effect is, fundamentally, illusory: an agent's intentions are not relevant to the permissibility of an action in the way that the proponents of the principle of double effect would claim, though an agent's intentions are relevant to moral assessments of the way in which the agent deliberated. That an agent intended to bring about a certain harm does not explain why the action was impermissible, but it can explain what is morally faulty about the agent's reasoning in pursuing that line of action.

 

So the abortion is a self-defense act against an aggressor....the baby?  I am not buying that.

 

In your example of the pregnant woman who has uterine cancer. The removal of the cancerous uterus will result in the death of the baby but it would be permissible under the principle of double effect.

The conditions of double-effect are satisfied in this case: 1) The act itself is good; it is the removal of a diseased organ. 2) All that one intends is the removal of the diseased organ. One does not want the death of the baby, either as a means or an end. Nonetheless, one sees that the unborn child will die as a result of the removal of the diseased organ. 3) The good action, the healing of the woman, arises from the removal of the diseased uterus, not from the regrettable death of the baby which is foreseen and unintended. 4) The unintended and indirect death of the child is not disproportionate to the good which is done, which is saving the mother’s life.

 

 

Edited December 19, 2012 by Papist

[Kevin]

So the abortion is a self-defense act against an aggressor....the baby?  I am not buying that.

 

In your example of the pregnant woman who has uterine cancer. The removal of the cancerous uterus will result in the death of the baby but it would be permissible under the principle of double effect.

The conditions of double-effect are satisfied in this case: 1) The act itself is good; it is the removal of a diseased organ. 2) All that one intends is the removal of the diseased organ. One does not want the death of the baby, either as a means or an end. Nonetheless, one sees that the unborn child will die as a result of the removal of the diseased organ. 3) The good action, the healing of the woman, arises from the removal of the diseased uterus, not from the regrettable death of the baby which is foreseen and unintended. 4) The unintended and indirect death of the child is not disproportionate to the good which is done, which is saving the mother’s life.

 

I think I mentioned at the beginning of this, that there have been many cases of people one might consider as innocent who killed people - schizophrenics, for example, who may be as pure as driven snow, but because of a brain problem and through no fault of their own act as "aggressors".

 

Yes, you keep explaining it to me, but actually, there is really no point, because even if I accepted this, there would still be hypothetical cases or indeed actual cases (I am no doctor) where this doctrine would nevertheless require the mother to die with the unborn child who would already die if one of these methods were not applicable. Which is insane. I only hope that somehow, double-effect can be extended to such a case. I recall that there was a similarly insane doctrine about the assured damnation of unbaptized infants that underwent a slight qualification in order to avoid such an insane conclusion, so I can only hope this will happen, or that medical technology somehow makes this impossible.

 

 

http://www.phatmass.com/phorum/topic/125706-planned-parenthood-changes-its-stripes/page-5
See post # 92

 

 

 

I understand that the pro-choice lobby probably did distort the issue - but by question is not about that any more. I am not really even considering probable instances, but logically possible ones, and what doctrine would seemingly require.

Edited December 19, 2012 by Kevin

[Papist]

I think I mentioned at the beginning of this, that there have been many cases of people one might consider as innocent who were killing - schizophrenics, for example, may be as pure as driven snow, but because of a brain problem act as "aggressors".

 

Yes, you keep explaining it to me, but actually, there is really no point, because even if I accepted this, there would still be hypothetical cases or indeed actual cases (I am no doctor) where this doctrine would nevertheless require the mother to die with the unborn child who would already die if one of these methods were not applicable. Which is insane. I only hope that somehow, double-effect can be extended to such a case. I recall that there was a similarly insane doctrine about the assured damnation of unbaptized infants that underwent a slight qualification in order to avoid such an insane conclusion, so I can only hope this will happen, or that medical technology somehow makes this impossible.

 

I understand that they probably are. I am not really even considering probable instances, but logically possible ones.

 

What doctrine is this?

[theculturewarrior]

I am going to need to think about this thread.  I will respond to it later.  There are childish issues that I must attend to first.

[Kevin]

What doctrine is this?

 

This is from New Advent, but I think it's accurate:

 

The Catholic teaching is uncompromising on this point, that all who depart this life without baptism, be it of water, or blood, or desire, are perpetually excluded from the vision of God. This teaching is grounded, as we have seen, on Scripture and tradition, and the decrees of the Church. Moreover, that those who die in original sin, without ever having contracted any actual sin, are deprived of the happiness of heaven is stated explicitly in the Confession of Faith of the Eastern Emperor Michael Palæologus, which had been proposed to him by Pope Clement IV in 1267, and which he accepted in the presence of Gregory X at the Second Council of Lyons in 1274. The same doctrine is found also in the Decree of Union of the Greeks, in the Bull "Lætentur Caeli" of Pope Eugene IV, in the Profession of Faith prescribed for the Greeks by Pope Gregory XIII, and in that authorized for the Orientals by Urban VIII and Benedict XIV. Many Catholic theologians have declared that infants dying without baptism are excluded from the beatific vision; but as to the exact state of these souls in the next world they are not agreed.

 

Now this position is altered:

 

On this subject, the 1992 Catechism of the Catholic Church states: "As regards children who have died without Baptism, the Church can only entrust them to the mercy of God, as she does in her funeral rites for them. Indeed, the great mercy of God who desires that all men should be saved, and Jesus' tenderness toward children which caused him to say: "Let the children come to me, do not hinder them," allows us to hope that there is a way of salvation for children who have died without Baptism. All the more urgent is the Church's call not to prevent little children coming to Christ through the gift of holy Baptism."

 

And yes, this is an alteration of doctrine: the first says "No Hope" the second says "Hope".

 

I really really really hope you don't want to say that the change doesn't mean what I take it as meaning, and that unbaptized infants are in fact damned (or put in Limbo, which is the same thing since the essence of damnation is exclusion from the Beatific Vision).

[Kevin]

I am going to need to think about this thread.  I will respond to it later.  There are childish issues that I must attend to first.

 

You shouldn't. Actually, I am going to abandon this thread, because it is distressing me too much. So at least, you'll have to carry on without me.

[Papist]

This is from New Advent, but I think it's accurate:

 

The Catholic teaching is uncompromising on this point, that all who depart this life without baptism, be it of water, or blood, or desire, are perpetually excluded from the vision of God. This teaching is grounded, as we have seen, on Scripture and tradition, and the decrees of the Church. Moreover, that those who die in original sin, without ever having contracted any actual sin, are deprived of the happiness of heaven is stated explicitly in the Confession of Faith of the Eastern Emperor Michael Palæologus, which had been proposed to him by Pope Clement IV in 1267, and which he accepted in the presence of Gregory X at the Second Council of Lyons in 1274. The same doctrine is found also in the Decree of Union of the Greeks, in the Bull "Lætentur Caeli" of Pope Eugene IV, in the Profession of Faith prescribed for the Greeks by Pope Gregory XIII, and in that authorized for the Orientals by Urban VIII and Benedict XIV. Many Catholic theologians have declared that infants dying without baptism are excluded from the beatific vision; but as to the exact state of these souls in the next world they are not agreed.

 

Now this position teaching is altered better explained :

 

On this subject, the 1992 Catechism of the Catholic Church states: "As regards children who have died without Baptism, the Church can only entrust them to the mercy of God, as she does in her funeral rites for them. Indeed, the great mercy of God who desires that all men should be saved, and Jesus' tenderness toward children which caused him to say: "Let the children come to me, do not hinder them," allows us to hope that there is a way of salvation for children who have died without Baptism. All the more urgent is the Church's call not to prevent little children coming to Christ through the gift of holy Baptism."

 

And yes, this is an alteration of doctrine: the first says "No Hope" the second says "Hope".

 

I really really really hope you don't want to say that the change doesn't mean what I take it as meaning, and that unbaptized infants are in fact damned (or put in Limbo, which is the same thing since the essence of damnation is exclusion from the Beatific Vision).

 

Fixed.

 

_{NOTE: newadvent.org is not doctrine.}

[Kevin]

Fixed.

 

_{NOTE: newadvent.org is not doctrine.}

 

I definitely understand that it isn't from the mouth of the Church, but it cited enough encyclicals to give it credibility as reflecting the position of the church.

 

However, as I said, I'm disengaging from this, because it is too stressful for me.

[Papist]

I definitely understand that it isn't from the mouth of the Church, but it cited enough encyclicals to give it credibility as reflecting the position of the church.

 

However, as I said, I'm disengaging from this, because it is too stressful for me.

 

Sorry. I didn't mean to upset you.