Soul Gender?

[scardella]

[quote name='Apotheoun' date='Jul 5 2005, 10:21 AM']The soul is the immaterial and substantial form of the human person. 

The fact that the soul is immaterial also means that it is indivisible, i.e., it means that it cannot be broken into parts or pieces, and so, it is not composite.  Furthermore, if it were composite instead of simple, there would not be one substantial form, but many, and a man would be as many beings as he had substantial forms, and this is clearly not the case.

You can read more about the spirituality, simplicity, and immorality of the soul in the Summa Theologica (Prima Pars, Q. 75, Q. 76, Q. 79) and the Summa Contra Gentiles (Part II, chapters, 57, 58, 76, 78, and 79).
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That's not doctrinal, even though he is a giant in western theological and philosophical thought. (As far as I know, he is not considered a "Church Father" either.) I was looking for something from the Magisterium that would make it doctrinal. Or, at the very least, something from the Magisterium that hinges upon it or implies that it is universally accepted.

Edited July 5, 2005 by scardella

[scardella]

Oh, and when I get a chance, I'll look over and try to understand the Summa Theologica and Summa Contra Gentiles stuff.

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='scardella' date='Jul 5 2005, 08:40 AM']That's not doctrinal, even though he is a giant in western theological and philosophical thought.  (As far as I know, he is not considered a "Church Father" either.)  I was looking for something from the Magisterium that would make it doctrinal.  Or, at the very least, something from the Magisterium that hinges upon it or implies that it is universally accepted.
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It is a doctrine, because to assert its opposite is to posit multiple beings in man, and that is heresy. The vast majority of definitive doctrines have been taught through non-defining acts of the Ordinary Magisterium. Very few have been taught through solemn defining acts of the Extraordinary Magisterium.

[scardella]

[quote name='Apotheoun' date='Jul 5 2005, 11:10 AM']It is a doctrine, because to assert its opposite is to posit multiple beings in man, and that is heresy.  The vast majority of definitive doctrines have been taught through non-defining acts of the Ordinary Magisterium.  Very few have been taught through solemn defining acts of the Extraordinary Magisterium.
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How is a non-simple soul positing multiple beings in man?

Is the simplicity of the soul in the CCC? Is it referred to by ecumenical council documents? the CDF? encyclicals? apostolic letters? If it's doctrine, it has to be referenced or documented somewhere in the Magisterium. So far, nobody has done that. I just want one specific example of the Magisterium that assumes it, references it or flat out says it.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote name='scardella' date='Jul 5 2005, 12:13 PM']How is a non-simple soul positing multiple beings in man?

Is the simplicity of the soul in the CCC? Is it referred to by ecumenical council documents?  the CDF?  encyclicals? apostolic letters?  If it's doctrine, it has to be referenced or documented somewhere in the Magisterium.  So far, nobody has done that.  I just want one specific example of the Magisterium that assumes it, references it or flat out says it.
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First, a non-simple soul is a contradiction in terms. By definition, the soul is the substantial form of the body. By definition, substantial forms are simple. Thus, if you are talking about a "non-simple" soul, then you are not really talking about a soul at all, but a combination of substantial forms. If there are multiple substantial forms making up one "soul" (now a misnomer) then you must have two beings, one for each substantial form.

Second, what you are asking for is a citation of a doctrinal definition or declaration by the Magisterium. But there are things which are doctrine yet are not defined or declared by the Magisterium. Whenever the saints and bishops of the Church speak with one voice on an issue, that carries the weight of doctrine, precisely because it [i]is[/i] doctrine, simply not a doctrine which has been declared/defined.

Every Catholic philosopher that I have ever read who has discussed the soul has done so with the understanding that the soul is simple. To argue otherwise, even if it has not been defined/declared, is to depart from the doctrine taught by the Church.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]365 The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the "form" of the body:234 i.e., it is because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature.[/quote]

[quote]We, therefore, directing our apostolic attention, to which alone it belongs to define these things, to such splendid testimony and to the common opinion of the holy fathers and doctors, declare with the approval of the sacred council that the said apostle and evangelist, John, observed the right order of events in saying that when Christ was already dead one of the soldiers opened his side with a spear. Moreover, with the approval of the said council, we reject as erroneous and contrary to the truth of the catholic faith every doctrine or proposition rashly asserting that the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is not of itself and essentially the form of the human body, or casting doubt on this matter. In order that all may know the truth of the faith in its purity and all error may be excluded, we define that anyone who presumes henceforth to assert defend or hold stubbornly that the rational or intellectual soul is not [b]the form of the human body of itself and essentially[/b], is to be considered a heretic.

- Council of Vienne (1312) [emphasis mine][/quote]

The soul is the form of the human body of itself and essentially. If the soul were composite, there would be something more essential to the form of the human body, namely, the composite parts of which the soul was made.

More importantly, however, I would like to point out that the Council, itself authoritative, still thought it of great importance to reiterate the fact that its teachings are consistent with the testimony and common teaching of the holy fathers and doctors.

Now all of the Fathers and Doctors that I know of, when discussing the soul, do so with the teaching that the soul is simple. It would be unwise to think that this is not enough, and that only a declaration or a definition of a Council can make a doctrine "real."

- Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[scardella]

I'm still in the process of reading the Aquinas stuff, but in Question 75, Article 5 "Whether the Soul Is Composed of Matter and Form?" it states

[quote]I answer that ... But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, [i]is [b]in[/b] the intellectual soul.[/i][/quote]

Here we see that Aquinas is implying knowledge is contained in the soul.

In Question 76, Article 1, it says
[quote]I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. [/quote]

Is he identifying the intellect with the soul here? Where did the knowledge go? I see distinction between knowledge and intellect.

He continues later on
[quote]But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man.[/quote]

One [b]can[/b] think in a uniquely masculine way without regard to the body.

and later

[quote]First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect.[/quote]

man's appetites are different from women's appetites.

and this is worth mentioning:
[quote]Reply to Objection 4: The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body.[/quote]

In Question 76, Article 3
[quote] I answer that ...  If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. ... We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul.[/quote]

Here's where the beef comes in Q76, A4:
[quote] In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual being---for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort---maintained that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption, all of which is clearly false.[/quote]

My problem here is that man cannot exist without being either male or female. As such, for man "to be", he has to be male or female. One cannot separate the maleness/femaleness or intellect or will or knowledge without changing who the person is. If you remove I guess what I'm arguing is that a male soul is substantially different from the female soul, not accidentally.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]My problem here is that man cannot exist without being either male or female. As such, for man "to be", he has to be male or female. One cannot separate the maleness/femaleness or intellect or will or knowledge without changing who the person is. If you remove I guess what I'm arguing is that a male soul is substantially different from the female soul, not accidentally.[/quote]

I think if you take a little time with it, you will realize that you're putting the cart before the horse in the above. You are right that for I]man[/I] to be, he must be male or female. But that is because one cannot talk about "man" without refering to a [i]person[/i]. A man's soul cannot be substantially different from a woman's soul on account of sex, because sex belongs to the [i]person[/i], and only the person. Man can't be reduced to his animating principle.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man.[/quote]

[quote]One [b]can[/b] think in a uniquely masculine way without regard to the body.[/quote]

[quote]First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect.[/quote]

[quote]man's appetites are different from women's appetites.[/quote]

No one is arguing that male and female appetites are the same, nor that man and woman think exactly alike. Perhaps an analogy will help:

Lets imagine two rivers, one is very wide and runs in a fairly straight direction, while the other is very narrow and meanders across the countryside.

Now let us imagine that a precise amount of force is applied to the water in each in order to make the river run, and the river will only run for as long as that force is applied. Moreover, lets imagine that the same amount of force is applied to both rivers. It is clear that the water in the broad straight river will flow slowly (the force is spread out), while the narrow river will rage and crash as it turns.

No one argues that the rivers are very different in their operations. Sure both are rivers, but one runs straight and slow while the other runs fast with twists and turns. In the same way man and woman, while both equally human, differ in their operations (like their appetites, their manner of thinking, etc).

However, this does not mean that the animating force which moves the water is somehow different from one river to the next, or, analogously, that the soul of a man must be different from that of a woman. Indeed, the force which moves the water is the same, and it would be wrong to gather from the operations of the rivers that one is a "broad, slow" force and the other a "narrow, fast" force. In the same way, it would be wrong to gather from the differing appetites and ways of thinking between men and women that somehow their [i]souls[/i] are male or female.

I hope that helps, rather than just making things more confusing.

- Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='scardella' date='Jul 5 2005, 03:04 PM']man's appetites are different from women's appetites.
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You are saying things that Aquinas is not saying. I see nowhere in any of his writings a distinction between "male appetites" and "female appetites," where in the Summa is this distinction made?

[Semperviva]

[quote name='Apotheoun' date='Jul 6 2005, 11:08 AM']You are saying things that Aquinas is not saying.  I see nowhere in any of his writings a distinction between "male appetites" and "female appetites," where in the Summa is this distinction made?
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...um, sounds like Thomist Fundamentalism being concieved... if its not in the Summa, it can't be true...

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote name='Semperviva' date='Jul 6 2005, 12:08 PM']...um, sounds like Thomist Fundamentalism being concieved... if its not in the Summa, it can't be true...
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In Todd's defense, I don't think that this is what he is saying. I think his argument is that you should have a good reason to assert something, and there is no reason provided by St. Thomas to assert such a division of appetites.

Personally, I would be even more strong in my retort: If you are going to assert something that Aquinas doesn't explicitly assert, you should have some kind of [i]prima facie[/i] evidence for the belief. Scardella hasn't provided any reason for us to think that division of the sexes is reasonable from a thomistic theology.

[Apotheoun]

The appetites are simply the natural inclinations of a being to a particular end or good. I think that some people are reading things into the philosophical language used by the Church in order to serve a modern agenda.

Moreover, as I've made clear before, I am not a Thomist; but nevertheless, when reading a man's writings, you cannot give them any meaning that may please you personally. That is why I asked for evidence that Thomas' use of the term "appetite" was the same as that of Scardella.

[scardella]

[quote name='Apotheoun' date='Jul 6 2005, 02:34 PM']The appetites are simply the seeking of the end or goal of a natural inclination.  I think that some people are reading things into the philosophical language used by the Church in order to serve a modern agenda.

Moreover, as I've made clear before, I am not a Thomist; but nevertheless, when reading a man's writings, you cannot give them any meaning that may please you personally.  That is why I asked for evidence that Thomas' use of the term "appetite" was the same as that of Scardella.
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Is JPII's understanding of appetite the same as Thomas? I'm a lot more familiar w/ JPII's thought than Aquinas. I don't think I'm a Thomist, really. I've just been trying to respond to him being brought up. It's been a while since I read Love and Responsibilty, but that's where I'm getting my understanding of appetite.

As far as I know, the sexual appetite is different in men and women. Hence, men being attracted to women and vice versa. Not only that, but the [b]way[/b] that men and women apprehend the good is different. That's why homosexual relationships between men are different than homosexual relationships between women, and those relationships are different than a heterosexual relationship.

The only kind of agenda that I've got is that your responses don't seem to add up to me, and that's bothering me. I've responded with my understanding of things, and I don't see how they're contrary to any teachings of the Church. If there's one thing I [b]don't[/b] want to be, it's heretical.

[Semperviva]

[quote name='JeffCR07' date='Jul 6 2005, 01:45 PM']In Todd's defense, I don't think that this is what he is saying. I think his argument is that you should have a good reason to assert something, and there is[b] no reason provided by St. Thomas[/b] to assert such a division of appetites.

Personally, I would be even more strong in my retort: If you are going to assert something that Aquinas doesn't explicitly assert, you should have some kind of [i]prima facie[/i] evidence for the belief. Scardella hasn't provided any reason for us to think that division of the sexes is reasonable from a thomistic theology.
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i agree with your last sentence, but why are we stopping at thomas? john paul diden't..... btw, was kidding about todd being fundamentalist (i know yer not todd ) just becuz some actually [i]think[/i] that way about Thomas, or at least act as if Thomas=infallible and center their ideologies around him and not Christ--of course you need good reasons for an assertion.......just [i]saaaayin[/i]' that one[i] very likely could [/i]have a good reason for an assertion, even if its[b] not[/b] explicetly Thomistic. yeah its safe to stick with him, but what do you lose by not branching out from him either? you lose alot...even thomas had assertions...they came to him from a study and grace...yes, his assetions make sense, there was reason behind his assertions...he had good reason to make them...although scardella may not be able to express his reasons with thomistic texts he is not ipso facto in error... i am not at this point agreeing with scardella's point per se, but more with his way of thinking ... going outside the thomistic box...

just as something (somewhat) irrelevent--- I'm not saying we should be against Thomas, but we can't say generally well "there's no good reason from Thomas to assert that. debate over." i think Thomas would be disappointed in us if we stopped with him.....when going towards a destination---the path being towards God ultimetely...you come to a place where you[i] seee [/i]more clearly what your destination is and you woulden't just stay there...you get a small glimpse of it...this is what thomas in his greatness does...he's just a small road sign pointing us further, closer to our destiny of deep and fuller union with jesus christ..seeing more clearly through him, it would spur you on to keep going on that road, into deeper knowledge...progression in grace and then wisdom...always go further...don't end your thinking with Thomas...he's a roadsign not a destination...this is exactly what john paul did as he developed his ideas in continuation with and combination of thomas, john of the cross and the phenomenoligists...[color=red]i'm sure[/color] you all know this already so feel free to disregard the rambling...

Edited July 6, 2005 by Semperviva

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='scardella' date='Jul 6 2005, 01:10 PM']Is JPII's understanding of appetite the same as Thomas?  I'm a lot more familiar w/ JPII's thought than Aquinas.  I don't think I'm a Thomist, really.  I've just been trying to respond to him being brought up.  It's been a while since I read Love and Responsibilty, but that's where I'm getting my understanding of appetite.

As far as I know, the sexual appetite is different in men and women.  Hence, men being attracted to women and vice versa.  Not only that, but the [b]way[/b] that men and women apprehend the good is different.  That's why homosexual relationships between men are different than homosexual relationships between women, and those relationships are different than a heterosexual relationship.

The only kind of agenda that I've got is that your responses don't seem to add up to me, and that's bothering me.  I've responded with my understanding of things, and I don't see how they're contrary to any teachings of the Church.  If there's one thing I [b]don't[/b] want to be, it's heretical.
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Pope John Paul II was a phenomenologist.

The appetites in the Thomist sense are not masculine and feminine; instead, they are merely the natural inclination to a good.

There is no such thing as a male or female soul.

The sexual appetite in men and women is identical, because it is simply the seeking of a natural good, and moreover, the soul itself is not reducible to the appetites or any other operations of a being.

You seem to be confusing disordered appetites with natural inclinations.

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='scardella' date='Jul 6 2005, 01:10 PM'][. . .]

Not only that, but the [b]way[/b] that men and women apprehend the good is different. 

[. . .]
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That fact that men and women [i]may[/i] apprehend the good in a different way, does not mean that their souls are "masculine" and "feminine." Once again, you seem to be confusing the composite ([i]hylomorphic[/i]) being, i.e., the person, with the substantial form, i.e., the soul. They are not identical.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]don't end your thinking with Thomas[/quote]

I have no set theological/philosophical school at this point. If anything, I am more Anselmian than Thomistic, but even then, I do far too much analytic philosophy to be considered a neo-scholastic. Moreover, I enjoy reading phenomenology, though I am unsure about some of its premises.

Edited July 7, 2005 by JeffCR07

[Semperviva]

[quote name='JeffCR07' date='Jul 6 2005, 09:14 PM']If anything, I am more Anselmian than Thomistic
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[i]
Well[/i] then, don't end your thinking with Anselm if the "if anything" implies your hesitance as yet subscribe to any [i]one[/i] philosophical school I commend you...cuz ultimetely we're not called to be in a school of anselm, thomas, john paul, its the thought and mind of Jesus Christ which we are to be one with...and when we start getting to into the thought of a man and not the God-man, we will inevitably trip up in our thought...always...uuh, anyways, moving along,
[i]note disclaimer: i know nothing[/i]

[scardella]

[quote name='Apotheoun' date='Jul 6 2005, 03:31 PM']Once again, you seem to be confusing the composite ([i]hylomorphic[/i]) being, i.e., the person, with the substantial form, i.e., the soul.  They are not identical.
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No, I don't think I am. However, I do have a problem because any and all characteristics dependent on the hylomorphic composite will necessarily be annihilated (as I understand what you're saying) at the point of death. That is what I have a problem with. There's nothing preventing those characteristics from being completely different at the Resurrection.

Also, the simplicity of the soul seems to preclude perfection or imperfection of it. Thus, Purgatory would make no sense.

As a for instance,
Jeff has a certain "Jeffie-ness" about him, so to speak. One of the particular things about Jeff is that Jeff is a guy. Now, with your understanding, it would seem that he could be given a glorified woman's body and be Jenny at the Resurrection. I'm sure that he wouldn't appreciate that. Furthermore, in the interim period between death and Resurrection, your understanding would seem to imply that Jeff's soul would have no sort of consciousness to be able to think "I am Jeff" or "I had a male body that died; I wonder what my glorified body will be like?" or even revel in the Beatific Vision. It would seem like the interim would be more like an anonymous soul with "Jeff's soul" on it, to make sure that God matched up the right soul with an appropriate glorified body. Then all of a sudden, what would we have? Would that person, who is an apparent new person, be Jeff? How could we know? Would he still have "Jeffie-ness"? Your understanding would seem to leave that in the air.