Argument against Double Effect?

[Didacus]

[quote name='Jake Huether' date='Jul 7 2005, 04:13 PM'][snip]

God bless you brother!  Thanks again.
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Entirely mutual I assure you.

We seem to be on the same road, heading in the same direction and at almost the precise same point.

I'm 31 years old, and feel I have wasted much time myself. The big awakening for me was the death of JPII... Since then I have been trying to catch up my knowledge for the last 10 years. Oh, it was not all wasted, I got married, graduated, started raising a family of three children and all... but I could have done much more... learned much more...

I will be away this weekend... but will come back and post a summary on Monday.

Farethee well... brother, friend.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote name='Didacus' date='Jul 5 2005, 03:19 PM']JeffCR07, I believe you have some very strong arguments there.

My thoughts turns around free will.  As I see it, free will is what completes the love of humans towards God.  It is this free will that allows us to choose to love Him.  If not for free will, then we would be no better than God's robots, simply doing as we are told and never more.

Can you love your TV?  Can your TV love you in return?  Of course your television cannot love you in return.  Had we not free will, would we be any better than a TV for God?  Can love exist without there being a will to bring this love into existance?  And should not this will be a free one?

God thus did not make a mistake in giving free will and opening humanity to the possibility of sin, he simply made humanity with the complete possibility of fullness of love.

Now here is the scary thought, if God can give free will, is it not logical that God has a free will of His own?  Thus I cannot accept that God only had one option in creating this world.  Having free will Himself, He was open to the possibility of making an evil world.  Worst still, could God not choose to be evil?  Could he not choose to be sinful in an aciton if He does have freewill?  Scary little thought....
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Free will does not rest in multiplicity of courses of actions, but in the concent of the will towards that action, as Anselm teaches in his [i]De Libertate[/i].

If our free will resided in our ability to sin, or our "possible courses of actions," then it would indeed, as you say, logically follow that God, the confirmed Angels, and all the Saints in Heaven are not free.

However, freedom, as Anselm defines it, is the ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake. Thus, even if God can do only one thing (ie no possible worlds) he will always be perfectly free, for He always keeps his uprightness of will (indeed, He IS uprightness of will) and everything that He does, He does for the sake of his own perfect goodness

Edited July 9, 2005 by JeffCR07

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]Main Entry: free·dom
Pronunciation: 'frE-d&m
Function: noun
1 : the quality or state of being free: as a : the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action b : liberation from slavery or restraint or from the power of another[/quote]

This definition of Freedom is clearly one that has its origins in 16th/17th Century nominalism. It is not in accord with the ancients and Doctors of the Church.

I suggest reading [i]De Libertate[/i] by St. Anselm of Canterbury, because he rules.

Edited July 9, 2005 by JeffCR07

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]Will only remains free when it doesn't perform evil. If one's will is to perform evil it is truly not free... In other words... By one's free will, they chose to give up their free will.[/quote]

Again, I must push back, and again, with Anselm, for he speaks of this directly. We never "lose" our free will, which is our ability to keep uprightness for its own sake, even when we do not possess that uprightness itself (mortal sin):

[quote]CHAPTER THREE
How after [Satan and Adam] had made themselves servants
of sin, they still had free choice. What free choice is.

S. You have convinced me that, before sin, nothing indeed prevented
this [i.e., prevented Satan’s and Adam’s having had free
choice]. But after they made themselves servants of sin, how is it
that they were able to keep free choice?

T. Although they had subjected themselves to sin, they were not
able to destroy their natural freedom of choice. However, they
were able to cause themselves no longer to be able to use this freedom
without a grace different from the grace they had originally
possessed.

S. I believe, but I desire to understand.

T. Let us examine first the kind of freedom of choice they had
before sin, when certainly they did have free choice.

S. I am expectantly awaiting this [examination].

T. For what end do you think they had that freedom of choice?
Was it in order to obtain what they willed, or was it in order to
will what they ought to will and what was advantageous for them
to will?

S. To will what they ought to will and what was advantageous
to will.

T. Therefore, the end for which they had freedom of choice is
uprightness-of-will. For, surely, as long as they willed what they
ought to have willed, they had uprightness-of-will.

S. That's right.

T. When we say that the end for which they had freedom is
uprightness-of-will, there is still doubt unless we add a further
point. So I ask: in what manner did they have this freedom whose
end is uprightness-of-will? Did they have it (1) in order to acquire
uprightness-of-will without anyone's giving it, since they did not yet
have it, or (2) in order to receive the uprightness-of-will they did
not yet have if it were given to them to have, or (3) in order to
desert the uprightness-of-will they had received, and to recover it
by themselves after they had deserted it, or (4) in order always to
keep the uprightness-of-will they had received?

S. (NOT 1) I do not think they had freedom in order to acquire
uprightness without anyone's giving it, because they were not able
to have anything which they did not receive. (NOT 2) But because
we must not believe that they were created without upright wills,
we must not say that they had freedom in order to receive from a
giver [the gift of the uprightness] that they did not yet have, in
order that they might have it. Yet, we must not deny that they had
the freedom to receive this same uprightness again if they deserted
it and if it were returned to them by the one who originally gave
it. (We often see evidence of this in men who are led back to justice
from injustice by heavenly grace.)

T. It is true, as you say, that [Satan and Adam] were able to receive
back the lost uprightness if it were given to them again. But
we are asking about that freedom which they had before they
sinned (when, no doubt, they had free choice), not about that freedom
which no one would need if he had never deserted the truth.

S. Well then, I shall proceed to reply to what remains of your
question. (NOT 3) It is not true that they had freedom in order to
desert this uprightness, for to desert uprightness-of-will is to sin,
and you have already shown that the ability to sin is neither freedom
nor a part of freedom. Nor did they receive freedom in order
to recover, by their own efforts, the uprightness they had deserted;
for this uprightness was given to the end that it never be deserted.
For the ability to recover uprightness-once-deserted would
beget a negligence in keeping uprightness-already-possessed. (4)
Therefore, it follows that freedom of choice was given to rational
nature in order to keep the uprightness-of-will which it had received.

T. You have given a good reply to my questions. But we must
still examine that on account of which rational nature was under
obligation to keep this uprightness: Was it for the sake of the uprightness
itself or was it for the sake of something else?

S. If freedom-of-choice had not been given to rational nature
in order for it to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this uprightness
itself, then freedom would not have been conducive to
justice, since it is evident that justice is uprightness-of-will kept for
its own sake. But we believe that freedom of choice is conducive
to justice. Therefore, we must maintain incontrovertibly that rational
nature did not receive freedom except in order to keep uprightness-
of-will for the sake of this uprightness itself.

T. Accordingly, since all freedom is ability, that freedom of
choice is the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this
uprightness itself.

S. It cannot be anything else.

T. So it is now clear that a free choice is nothing other than a
choice which is able to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this
uprightness itself.

S. This conclusion is certainly obvious. But as long as [choice]
had this uprightness, it was able to keep what it had. However,
after it has deserted uprightness, how is it able to keep what it does
not have? Therefore, in the absence of the uprightness which can
be kept, the free choice which is able to keep uprightness is also
absent; for a choice is not able to keep what it does not have.

T. Even if uprightness-of-will is absent, rational nature still has
without diminution what belongs to it essentially. For in my opinion
we have no ability which by itself suffices to any actual deed;
nevertheless, when those conditions are absent without which our
abilities are not at all brought into operation, we are said to have
these abilities in ourselves without diminution. Indeed, no instrument
suffices by itself to accomplish anything; nevertheless, when
those conditions are absent without which we cannot use the instrument,
we say without falsity that we have the instrument for a
given kind of work. I shall give you an example of this in one case
so that you may notice it in many cases. No one who has sight is
said to be altogether unable to see a mountain.

S. Surely, anyone who is unable to see a mountain has no sight.

T. So anyone who has sight has the ability and the instrument
for seeing a mountain. However, if there is no mountain present
and you say to someone, “See the mountain,” he will answer: “I
cannot, because there is no mountain here; but if there were a
mountain here, I would be able to see it.” Likewise, if there were
a mountain but were no light, he would answer the one instructing
him to see the mountain: “I cannot, since there is no light here;
but if there were light, I would be able [to see the mountain].” Or
again, if a mountain and light are present to a man who has sight,
but if something obstructs his sight—for example, if someone covers
the man's eyes—then he will say that he is not able to see the
mountain; but if nothing were blocking his sight, without doubt
he would have the ability to see the mountain.

S. Everyone knows all this.

T. So don’t you recognize that the power of seeing a material
object is (1) one power in the one who sees, (2) another power
in the object to be seen, and (3) still another power in the medium
(i.e., neither in the one who sees nor in the object to be seen)?
Moreover, that power which is in the medium is (3a) one power
with respect to aiding [the seeing] and (3b) another power with respect
to not impeding [the seeing], i.e., when nothing that could
impede does impede.

S. I see this clearly.

T. Therefore, these capabilities are four in number. If any one
of them is missing, the other three are not able to accomplish anything
either singularly or collectively. Nevertheless, when other of
the capabilities are absent, we do not deny that the man who has
sight does have sight (i.e., the instrument or ability to see) or that
the visible object is able to be seen or that light is able to aid sight.

CHAPTER FOUR
How [Satan and Adam] have the ability to keep uprightness,
which they do not have.

T. However, the fourth power [viz., 3b] is called a power improperly.
For when what is accustomed to obstruct sight does not
obstruct sight, then it is said to give the capability to see only because
it does not remove the capability to see.
However, the power of seeing light consists only of three factors,
for in this case what is seen and what aids sight are identical.
Doesn't everyone know this?

S. Surely no one is ignorant of it.

T. Therefore, if there is no object nearby to be seen and if when
we are placed in darkness and have our eyes closed or covered,
we still have within us the ability to see any visible thing whatsoever,
what prevents our having the ability to keep uprightness-ofwill
for the sake of this uprightness itself—even in the absence of
this uprightness—as long as within us we have reason, by which to
recognize it, and will, by which to hold it fast? For the previously
mentioned freedom of choice consists of both of these.

S. You have convinced me that this ability to keep uprightnessof-
will belongs always to rational nature, and that this ability was
free in the choice of the first man and [in the choices] of the angels,
from whom uprightness-of-will was not able to be removed
against their wills.[/quote]

Edited July 9, 2005 by JeffCR07

[Jake Huether]

JeffCR07,

You the man! Wow. Anselm rocks.

That cleared a lot up for me. It is clear that free will is not "lost" like I had originally thought. Freedom of choice is an instrument that we always have, used to keep uprightness of will for the sake of uprightness itself. Sin, however, removes one of the conditions necessary for the use of such a tool, namely, uprightness. Without uprightness, we've lost uprightness of will, and therefore cannot use our freedom of choice, which we still have.

But I'm trying to figure out how it is that Humanity has it such that these conditions can align so that we still can achieve uprightness of will, yet Satan and his demons cannot.

Here are my thoughts:

So for humanity, we can say that the conditions change continuously (we close our eyes, our shut off the light, etc.), but we have, by the Grace of God, the ability to use our free will and "re-capture" our uprightness. God places the mountain there, we open our eyes... And by the Grace of His Sacraments we are able to continue to use our free will to keep uprightness of will for the sake of uprightness.

Satan and his demons, however, although they still have this tool (which all rational creatures have), are always in the absence of uprightness. The mountain has been permanently removed.

Do I have that right?

I've been reading St. Augustine’s Confessions too, and he also had some insight that helped.

While Anselm clearly explains what freedom of will is, St. Augustine touched on the use, or abuse, of this free will. And this is where my thoughts have been: The difference in our free will, and that of Satan, and why we can turn back to God, yet Satan and his demons cannot.

Here's what I jotted down yesterday while reading. How does this mesh with what Anselm has to say?


Our free will can be mastered by us or by others. (now, learning to use the tool and keep the mountain in sight). St. Augustine talked about how we are basically only second to God, but yet we are mastered by those which where created to be mastered by us!

Angles, being will themselves, are masters of themselves. For this reason when they chose to reject God they cannot be mastered to change their will, which is themselves. They've essentially removed the mountain from their own sight, so that they will never see it - although they continue to retain sight.

We, on the other hand, having a will but not being will are subject to temptation. We can master our own will (which is good), we can hand our will over to be mastered by God (even better - but this also requires mastering our own will), but our will can also be mastered by others - fallen angels, other people, or objects.

Our will then remains free, but the choices we make in free will are determined by who is mastering our free will. Just like the power to see, while remaining ours, is subject to the condition of light, the presence of an object to see, etc. While we retain the tool, if we do not master it ourselves, it may be mastered by others.

It is interesting that in order to prove that we've mastered our will, and that we know we aren't being coerced into a choice, we always must refrain from choosing the choice set before us. Several examples help to explain:

If a bowl of ice-cream is set before me, and I eat it, I'll never know if I was the master of that choice, or if it was my appetite that coerced me. But if I refrain from eating it, then I know that I am truly free.

Or if a bowl of worms is set before me, and I choose not to eat it, I will never know if my stomach coerced me to not eat, but if I do eat it, then I know I was the master of my choice.

Of course - these are examples which show our will mastering our bodies, but the same can be said for sins (both corporal and spiritual).

This is the reason we fast! We practice using our free will, so that in moral choices we may keep an upright will.

And a note on our will once we have died:

At death our spirits are separated from our bodies and we have not a body to master our will, but like angels we can make a definitive yes or no to God (If we are in mortal sin - by the lack of the grace required to make this choice - we've already chosen). In essence, at death, our final state (heaven, hell or purgatory) doesn't depend on our ability to freely chose, but on the conditions that are available to use it. If we died in the absence of an upright will, having chosen to remove the mountain, without a body we cannot obtain the Sacramental Grace necessary for the mountain to be present, our eyes to be open, and the light to shine on the mountain! We, like Satan, have removed the mountain. If we die without an upright will, having chosen to close our eyes or shut out the light (through venial sin), then in Purgatory we don't have a body to help or hinder us, but we're left solely to God's goodness to clean us and make us masters of our own spirit, giving them in free will to be mastered by God, and the light shines and our eyes are opened. If we die with an upright will, then we can clearly make the right choice to say yes to God. We see him, as we see the mountain.



Completely off topic. Like I said, I'm reading St. Augustine. It is incredible that this person from the 300's is talking about "mother" Church, and the Catholic faith, just like we do now. It's so comforting to read this.

God bless.

Edited July 11, 2005 by Jake Huether

[Didacus]

Need a bit more time... will post in about 4 hours.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote name='Jake Huether' date='Jul 11 2005, 11:08 AM']JeffCR07,

You the man! Wow. Anselm rocks.

That cleared a lot up for me. It is clear that free will is not "lost" like I had originally thought. Freedom of choice is an instrument that we always have, used to keep uprightness of will for the sake of uprightness itself. Sin, however, removes one of the conditions necessary for the use of such a tool, namely, uprightness. Without uprightness, we've lost uprightness of will, and therefore cannot use our freedom of choice, which we still have.

But I'm trying to figure out how it is that Humanity has it such that these conditions can align so that we still can achieve uprightness of will, yet Satan and his demons cannot.

Here are my thoughts:

So for humanity, we can say that the conditions change continuously (we close our eyes, our shut off the light, etc.), but we have, by the Grace of God, the ability to use our free will and "re-capture" our uprightness. God places the mountain there, we open our eyes... And by the Grace of His Sacraments we are able to continue to use our free will to keep uprightness of will for the sake of uprightness.

Satan and his demons, however, although they still have this tool (which all rational creatures have), are always in the absence of uprightness. The mountain has been permanently removed.

Do I have that right?

I've been reading St. Augustine’s Confessions too, and he also had some insight that helped.

While Anselm clearly explains what freedom of will is, St. Augustine touched on the use, or abuse, of this free will. And this is where my thoughts have been: The difference in our free will, and that of Satan, and why we can turn back to God, yet Satan and his demons cannot.

Here's what I jotted down yesterday while reading. How does this mesh with what Anselm has to say?
Our free will can be mastered by us or by others. (now, learning to use the tool and keep the mountain in sight). St. Augustine talked about how we are basically only second to God, but yet we are mastered by those which where created to be mastered by us!

Angles, being will themselves, are masters of themselves. For this reason when they chose to reject God they cannot be mastered to change their will, which is themselves. They've essentially removed the mountain from their own sight, so that they will never see it - although they continue to retain sight.

We, on the other hand, having a will but not being will are subject to temptation. We can master our own will (which is good), we can hand our will over to be mastered by God (even better - but this also requires mastering our own will), but our will can also be mastered by others - fallen angels, other people, or objects.

Our will then remains free, but the choices we make in free will are determined by who is mastering our free will. Just like the power to see, while remaining ours, is subject to the condition of light, the presence of an object to see, etc. While we retain the tool, if we do not master it ourselves, it may be mastered by others.

It is interesting that in order to prove that we've mastered our will, and that we know we aren't being coerced into a choice, we always must refrain from choosing the choice set before us. Several examples help to explain:

If a bowl of ice-cream is set before me, and I eat it, I'll never know if I was the master of that choice, or if it was my appetite that coerced me. But if I refrain from eating it, then I know that I am truly free.

Or if a bowl of worms is set before me, and I choose not to eat it, I will never know if my stomach coerced me to not eat, but if I do eat it, then I know I was the master of my choice.

Of course - these are examples which show our will mastering our bodies, but the same can be said for sins (both corporal and spiritual).

This is the reason we fast! We practice using our free will, so that in moral choices we may keep an upright will.

And a note on our will once we have died:

At death our spirits are separated from our bodies and we have not a body to master our will, but like angels we can make a definitive yes or no to God (If we are in mortal sin - by the lack of the grace required to make this choice - we've already chosen). In essence, at death, our final state (heaven, hell or purgatory) doesn't depend on our ability to freely chose, but on the conditions that are available to use it. If we died in the absence of an upright will, having chosen to remove the mountain, without a body we cannot obtain the Sacramental Grace necessary for the mountain to be present, our eyes to be open, and the light to shine on the mountain! We, like Satan, have removed the mountain. If we die without an upright will, having chosen to close our eyes or shut out the light (through venial sin), then in Purgatory we don't have a body to help or hinder us, but we're left solely to God's goodness to clean us and make us masters of our own spirit, giving them in free will to be mastered by God, and the light shines and our eyes are opened. If we die with an upright will, then we can clearly make the right choice to say yes to God. We see him, as we see the mountain.
Completely off topic. Like I said, I'm reading St. Augustine. It is incredible that this person from the 300's is talking about "mother" Church, and the Catholic faith, just like we do now. It's so comforting to read this.

God bless.
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Anselm addresses your question of the division of freedom of choice in the same work that I have quoted above. Here is the chapter:

[quote]CHAPTER FOURTEEN
The division of this same freedom.

S. What remains now is for you to divide this same freedom.
For although in accordance with your definition, freedom is common
to every rational nature, nevertheless God's freedom is quite
different from the freedom possessed by rational creatures; and
among rational creatures there are differences of freedom.

T. [Here are the distinctions appropriate to freedom:]

I. There is an unoriginated freedom of choice, which was neither
created by nor received from anyone else; this freedom is
characteristic only of God.

II. There is a freedom of choice which was both created by and
received from God; this freedom is characteristic of men and angels.
However, this created or received freedom of choice either
(A) does have uprightness to keep or (B) does not have uprightness
to keep.

II-A. The freedom of choice which has uprightness keeps it
either (1) so as to be able to lose it or (2) so as not to be able to
lose it.

II-A-1. The freedom of choice which keeps uprightness
so as to be able to lose it was characteristic of all angels
before the good ones were confirmed and the evil
ones fell; and it characterizes prior to death all those
men who have this uprightness.

II-A-2. But the freedom of choice which keeps uprightness
so as not to be able to lose it is characteristic of
elect angels and elect men—of elect angels after the fall
of the reprobate angels, and of elect men after death.

II-B. However, the freedom of choice which does not have uprightness
lacks it in such way as either (1) to be able to recover it
or (2) not to be able to recover it.

II-B-1. The freedom of choice which does not have uprightness
and yet is able to recover it characterizes only
men who lack it during their lifetime—although many
might never recover it.

II-B-2. However, the freedom of choice which does not
have uprightness and is not able to recover it is characteristic
of reprobate angels and men—of reprobate
angels after their fall and of reprobate men after their
lifetime.

S. Through the favor of God you have so satisfied me with your
definition and division of freedom of choice that I can find nothing
which I must ask regarding them.[/quote]

[Didacus]

first, may I ask if you read this brief thread:

[url="http://www.phatmass.com/phorum/index.php?showtopic=32282&hl=double+effect"]http://www.phatmass.com/phorum/index.php?s...l=double+effect[/url]

?

Second:

JeffCR07,

"Free will does not rest in multiplicity of courses of actions, but in the concent of the will towards that action, as Anselm teaches in his De Libertate."

Thus the free will comes to be free by the intent behind it? As though one man may choose to eat the ice cream out of glutony, and i may choose to eat it to sustain myself? We have the same action, but different intent and thus expressed our wills in a diffrenet manner. Do i understand this right?

After reading further, and collecting my thoughts, i entirely agree that multiplicity of choice of actions is insufficient for free will to exist, however, I still do not understand clearly how its absence can allow free will to exist? Can not the intent in itself be part of the action taken and thus constitute part of the whole action?


[b]"I suggest reading De Libertate by St. Anselm of Canterbury, because he rules." [/b] would you have a link?


Freedom is the ability to keep uprightness.

Though you make a strong argument for this, i fail to see how this is not simply the flip-side of what was stated before hand in this thread.
Can not one simply say: Freedom is the ability to sin? Which is in effect the stand point that was being presented.




I have a bit of trouble with this:

[b]"Indeed, no instrument suffices by itself to accomplish anything; nevertheless, when those conditions are absent without which we cannot use the instrument, we say without falsity that we have the instrument for a given kind of work."[/b]

Can an instrument have work for itself? How can we be free in without falsity we are but instruments and cannot accomplish anything by ourselvse?


and Jake:

"But I'm trying to figure out how it is that Humanity has it such that these conditions can align so that we still can achieve uprightness of will, yet Satan and his demons cannot."

I second this question, and the most part of your comments that follow...

I will post a second post to further my reflections, which in this case are more like questions, which are more specific to this...

[Didacus]

[quote name='JeffCR07' date='Jul 11 2005, 01:51 PM']Anselm addresses your question of the division of freedom of choice in the same work that I have quoted above. Here is the chapter:
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[quote]II-A. The freedom of choice which has uprightness keeps it
either (1) so as to be able to lose it or (2) so as not to be able to
lose it.
[/quote]

[quote]II-B-2. However, the freedom of choice which does not
have uprightness and is not able to recover it is characteristic
of reprobate angels and men—of reprobate
angels after their fall and of reprobate men after their
lifetime.[/quote]

So let me get this straight;

When you have freedom of choice with uprigthcheouness to keep, you can or cannot have the ability to lose it. The same with the lack thereof.

If you cannot, then you may or may not recover it. If you are a reprobate angel or a reprobate man you cannot (woman never fall into this category since woman are always right).

But this does not explain WHy someone is reprobate or not?

Now, I believe I might misunderstand reprobate... please explain more clearly? Is this a state caused by dying in mortal sin?

furthermore, I fail to see any distinction between humans and angels in what is being advanced here, which I thought was one of the main topics being explored;




JEFF, the main points I see in your post are:

"We, on the other hand, having a will but not being will are subject to temptation."

Yes, to this I can entirely agree as one of the fundamentals differences between the will of God and the will of angles/humans.



"Angles, being will themselves, are masters of themselves. For this reason when they chose to reject God they cannot be mastered to change their will, which is themselves."

But why can this not be reversed for angels?



"We, on the other hand, having a will but not being will are subject to temptation. "

Wihtout a doubt, angels are also subject to temptations, unless they would never have fallen. Their temptations are simply not that of earthly flesh... granted... but some temptations to evil must exist - falling to evil does not happen by accident.



"It is interesting that in order to prove that we've mastered our will, and that we know we aren't being coerced into a choice, we always must refrain from choosing the choice set before us."

I understand your examples, and I agree to them to some extent. May I ask, how would you consolidate an example involving life and death and necessity to live? (at the risk of this being a silly question)

If I do not eat the ice-cream, I will die. But I refrain from choosing the option in front of me which would perpetuate my life further and allow myself to die because I value freedom higher than my own life?


And do you have a link to the works of Augustine the Great?

thank you, and I do hope my thoughts are coherent and my questions not a bore.

Fare thee well....

[Guest JeffCR07]

Didacus, God Bless!

I don't have a link to his works, but I do have translations to all of them in pdf format on my computer, if you'd like to check them out, send me a PM with your email address and I'd be more than happy to send you the file!

Now on to your comments/questions:

[quote]first, may I ask if you read this brief thread[/quote]

Yes, I have read it, though Cam is summing up the doctrine. If you are interested, more in depth discussions of the principle can be found [url="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/"]here[/url] or [url="http://www.saintmarys.edu/~incandel/doubleeffect.html"]here[/url].

[quote]Thus the free will comes to be free by the intent behind it? As though one man may choose to eat the ice cream out of glutony, and i may choose to eat it to sustain myself? We have the same action, but different intent and thus expressed our wills in a diffrenet manner. Do i understand this right?[/quote]

Not quite, Anselm points out that free will can be understood in two ways. One in the particular operations, which you are talking about, but more properly in the faculty which produces the operations.

This means that an act can be [i]of[/i] a free will, but an act in itself is not free will. Free will, properly understood, is the ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake. Though intent is part of this definition ([i]for its own sake[/i]) be careful that you do not make that the entirety of the definition: keeping uprightness of will is an objective component.

[quote]After reading further, and collecting my thoughts, i entirely agree that multiplicity of choice of actions is insufficient for free will to exist, however, I still do not understand clearly how its absence can allow free will to exist? Can not the intent in itself be part of the action taken and thus constitute part of the whole action?[/quote]

I am unclear exactly what you are asking here regarding intent, but free will does indeed exist in the absence of the ability to choose to sin or not sin. The Saints and Angels in Heaven, confirmed in their virtue, are even more free than we are, though they cannot choose to do evil.

A man who possesses his rights in a way such that he can never lose them is more free than a man who possesses his rights in such a way that they can be taken from him. Similarly, a man who has the ability to keep uprightness of will in such a way that he cannot lose it is more free than one who has uprightness of will in such a way that it can be removed from him.

[quote]Freedom is the ability to keep uprightness.

Though you make a strong argument for this, i fail to see how this is not simply the flip-side of what was stated before hand in this thread.
Can not one simply say: Freedom is the ability to sin? Which is in effect the stand point that was being presented.[/quote]

No

First, Freedom is the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for its own sake.

Second, this is a far cry from the ability to sin. If the ability to sin were the definition of freedom, then God would not be free, Christ would not be free, and the confirmed angels and Saints in heaven would not be free. None of them are capable of sin, yes all of them are perfectly free.

The ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake and the ability to sin are not "flip sides" of each other in the sense which you are describing. In fact, they are diametrically opposed.

[quote]I have a bit of trouble with this:

"Indeed, no instrument suffices by itself to accomplish anything; nevertheless, when those conditions are absent without which we cannot use the instrument, we say without falsity that we have the instrument for a given kind of work."

Can an instrument have work for itself? How can we be free in without falsity we are but instruments and cannot accomplish anything by ourselvse?[/quote]

I am not quite sure what you are asking here. Anselm is saying that any given instrument cannot accomplish its task alone, it needs something else, but he is noting that when this something else is lacking, we still can claim to have the instrument.

Using his analogy, your eye is an instrument for seeing. But you cannot see without light. However, even when it is dark out, we still say that you have the ability to see, or are capable of seeing, because you possess the instrument needed to see, and would be seeing if it were not for the lack of light.

Similarly, a man in mortal/original sin, who does not possess uprightness, is still said, rightly, to be free, because even though uprightness is lacking, he has the instrument for keeping it if it were present.

[quote]So let me get this straight;

When you have freedom of choice with uprigthcheouness to keep, you can or cannot have the ability to lose it. The same with the lack thereof.

If you cannot, then you may or may not recover it. If you are a reprobate angel or a reprobate man you cannot (woman never fall into this category since woman are always right).

But this does not explain WHy someone is reprobate or not?

Now, I believe I might misunderstand reprobate... please explain more clearly? Is this a state caused by dying in mortal sin?

furthermore, I fail to see any distinction between humans and angels in what is being advanced here, which I thought was one of the main topics being explored;[/quote]

Correct on the above, especially the women part.

When Anselm uses the term "reprobate" he is referring to fallen angels and damned men. These, thought they remain free, will never regain the uprightness which they lost.

With regards to "why" they are reprobate, you could be looking for one of two answers. First, you might be wondering how they become reprobate - that is, how do they come to sin. Second, you might be wondering why God does not allow them more time to repent.

Regarding the first, Anselm has a whole work on the subject, entitled [i]De Casu Diaboli[/i] which I can send to you along with [i]De Libertate[/i] if you would like. Regarding the second, it is simply a matter of Divine Justice. Those who forsake their ubrightness merit condemnation, and do not deserve to have it returned to them.

There is little to distinguish between the operations of the wills of man and angel, and what must be distinguished Anselm discusses.

[i]I[/i] thought we were discussing Double Effect and Possible Worlds

[quote]JEFF, the main points I see in your post are:

"We, on the other hand, having a will but not being will are subject to temptation."[/quote]

Jake typed that, not me

[Jake Huether]

Jeff! Ahh! You're teasing me man. Hahaha. Anselm is so deep. Wow! So, he covers the definition of the defference between the free will of God, man and angels, but you left me hanging! Is there a "why" that Anselm explores? I think I came to the same conclusion as him as to the difference itself, but it is the "why" that I'm attempting to clarify.

Thanks. Is it okay if I PM you and you can send me the pdf's. I would love to read Anselm's work.








[quote]"Angles, being will themselves, are masters of themselves. For this reason when they chose to reject God they cannot be mastered to change their will, which is themselves."

But why can this not be reversed for angels?[/quote]

This is one of the questions I'm struggling with myself. Though I know it is true, it is only on the tip of my mind, and not yet firmly planted in understanding. I take it on faith at this point, but I'd like to be able to understand it better rationally...

I think since Angels are spirits, and because they were created first - they were infused with the knowledge of good and evil (even before Adam and Eve were created). So when they made their choice, since God doesn't coerce or force and there was no other life other than God and them, they made this choice in full knowledge and full will. I can't say they knew the consequences, but they knew they didn't want God. And because they weren't forced into it, but chose it freely without any outside swaying, the are forever set in this way.


[quote]"We, on the other hand, having a will but not being will are subject to temptation. "

Wihtout a doubt, angels are also subject to temptations, unless they would never have fallen. Their temptations are simply not that of earthly flesh... granted... but some temptations to evil must exist - falling to evil does not happen by accident.[/quote]

Actually, now that I think about it... Satan most definitly was NOT tempted. He didn't fall into evil, neither by being tempted nor by accident. He made the choice to reject God all on his own. His followers on the other hand might have been tempted by him to leave God. The Bible says "Satan and his angles". So you may have something here. But if they were tempted, then it makes me wonder why they can't be tempted to change now.

What is it, what property or nature of angel, that makes them firm in their first choices?


The Angels most assuradly were tested (not necessarily tempted but tested). God must have laid before them the choice to be with Him or not. Having made Lucifer the most beautiful of angels, one can see how this test might have gone. But God didn't attempt to sway the angels toward Him or against Him. He simply gave them the choice. In going along with Anselms mountain analogy... God gave them eyes, and they could close them, or keep them open.



[quote]"It is interesting that in order to prove that we've mastered our will, and that we know we aren't being coerced into a choice, we always must refrain from choosing the choice set before us."

I understand your examples, and I agree to them to some extent. May I ask, how would you consolidate an example involving life and death and necessity to live? (at the risk of this being a silly question)

If I do not eat the ice-cream, I will die. But I refrain from choosing the option in front of me which would perpetuate my life further and allow myself to die because I value freedom higher than my own life?[/quote]


I think you are right. It is in choosing freely to be upright in will even in the face of death that may not perpetuate earthly life, but assuredly will bring about life everlasting.

Now, I do see where you are coming from. There are instances where our flesh acts out in instinct to protect us. However, I think a distinction needs to be made in the practice of free will and the actual use of free choice in keeping an upright will. Like it wouldn't be an act against free will to jump out of the way if a car is coming at us. It would be quite stupid to stand in the way and die in order to prove to yourself that you are the master of your will. You will have surly proven this, but to what end? The reason we fast and become masters of our will isn't for this life, but for the next. What good is practicing our mastery of will to the point of death, and not being able to use this mastery to keep an upright will in the face of spiritual tempatation?


[quote]And do you have a link to the works of Augustine the Great?[/quote]

I don't. I bought a copy of Augustine's Confessions at a used book store for $5.

[quote]thank you, and I do hope my thoughts are coherent and my questions not a bore.[/quote]

Not at all. This discussion is becoming more interesting by the minute. I hope Jeff will send us more of Anselms work!






[quote]When Anselm uses the term "reprobate" he is referring to fallen angels and damned men. These, thought they remain free, will never regain the uprightness which they lost.

With regards to "why" they are reprobate, you could be looking for one of two answers. First, you might be wondering how they become reprobate - that is, how do they come to sin. Second, you might be wondering why God does not allow them more time to repent.

Regarding the first, Anselm has a whole work on the subject, entitled De Casu Diaboli which I can send to you along with De Libertate if you would like. Regarding the second, it is simply a matter of Divine Justice. Those who forsake their ubrightness merit condemnation, and do not deserve to have it returned to them.

There is little to distinguish between the operations of the wills of man and angel, and what must be distinguished Anselm discusses.

I thought we were discussing Double Effect and Possible Worlds  [/quote]

I think it is relative to the topic though, since to fully understand free will, we need to be able to grasp all aspects. If we understand it enough to dialogue about Double Effect and Possible Worlds, yet don't understand it entirely... these threads lose their meaning.

The Spirit blows as He wills, and I think getting to know God is the True end of this thread... Not necessarily just to prove or disprove Double Effect.

Let's setttle our issues with free will, necessarily first, and then we can come back with renewed understanding and firmer grasps on the nature of Double Effect and Possible Worlds.


God bless.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]I think it is relative to the topic though, since to fully understand free will, we need to be able to grasp all aspects. If we understand it enough to dialogue about Double Effect and Possible Worlds, yet don't understand it entirely... these threads lose their meaning. [/quote]

While I agree that the discussion is entirely worthwhile, and I still have my own questions concerning the relation between free will and sin, it does not actually pertain to the topic of this thread, as the manner in which the problem is set up makes the source of evil (ie, human free will) completely irrelevant: only whether or not that evil is necessary or contingent is significant.

Thus, a discussion of human free will, while i think totally valuable, is markedly off-topic with regards to this thread.

[Didacus]

I got the pdf file...

mille mercis mon ami.
A thousand thank yous my friend.

I hope to have time to post tomorrow... or maybe I will take the time to read a little more and post later in the week.

I am really enjoying this thread and I hope we cna keep exchanging ideas for a good while still.

Take care guys, and talk to youz a little later.