qfnol31 Posted December 9, 2005 Posted December 9, 2005 Here it is. It is a little long, though, so beware. [b]The Demise of God in Philosophy through the Modern Thoughts of Locke and Hume[/b] Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart a desire to know the truth—in a word, to know himself—so that, by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves. -- John Paul II (Fides et Ratio) David Hume defies much of the ancient philosophies and, even more so, medieval philosophies in his essay An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding; most notably he contends that there can be no proof for God’s existence through reason. John Locke, on the other hand, a predecessor to Hume, argues just the opposite in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. However, in this text, which follows the early modern works, Locke’s claim quickly falls apart under any extreme scrutiny and gives way to an almost atheistic or pagan approach to philosophy. Hume extends this further to say that God Himself can only be known through faith—something else he destroys. Just as Francis Bacon removed metaphysics as the highest goal in philosophy, Hume and Locke each eliminate any inquiry into God or His nature through reason. This can lead to both a destruction of belief in God, but most importantly, it can give way to the appearance of two contradictory truths: one based on man’s intellect, and the other merely on philosophical writings. Pope John Paul II, in his encyclical Fides et Ratio, tells the story of St. Thomas Aquinas, the man attributed with ultimately demonstrating faith and reason as complementary, not contradictory. The Holy Father writes, [i]A quite special place in this long development [of the fundamental harmony between the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of philosophy] belongs to Saint Thomas…In an age when Christian thinkers were rediscovering the treasures of ancient philosophy, and more particularly of Aristotle, Thomas had the great merit of giving pride of place to the harmony which exists between faith and reason. Both the light of reason and the light of faith come from God, he argued; hence there can be no contradiction between them (43).[/i] During the Medieval period, Aristotle’s works began reappearing in Christian Europe. Instead of welcoming these ideas as a complement to the Catholic Faith, many people either rejected them as contrary to Truth or accepted them and threw away their Faith. At the bidding of St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas worked to show the connection between the writings discovered by the Arabs (reason) and those of the Church (faith). Yet, by their works, Hume and Locke destroy this very relationship between faith and reason through their denial of knowledge of God through reason. To understand Locke and his argument, it is necessary to know his conception of the mind and ideas. Locke explains, “every man being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about while thinking being the ideas that are there” (Locke II.1.1). These ideas come from two sources: sensation and operations of the mind. He says that “first, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways in which those objects affect them” (II.1.3). He later calls this method sensation and it comes from external objects. About the mind, Locke says, “the other fountain from which experience furnishes the understanding with ideas is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has gotten—which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without” (II.I.4). This concept of reflection, Locke says, has nothing to do with sensing, but is very similar to sensation (II.I.4). Another type of ideas is the complex ideas of substances. About these he says, “The mind being […] furnished with a great number of the simple ideas […] takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together, which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name” (312). From these notions of ideas comes Locke’s argument in favor of God’s existence and the reason why it is unconvincing. Locke begins his testimony for the existence of God by saying that man does not have an idea of God inherent within himself. He builds on this conception to distinguishes that this does not diminish man’s assurance of God, saying, “Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself, though he has stamped no original characters on our minds in which we may read his being, yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he has not left himself without a witness, since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him” (IV.X.1). However, before this Locke insists that man cannot come to know God through the senses, which leaves the operations of the mind. Next Locke actually gives two separate proofs of how man can come to know that God exists, arguing that “in the different make of men’s tempers and application of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the confirmation of the same truth. The first proof begins with the existence of man and moves from there. Locke says, “it is beyond question that man has a clear idea of his own being; he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something” (IV.X.2). The next part of this proof says, [i]Man knows by an intuitive certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any real being that it can be equal to two right angles…If therefore we know there is some real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration that from eternity there has been something, since what was not from eternity had a beginning, and what had a beginning must be produced by something else (IV.X.3). [/i] Locke argues that man can go from knowing himself to knowing his Creator as source, and because this Creator cannot have a beginning (as source), he must be eternal. Next Locke moves to argue that a source requires the powers of those things that it creates; therefore, man’s Creator must have all the powers of man himself. Following this, he then says, “this eternal source of all being must also be the source and origin of all power; and so this eternal being must also be the most powerful” (IV.X.4). This Being is the source of all being and power and likewise the origin of all knowledge (following the same proof as power). Locke finally concludes, “Thus from the consideration of ourselves and what we find infallibly in our own constitution, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being, which, whether anyone will please to call God, it matters not” (IV.X.6). The second proof beings with the assertion that there must be an Eternal Entity because there cannot be a time with nothing. It then follows that this Being is either cogitative or incogitative because “there are but two sorts of beings in the world that man knows or conceives” (IV.X.9). It follows from this that, as Locke argues, since an incogitative being cannot give rise to a cogitative being, “it is evident that something necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident that that something must necessarily be a cogitative being” (IV.X.11). He concludes that this Being cannot be matter for three reasons: firstly, not every particle of matter thinks; secondly, one particle of matter alone cannot think; and lastly, it cannot be a “certain system of matter duly put together”—the only option left—or in other words a “juxtaposition of parts” because that is only a “new relation of position,” which Locke says cannot give thought or knowledge (IV.X.13-16). It is in this way that Locke forms his second proof for the existence of God. Hume’s discussion of the existence of God follows a section on miracles, in which he argues that miracles are actually transgressions against the laws of nature. He describes a conversation between a friend and himself, in which he begins with the good fortune of philosophy through the ages. His friend eventually takes up the side of the Epicureans saying, “We shall not here dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds. We shall only inquire how far such questions concern the public interest” (Inquiry 544). He concludes “that they [the origin and government of the worlds] are entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government […]” (544). The point of this argument is to show that the origin of the world does not change liberty or other worldly concerns; nevertheless, it ultimately involves a separation of theology and philosophy. The friend continues, You then, who are my accusers, have acknowledged that the chief or sole argument for a divine existence (which I never questioned) is derived from the order of nature, where there appear such marks of intelligence and design that you think it extravagant to assign for its cause either chance or the blind and unguided force of matter. You allow that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes. From the order of the work you infer that there must have been project and forethought in the workman” (545). In this argument, the friend allows for the knowledge of the cause from the effect. He further contends, “If the cause is known only by the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect; nor can we, by any rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause and infer other effects from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us” (545). He later confirms this relationship between cause and effect when he says, “The Deity is known to us only by his productions and is a single being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him” (548). Thus, this friend argues that from the effect (the world and the whole of creation), man can come to know the cause (the Creator: namely, God). In the later part of this argument, the friend insists that “they have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination; otherwise they could not thus change their manner of inference and argue from causes to effects […] forgetting that they have no reason to ascribe these celestial beings any perfection or any attribute but what can be found in the present world” (546). Through this, he upholds the notion that a cause can come to be known from its effect, but he also says that intelligent design is not a necessity: “While we argue from the course of nature and infer a particular intelligent cause which first bestowed and still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a principle which is both uncertain and useless” (547). He continues to describe, “It is uncertain because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience” (547). However, his most pointed disagreement is rather that “it is useless because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never, according to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause with any new inference or, making additions to the common and experienced course of nature, establish any new principles of conduct and behavior” (547). Just as he began, knowledge of the cause does not change the public interest. The last major point of this friend in his account of the causal and effect relationship is a disagreement with the suppositions about the behavior of God. He claims that the “great source of our mistake in this subject and the unbounded license of conjecture which we indulge is that we tacitly consider ourselves as in the place of the Supreme Being and conclude that he will, on every occasion, observe the same conduct which we ourselves, in his situation, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible” (549). In this short point, Hume’s friend denies the link between reason and God, ultimately separating God from goodness itself. This separation between the two becomes more important in Hume’s response to his friend. Like Hume’s friend, Locke works from the relationship between cause and effect in his major argument for the existence of God. The second argument is the weaker of the two; elsewhere in the work, Locke determines that knowledge of God’s existence cannot be arrived at through the senses, but then in this second proof he uses arguments based on the senses to arrive at God, contradicting his earlier premise. The first proof, though not as easy to counter, is as fallible as the second when compared with other parts of his essay. Although he says that proof of God is not wanting, he also calls knowledge of God demonstrative knowledge, which depends on proofs. Earlier in the section on complex ideas of substances (which are really just a collection of ideas united as a substance), he says about the idea of God, “If we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible supreme being, we shall find that we come by it the same way, and that the complex ideas we have both of God […] are made of the simple ideas we received from reflection” (II.XXIII.33). This reduces the argument about the existence of God to simply an idea instead of necessarily an actuality. Locke confirms this when he says, “When we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the supreme being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity, and so putting them together make our complex idea of God” (II.XXIII.33). Rather than argue for the existence of God from our existence, Locke here says that God’s existence comes from other ideas, which in effect impairs his later argument. Another problem in Locke’s argument comes about because he posits that knowledge of God’s existence is only of real existence without the mind, the lowest type of knowledge. He specifically says, “‘God is’ is of real existence” (IV.I.7). It is about this that he says, “As to the fourth sort of our knowledge, namely, of the real actual existence of things, we have […] a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a God” (IV.III.2). He then posits that ideas are clearer than knowledge itself, which ultimately leads to the conclusion that the idea of God’s existence is clearer than knowledge of it. All of these different perceptions pose problems in the proof for the existence of God. Though not necessarily worthless, Locke’s proof becomes weaker in light of his other conjectures about God’s existence; however, this plays an important role in Hume’s understanding of reason and knowledge of God’s existence. Hume’s conversation with his friend takes the same ideas as Locke in the beginning. His friend uses the cause and effect relationship to discuss the existence of God. However, Hume destroys this relationship at the very end when he tells the friend, “But there occurs to me […] with regard to your main topic a difficulty which I shall just propose to you […] I much doubt whether it is possible for a cause to be known only by its effect (as you have all along supposed) or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object that has ever fallen under our observation” (550). He destroys the cause and effect relationship that Locke argues, through which man can reason to know God. Hume later confirms this belief, explaining, “There is, I admit, some difficulty how we can ever return from the cause to the effect and, reasoning from our ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter or any addition to it” (550). Through this destruction of knowledge of the cause through the effect, Hume destroys any rational proof for God’s existence.
qfnol31 Posted December 9, 2005 Author Posted December 9, 2005 I have no conclusion...I have to wait to get my paper back...it's got the only version.
philothea Posted December 10, 2005 Posted December 10, 2005 It did seem to end a bit abruptly... I don't think Locke would have a chance in the Debate Table. Hume's friend sounds more sensible to me than either of them, even if he is disproven in the end. Nicely written. (Though I don't do philosophy anymore. ) Reading the other one now...
qfnol31 Posted December 10, 2005 Author Posted December 10, 2005 LoL, it will end less abruptly when I get my ending back.
qfnol31 Posted December 13, 2005 Author Posted December 13, 2005 Well, I ended up getting an A on this, so I was happy. My professor seemed to like it. Here is the ending: One of the most problematic things about Hume's rejection of proof through reason for the existence of God is that it tends towards a [i]fideistic[/i] approach to Christianity; however, Hume takes this further and destorys faith from the Bible as well. IN the section on miracles, Hume rejects the Catholic dogma of the True Presence in the Blessed Sacrament. First he says, "Our evidence, then, for the truth of the [i]Christian[/i] religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses, because even in the first authors of our religion it was no greater" (534). Man should therefore trust his senses more than anything else because they are more immediate to him. Following this line of reasoning, Hume eventually argues, "Were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it would be directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it" (534). Through this simple passage, he destroys any true authority of the Bible by saying that it can be fallible. Lock gives a weak argument in favor of God's existence based on reason, which ends up contradicting a few of the premises that he said before - this leads to the question of whether or not he actually believes in knowing God through reason. Hume takes this a step further and denies that man can come to know the cause from the effect, that is, he cannot come to know God through man or any of His creation. The problem with this type of view is it first creates a second notion of truth that counters any in faith. This is the same issue that the Church faced in the thirteenth century, during the time of St. Thomas. Hume's [i]fideistic[/i] method ultimately denies God as any source of truth. Yet he does not stop there; Hume denies any authority of the Scriptures in matters of truth by ordering truth under what is most direct, the senses. Both Hume and Lock give rise to the end of God in their writings, moving philosophy to an almost atheistic approach to knowing the world man lives in. Their words signal the death of God in philosophy. FINIS
philothea Posted December 13, 2005 Posted December 13, 2005 :applause: Very nice! But I had to look up Fideism.
qfnol31 Posted December 13, 2005 Author Posted December 13, 2005 Ahh, sorry, my professor taught it to me so I just took it for granted now. Thanx.
phatcatholic Posted December 13, 2005 Posted December 13, 2005 yea, what does that word mean? (too lazy to look it up)
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