Catholicism and Secular Laws

[Paphnutius]

[quote]1951 [b]Law is a rule of conduct enacted by competent authority for the sake of the common good.[/b] The moral law presupposes the rational order, established among creatures for their good and to serve their final end, by the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator. All law finds its first and ultimate truth in the eternal law. Law is declared and established by reason as a participation in the providence of the living God, Creator and Redeemer of all. "Such an [b]ordinance of reason [/b]is what one calls law." 2


Alone among all animate beings, man can boast of having been counted worthy to receive a law from God: as an animal endowed with reason, capable of understanding and discernment, he is to govern his conduct by using his freedom and reason, in obedience to the One who has entrusted everything to him. 3[/quote]

There we go...that paragraph should be helpful. Is the law enacted by a competent authority? If not, then it cannot be a law. Does it seek the common good? If it does not, then it is not a law. Is it an ordinace of reason (meaning is it within reason)? If not, then it is not a law.

Also let us look at Romans 13:1[quote]1 Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God.[/quote]

Okay as you were....

[philothea]

Thanks Paphnutius!

Sounds good to me. (Even easier!)

But it still binds someone to obey underage drinking laws.

[Aloysius]

thank you, Paphnutius, that goes far to illustrate my point. if it does not seek the common good, it is not a morally obligatory law.

[Aloysius]

[quote name='philothea' date='Dec 13 2005, 09:24 PM']Thanks Paphnutius!

Sounds good to me.  (Even easier!)

But it still binds someone to obey underage drinking laws.
[right][snapback]824229[/snapback][/right]
[/quote]
haha, that's because it's the Catechism's cliff-notes section :

again, we're not discussing that at the moment, I am taking issue with the idea "as long as it doesn't require you to do something immoral, it is a morally obligatory law". I think that is a dangerous philosophy that gives the state way too much power (like L_D says, a mildly marxist idealogy

[Paphnutius]

[quote name='Aloysius' date='Dec 13 2005, 08:26 PM'] "as long as it doesn't require you to do something immoral, it is a morally obligatory law".  [/quote]
I remember someone saying earlier (perhaps a different thread) that penal laws are not morally obligatory. They do not seek to bind on conscience, but do seek to enact a penalty if they are broken. Where as a perceptive law is binding on conscience.

[Paphnutius]

[quote name='Aloysius' date='Dec 13 2005, 08:26 PM']haha, that's because it's the Catechism's cliff-notes section :
[/quote]
Really? I just looked up law in the index of CCC.

[Aloysius]

after every section they have a re-cap.

that's basically the summary of all the quotes we've been arguing over.

[Paphnutius]

[quote name='Aloysius' date='Dec 13 2005, 08:32 PM']that's basically the summary of all the quotes we've been arguing over.
[/quote]
Well if that is all you are arguing about then I think you need to take the intention of the government into consideration.

A penal law would be likened to an overdue library book. They do not mean it to be binding on conscience, but one is to pay a fine if they break it. It is not a sin to transgress this purley penal law as long as one is willing to pay the fine.

That being said, I think that moral theolgians actually vary on how much they consider purely penal or preceptive. Some will say most if not all civil law is only penal, while others will say it is preceptive unless stated otherwise. I wish I could offer more, but that I all that I have right now.

Keep in mind though, that a civil law that is in opposition to a higher law (natural, divine, or ecclesial) is not binding on conscience because it is not really a law. For all law finds its fullness in the divine or eternal law, so if it is in opposition to it, it is not a law.

[Aloysius]

yep.

I'm arguing against the notion that any law that doesn't require you to do something immoral is morally obligatory, i.e. it would be a sin to break it.

So I agree with you.

[philothea]

Sorry, I get interrupted a lot. (Though I got some work done, so that was okay... )

[quote name='Aloysius' date='Dec 13 2005, 08:47 PM']I'm arguing against the notion that any law that doesn't require you to do something immoral is morally obligatory, i.e. it would be a sin to break it.
[right][snapback]824244[/snapback][/right]
[/quote]

I wouldn't go quite that far. I think a law enacted merely for the common good is still morally obligatory, even if it isn't otherwise a moral issue.

Say there is a parade planned in your city, and you're not supposed to park your car on the street that day. Well, parking your car is not a moral issue, but moving it would further the common good. Would we not be morally bound to obey the proper authority in this matter?

I'll accept that unreasonable laws are not binding, but I'm thinking unreasonable doesn't mean "annoying" or "inconvenient" but rather "not possible to practically obey."

(Apologies if I misunderstood your statement.)

[franciscanheart]

[philothea]

[quote name='hugheyforlife' date='Dec 13 2005, 10:41 PM']
[right][snapback]824468[/snapback][/right]
[/quote]
:

I gotta get out of this debating stuff.

[Aloysius]

well, what I was arguing against was the concept "as long as it doesn't require immoral actions, it is a just law"

so you would not say that, then? good, that's all I was going for.

if that's the case, then there is a possible scenario with a law that doesn't require you to do something immoral that would also not be morally obligatory. score one for conscience and right reason over ultimate power of the state

a law to clear a parade route... sounds like a law enacted for the common good by right reason to me, obeying that law I could admit as morally obligatory. disobedience to such a law, enacted by a competant authority for the common good, would be the sinful disrespect of said competant authority. provided it's not a gay pride parade :

[philothea]

Al! Can we be...











...agreeing?





:

(I'm sure it will all fall apart in the details )

[philothea]

I was considering specifically excluding a gay pride parade. :

[Aloysius]

haha, I have no problem agreeing :

we're agreeing on general principals here. applying them is obviously a different story, but here in this thread I was very very concerned to make sure that us Catholics here agreed on the principle by which we judge whether a law is just or not, and that principle cannot be "as long as it doesn't make you do something immoral"

and whether or not either of us have changed our position throughout the thread, is not my concern. as long as we agree now :



pax Christi :

[Resurrexi]

I only follow Church laws!

[qfnol31]

[quote name='StThomasMore' date='Feb 8 2006, 08:41 PM']I only follow Church laws!
[right][snapback]881095[/snapback][/right]
[/quote]

According to Thomas, you should follow both Natural Law (not part of the Church) and any human laws that do not contradict the Natural Law or Divine Law.

[Resurrexi]

[quote]According to Thomas, you should follow both Natural Law (not part of the Church) and any human laws that do not contradict the Natural Law or Divine Law. [/quote]

ok, I follow the natural law too, but not the state law!

[qfnol31]

But you should...

[quote]Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby, as stated above (92, 1). But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame laws.

Objection 2. Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.

Objection 3. Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above (90, A1,2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made.

I answer that, As stated above (63, 1; 94, 3), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do.

Reply to Objection 1. Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.

Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.

Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men.

Reply to Objection 3. Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that has happened or not happened," and the like.[/quote]

[quote]Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?

Objection 1. It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference." But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law.

Objection 2. Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above (94, 4). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the natural law.

Objection 3. Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all: which is clearly false.

Objection 4. Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist says [Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.

On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws."

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (91, 2, ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.

But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man": while some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature.

Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law.

Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural law.

Reply to Objection 2. This argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.

Reply to Objection 3. The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people.

Reply to Objection 4. These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at once what is the best thing to decide.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations."[/quote]