Sheed and God experiencing

[Quietfire]

He said,
word good man.

[N/A Gone]

whats that mean

[toledo_jesus]

[quote name='Revprodeji' date='Jan 26 2006, 12:50 PM']whats that mean
[right][snapback]866586[/snapback][/right]
[/quote]
Word as in the affirmation of what you said. "Word, dawg" being common usage.

Bon Homme being French for good man, as in my "homie"

So in effect, I said "word, homie."

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]I remember your argument on subsequent and preceeding necessity and I think it is a very faulty argument. All it would end up saying is that we are dominos in a line started by a God millions of dominos ago.[/quote]

You clearly do not understand the distinction between subsequent and preceeding necessity if you think it results in God starting a line of dominoes. In fact, this is exactly what it [i]denies[/i]. God's knowledge of all facts, whether past, present, or future, is necessary according to [i]subsequent[/i] necessity, and that is [b]non[/b]-causal.

God knows everything that I [i]freely[/i] do simply because He is outside of time. He observes that I do X, and so He knows that I do X. That does not mean that He makes me do X. The [i]cause[/i] of my doing it is nothing other than my own free will.

[quote]now, lets talk an offensive tone. What is wrong, theologically with having the future events completely known by God, but known as possibility? Whats wrong with having an experiencial God? Not effected by time of course, but maybe if you could systematically explain why this is such a heresy using simple logic and scripture.[/quote]

Quite simply:

Wherever something exists, there is God, for there is no existence without God. If the future exists as possibility, then there also must be God. But all possibility is potentiality, and there is no potentiality in God, for He is pure actuality. If some actuality were present in some potentiality, then that potentiality would no longer be potential, but actual, insofar as that one actuality was present. Therefore, the future cannot exist as a potentiality, but must in fact be actualized for God.

Another Argument:

Wherever something exists, there is God, for there is no existence without God. If the future exists as possibility, then there also must be God. But when a possible future becomes a determined present, then all things in it must change from possible to actual/determined. Anything that changes is mutable, but God is immutable. Therefore, God does not change from possible to actual, and so God is not in any possible future. But wherever God is not, there is no existence. Therefore, possible futures do not exist.

A much better treatment of the subject than I can give, by St. Anselm:

[quote]CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
[The Supreme Being] exists
without beginning and without end.

From what time, then, did this so simple Nature—Creator and Sustainer
of all things—first exist? And when will it cease to exist?
Or does [this Nature] exist neither from a beginning point nor to
an end point but rather as beginningless and endless? For were it
to have a beginning it would have a beginning either (1) from or
through itself, (2) from or through something other [than itself],
or (3) from or through nothing. But from the truth already seen,
clearly [this Nature] does not in any way exist either from something
other [than itself] or from nothing, either through something
other [than itself] or through nothing. Therefore, it did not
at all have a beginning from or through something other [than itself],
from or through nothing. Moreover, it could not have had a
beginning from or through itself, even though it exists from itself
and through itself. For [this Nature] exists from and through itself
in such way that there is not at all one being which exists from
and through itself and another being through which and from
which the first being exists. Now, whatever begins to exist from
something or through something is not at all the same thing as
that from which or through which it begins to exist. Therefore, the
Supreme Nature did not begin [to exist] through itself or from itself.
Thus, since it has no beginning either from or through itself,
either from or through something other [than itself], either from
or through nothing, it has no beginning at all.
On the other hand, [the Supreme Nature] will also have no end.
For if it were going to have an end, it would not be supremely immortal
and supremely incorruptible. But it is evident that it is both
supremely immortal and supremely incorruptible. Hence, it will
not have an end. Furthermore, if it were going to have an end, it
would come to an end either willingly or unwillingly. But surely
that [Being] by means of whose will the Supreme Good perished
would not be a simple good. But the Supreme Nature is a true and
simple good. Hence, this Nature, which is assuredly the Supreme
Good, would not come to an end willingly. Yet, if it were going to
come to an end unwillingly, it would not be supremely powerful
or all-powerful. But rational necessity has already declared that it
is supremely powerful and all-powerful. Hence, it would not come
to an end unwillingly. Consequently, if the Supreme Nature shall
not have an end either willingly or unwillingly, it shall not at all
have an end.
Moreover, if the Supreme Nature were to have a beginning or
an end it would not be true eternity—something which it has already
uncontestably been found to be. Or again, let anyone who
can, try to conceive of when it began to be true, or was ever not
true, that something was going to exist. Or [let him try to conceive
of] when it will cease being true and will not be true that something
has existed in the past. Now, if neither of these things can
be conceived, and if both [statements] can be true only if there is
truth, then it is impossible even to think that truth has a beginning
or an end. Indeed, suppose that truth had had a beginning,
or suppose that it would at some time come to an end: then even
before truth had begun to be, it would have been true that there
was no truth; and even after truth had come to an end, it would
still be true that there would no longer be truth. But it could not
be true without truth. Hence, there would have been truth before
truth came to be, and there would still be truth after truth had
ceased to be. But these [conclusions] are self-contradictory. Therefore,
whether truth is said to have a beginning or an end, or
whether it is understood not to have a beginning or an end, truth
cannot be confined by any beginning or end. Consequently, the
same [conclusion] holds with regard to the Supreme Nature, because
the Supreme Nature is the Supreme Truth.

CHAPTER NINETEEN
How nothing existed before or will exist after the Supreme
Being.

But, behold, nothing once again rises up; and it alleges to be nothing
all that reason has thus far discussed and all that truth and
necessity have given consistent witness to. For if those things which
have been explained
above have been made secure by the fortification of necessary
truth, then there was not anything earlier than the Supreme Being
nor will there be anything later than the Supreme Being. Hence,
nothing was before it, and nothing will be after it. For, necessarily,
either something or nothing preceded it and is going to succeed
it. But anyone who says that nothing was before it and that nothing
will be after it seems to be saying that (1) before the Supreme
Being there was a time when nothing existed and that (2) after
the Supreme Being there will be a time when nothing will exist.
Consequently, when nothing existed, the Supreme Being did not
exist; and when nothing will exist, the Supreme Being will not
exist. So if when nothing already existed the Supreme Being did
not yet exist, and if the Supreme Being will no longer exist when
nothing will still exist, how is it that [the Supreme Being] did not
begin [to exist] from nothing, or how is it that it will not come to
nothing? What, then, did such an array of arguments accomplish
if nothing so easily destroys their efficacy? For if it be established
that the Supreme Being is subsequent to nothing, which precedes
it, and ceases prior to nothing, which succeeds it, then all that necessary
truth determined above is destroyed through a mere nothing.
Or must this nothing be opposed, lest so many necessary structures
of reason be overthrown by nothing and lest the Supreme
Good, which by the light of truth has been sought-after and found,
be lost for nothing?
Therefore, if possible, let us deny the proposition “Nothing existed
before and will exist after the Supreme Being” rather than,
while giving place to nothing before and after the Supreme Being,
to reduce to nothing through nothing this Being, which through
itself brought into existence what had been nothing. For the one
expression—viz., “Nothing existed before the Supreme Being”—
has a twofold meaning. For one meaning of it is that before the
Supreme Being existed there was a time when nothing existed; but
the other meaning of it is: it is not the case that there was anything
before the Supreme Being. Similarly, if I were to say “Nothing
taught me to fly” I might construe this [statement] to mean
that nothing itself (in the sense of not-something) taught me to
fly—[an assertion] which would be false. Or [I might construe it
to mean] that it is not the case that anything taught me to fly—
[an assertion] which is true. And so, the first construal is that from
which there follows the inconsistency discussed above; and [this
construal] is rejected as in every respect false. But the second [construal]
is perfectly consistent with the earlier [conclusions] and is
of necessity true in conjunction with them. Therefore, when it is
said that nothing existed before the Supreme Being, the statement
must be taken in accordance with the second meaning. It must
not be construed to mean that there was a time when nothing existed
and the Supreme Being did not exist; rather, [it must be construed]
to mean that it is not the case that there was anything before
the Supreme Being. The same kind of twofold meaning occurs
if we say that nothing will exist after the Supreme Being. Accordingly,
if we examine carefully the construal which has been
given concerning [the word] “nothing,” then we conclude very
truly that neither something nor nothing preceded or will succeed
the Supreme Being and that nothing existed before it or will exist
after it. And nevertheless, the stability of our previously established
conclusions is not at all shaken by a mere nothing.

[b]CHAPTER TWENTY
The Supreme Being exists in every place and at all times.

It was concluded above that this Creative Nature exists everywhere,
in all things and through all things; and the fact that it neither
began to exist nor will cease to exist entails that it always was,
is, and will be. Nonetheless, I detect a murmur of contradiction
which requires me to investigate more closely where and when the
Supreme Being exists. Accordingly, the Supreme Being exists either
(1) everywhere and always or (2) only in some place and at
some time or (3) nowhere and never—in other words, either (1)
in every place and at every time or (2) [only] in a delimited way
in some place and at some time or (3) in no place and at no time.
But what is more obviously objectionable than [supposing] that
what exists supremely and most truly, exists nowhere and never?
Therefore, it is false that the Supreme Being exists nowhere and
never. Moreover, without this Being there would exist neither any
good nor anything at all. Hence, if it existed nowhere or never,
there would nowhere or never be anything good and nowhere or
never be anything at all. (It is not necessary to discuss how false
this [consequence] is.) (NOT 3) So it is false that the Supreme Being
nowhere and never exists. Hence, either it exists [only] in a delimited
way in some place and at some time or else it exists everywhere
and always. Assume that it exists only in a delimited way
in some place and at some time. Then, only where and when it
existed could anything exist; where and when it did not exist, no
being would exist—because without the Supreme Being there
would be nothing. Thus, it would follow that there is a place and
a time at which there would not exist anything at all. But this [consequence]
is false; for that place and that time would be something.
(NOT 2) Therefore, the Supreme Nature cannot exist [only]
in a delimited way in some place and at some time. Now, if it be
said that through itself this Nature exists in a delimited way in
some place and at some time but that through its power it exists
wherever and whenever something is—[this statement] would not
be true. For since, clearly, this Nature's power is nothing other
than itself, its power exists in no way apart from itself. (1) Therefore,
since [this Nature] does not exist in a delimited way in any
place or at any time, it is necessary that it exist everywhere and
always, i.e., in every place and at every time.[/b][/quote]

[N/A Gone]

thanks bro, but I am in prayerful struggle over whether or not to continue this debate. I met with my priest and bishop again this weekend and once again I was told that there is no issue here. That open theism as I explained it to them (i used pictures, maybe thats the issue here) has no problem within catholicism. If anything it is a possiblility that needs to be looked at. The way you have been showing me is the common view, but by no means is the only view. Both views work within the guidlines. I know you are going to argue against this, but coming from a bishop and a well taught priest I have issues arguing this more.