Justified Saint Posted July 7, 2006 Posted July 7, 2006 But unlike Ratzinger, I am pretty sure Jean-Paul Sartre and Anselm are poles apart (thankfully). Anselm can be a whipping boy of sorts in some circles, kind of like Descartes of theology, but I have been told that he can stand up to the challenge (unlike Descartes . From [i]God as Otherwise Than Being[/i] by Calvin O. Schrag: "Using passion and freedom the for-itself strives for unification -- indeed coincidence -- of being-in-itself and being-for-itself, thus overcoming the perplexing contigencies of life by securing its own foundation. Such a life would be without anxiety, without despair, without the dread of becoming that thrusts one into an unknown future. But such an idea and ideal is self-contradictory, for in the moment the self would become a synthetic unity of for-itself and in-itself, it would lose itself as for-itself. Now such an unbroken solidarity of being-in-intself and being-for-itself is precisely that which characterizes the being of the God of classical theism, in which God is defined as an infinite and supremely perfect being. Hence, the very idea of God is self-contradictory, and the fundamental desire to give birth to God is destined to suffer a profound metaphysical frustration. Sartre's reactive theism takes the form of a peculiar inversion of the classical ontological argument for the existence of God. God, defined as that being which nothing greater can be conceived (Anselm) or as that supremely pefect being (Descartes), [i]necessarily cannont exist[/i] because the existence of such a being would be internally self-contradictory." In Sartre's terminology, the [b]in-itsel[/b]f is being fixed, without becoming while its opposite, [b]for-itself[/b], is incompletness and being in the constant state and process of becoming. Being-in-itself is the objective world while being-for-itself is basically what humans are (having choice, freedom etc.) As such, on Sartre's account, to merge or conflate being-in-itself and being-for-itself is a complete misunderstanding of being. Thus I understand the critique to be as such: if God is that which nothing greater can be conceived than he is necessarily a being (He exists), a being still among others that is simply the highest and greatest being. Thus, on this account, God cannot exist because the [b]definition[/b] of God is ontologically confused and suspect. Now, I find this an interesting discussion, because if Schrag talks about reactive atheism he can also certainly talk about reactive theism. Is there not any other way to conceive of God other than by reifying him as the highest, most perfect being? Kierkegaard's statement is worth thinking about when considering this quesiton, "God does not exist, he is eternal."
Guest JeffCR07 Posted July 7, 2006 Posted July 7, 2006 Before I type out anything, I would like to qualify this post by saying that I can in no way provide a comprehensive reply to an atheistic-existentialist critique of Anselm's argument, since I am not deeply familiar with Sartre's thought. So, understanding that I am limited, I will offer what little response I can. It seems that Sartre, in many respects, divides being into either a kind of parmenidean permenancy or a hereclitian dynamism. The for-itself is necessarily changing (and imperfect) and thus is not self-identical, while the in-itself is static, perfect, and self-identical. However, Sartre seems to simply discount from the beginning the christian notion of triune God. In the Trinity, we find a kind of being that Sartre simply doesn't include in his analysis. We find a perfect dynamism - a being of pure act that is perfect and self-identical, and when considered in its attributes is unchanging, but when considered in its action is constantly dynamic. It is not so much that Sartre contemplates God and finds the notion to have no content, but rather, that he constructs an inadequate account of being that is incapable of providing an account of such a being, and so he proclaims that such a being is impossible. It seems to simply come down to this: is the term "God" meaningful. Sartre can either say yes or no, if he says "yes" then he must concede Anselm's argument as true. If he says "no" then he cannot deny God's existence, because he doesn't even know what this word "G-O-D" actually means. As I have said above, this is clearly an inadequate response, and I hope someone more aquainted with existentialism can give a better response. Your Brother In Christ, Jeff
Justified Saint Posted July 8, 2006 Author Posted July 8, 2006 Jeff, I like your answer since it brings the relevance of the Holy Trinity into sharp focus. I always find it a source of frustration that so-called critiques of "classical theism" make little to no reference to the Trinity, as if the Triune God is simply an unnotable aberration or derivative of radical monotheism. This seems like a huge mistake since it overlooks the entire relational aspect of God. However, I am confused on your notion of a perfect dynamism since you seem to describe it as basically the fusion of the in-itself and for-itself which Sartre says is impossible and thus the contradiction (maybe not a contradiction but a paradox?). Sartre cannot say "God" is meaningful (which is why he is classified as a "reactive atheist"), and that is one reason why Schrag wrote his book. He accepts the ontological critique (God as the greatest and most perfect being is a contradiction), but Schrag must find another way to salvage God, namely one that is otherwise than being (as the title suggests). Thus Sartre is taken in up in a larger context to reconfigure the semantics of God, i.e. if God is simply [b]a[/b] being than he is by definition idolatrous since he is simply made the most perfect and greatest of beings.
Guest JeffCR07 Posted July 9, 2006 Posted July 9, 2006 [quote name='Justified Saint' post='1019747' date='Jul 7 2006, 10:50 PM'] Jeff, I like your answer since it brings the relevance of the Holy Trinity into sharp focus. I always find it a source of frustration that so-called critiques of "classical theism" make little to no reference to the Trinity, as if the Triune God is simply an unnotable aberration or derivative of radical monotheism. This seems like a huge mistake since it overlooks the entire relational aspect of God. However, I am confused on your notion of a perfect dynamism since you seem to describe it as basically the fusion of the in-itself and for-itself which Sartre says is impossible and thus the contradiction (maybe not a contradiction but a paradox?). Sartre cannot say "God" is meaningful (which is why he is classified as a "reactive atheist"), and that is one reason why Schrag wrote his book. He accepts the ontological critique (God as the greatest and most perfect being is a contradiction), but Schrag must find another way to salvage God, namely one that is otherwise than being (as the title suggests). Thus Sartre is taken in up in a larger context to reconfigure the semantics of God, i.e. if God is simply [b]a[/b] being than he is by definition idolatrous since he is simply made the most perfect and greatest of beings. [/quote] The problem with that analysis is that it pays no mind whatsoever to the whole debate about equivocal/analogical/univocal predication of being. I have no idea where Sartre stands on the issue (does he, like Kant, reject that "being" or "exists" is a predicate?). It seems like Sartre is understanding being to be exclusively univocal, which I reject. Even if one attempts to abstract the concept "being" from contingency or necessity, one is left with a notion of being as "that which is" and this notion admits of no element of "not being." As such, the so-called abstracted notion of being (pure being) inevitably collapses back into necessary being. Thus, I argue that the concept of being is essentially analogical, because for one to have a notion of contingent being, it is essentially founded upon, but really distinct from, a notion of necessarily being. The point I am trying to make is that it seems like Sartre seems to just skip this whole question by, and instead assumes that univocal predication of being is possible. Since I not only reject this, but don't even know exactly where he stands, I can't really respond. Your Brother In Christ, Jeff
Justified Saint Posted July 9, 2006 Author Posted July 9, 2006 (edited) [quote name='JeffCR07' post='1020483' date='Jul 9 2006, 08:39 AM'] The problem with that analysis is that it pays no mind whatsoever to the whole debate about equivocal/analogical/univocal predication of being. I have no idea where Sartre stands on the issue (does he, like Kant, reject that "being" or "exists" is a predicate?). It seems like Sartre is understanding being to be exclusively univocal, which I reject. Even if one attempts to abstract the concept "being" from contingency or necessity, one is left with a notion of being as "that which is" and this notion admits of no element of "not being." As such, the so-called abstracted notion of being (pure being) inevitably collapses back into necessary being. Thus, I argue that the concept of being is essentially analogical, because for one to have a notion of contingent being, it is essentially founded upon, but really distinct from, a notion of necessarily being. The point I am trying to make is that it seems like Sartre seems to just skip this whole question by, and instead assumes that univocal predication of being is possible. Since I not only reject this, but don't even know exactly where he stands, I can't really respond. Your Brother In Christ, Jeff [/quote] I can't say which position he takes on those modalities of being (I really don't even understand what all of them mean I am not overly familiar with Sartre either, I am just presenting him as he appears in the cited text. However, I would not be suprised if he "skips" the question or refrains from taking a "stand" on the issue. Sartre, coming out of the school of existentialism and phenomenology, is trying to problematize the question of being, and therefore would naturally jettison what is seen as a kind of medieval, dogmatic construct of being. Certainly, "that which is" sounds like an appropriate phenomenological observation and there could still be "not being" though probably not in a traditional sense. "Not being" could refer to an existential state of inauthenticity (e.g. Sartre's [i]Being and Nothingness[/i]) and more simply that which is without consciousness. "Contingent" and "necessary" (substance and accident?) being are phenomenologically suspect on this account. It helped me to better understand Sartre's "ontological" critique when it is coupled with Freud's pscyhological critique of God and religion (this is how Schrag presents it in his book). Sartre is basically arguing what Freud argued but with a different twist; man desires to be God so thus God is reified and pictured as the most perfect being (which actually serves to delimit and subvert the very transcendence of God). Edited July 9, 2006 by Justified Saint
Recommended Posts
Create an account or sign in to comment
You need to be a member in order to leave a comment
Create an account
Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!
Register a new accountSign in
Already have an account? Sign in here.
Sign In Now