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Metaphysics Of The Eucharist...


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Fiat_Voluntas_Tua
Posted

Ok folks... some of you really really really old ones might remember me, but most of you probably won't. Since I was last on here I have become fairly proficent with latin (4 semesters and in the process of translating Aquinas commentary on Aristotles Metaphysics), I am also preparing research for my Philosophy thesis... The topic will most likely be:
[b][i] The Metaphysics of the Eucharist: the degree of "being" of accidents and substance in the Eucharist[/i][/b]

I have a few sources already... I have read the chapters in the Summa Theologiae tertia pars (70ish). But if any of you are interested in helping me research I will be glad to recognize you in my acknowledgements and who knows maybe we might learn something.

Laus tibi, Christe!

Andrew Jaeger

Posted

I don't know if I can be much help... I'm just taking metaphysics rights now and had a question I posted on here earlier this year but no one answered it.

So how does the metaphysics of the eucharist work?

We've studied Concrete Particulars and we talked about sub-stratum theorists, bundle theorists, and aristotelean substances. What was Aquinas's views on concrete particulars, especially the Eucharist?

Fiat_Voluntas_Tua
Posted

This is from the Summa Theologiae, III, Q.75, a. 2, respondeo:

[i]Now a thing cannot be in any place, where it was not previously, except by change of place, or by the conversion of another thing into itself; just as fire begins anew to be in some house, either because it is carried thither, or because it is generated there. Now it is evident that Christ's body does not begin to be present in this sacrament by local motion. First of all, because it would follow that it would cease to be in heaven: for what is moved locally does not come anew to some place unless it quit the former one. Secondly, because every body moved locally passes through all intermediary spaces, which cannot be said here. Thirdly, because it is not possible for one movement of the same body moved locally to be terminated in different places at the one time, whereas the body of Christ under this sacrament begins at the one time to be in several places. And consequently it remains that Christ's body cannot begin to be anew in this sacrament except by change of the substance of bread into itself. But what is changed into another thing, no longer remains after such change. Hence the conclusion is that, saving the truth of this sacrament, the substance of the bread cannot remain after the consecration.[/i]

Obviously he says that the SUBSTANCE changes, otherwise, it would not be fully Christ.

He goes on in article 5 to tell that the accidents of bread do not change into the accidents of flesh and blood. He places the weight of the change on Divine Providence and Omnipotence saying: "As is said in the book De Causis, an effect depends more on the first cause than on the second. And therefore by God's power, which is the first cause of all things, it is possible for that which follows (namely the accidents) to remain, while that which is first (namely the substance) is taken away." [ST III, Q. 75, a.6, rep. ob. 1]

I have to go to bed... but Book III, questions 75-76 are a good starting point... also "On Division and Methods of the Sciences" is another place to start when it comes to begining Metaphysics.

Posted

I swear I commented on this on the open mic..;)

Posted

ok, so it would seem that the bread is a concrete particular.

Again though, is Aquinas a substratumist? That is does he believe the substrata of bread, which holds all the accidents, change? Obviously there are problems in this theory that need to be account for...

Or is he more of an Artistotelian?

Should transubstantiation be thought of as more a change in the substratum, or a change in the form of the aristotelian substance (that is bread)?

Fiat_Voluntas_Tua
Posted

[quote name='rkwright' post='1212456' date='Mar 12 2007, 03:00 AM']ok, so it would seem that the bread is a concrete particular.

Again though, is Aquinas a substratumist? That is does he believe the substrata of bread, which holds all the accidents, change? Obviously there are problems in this theory that need to be account for...

Or is he more of an Artistotelian?

Should transubstantiation be thought of as more a change in the substratum, or a change in the form of the aristotelian substance (that is bread)?[/quote]

He does not hold that the accidents change. He for most all purposes is an Aristotelian through and through.

Posted (edited)

disregard this post... I may post on it later, but I feel I want to do a bit more reading before posting it.

Edited by rkwright
Posted

Sorry for the last post...

Do you have Ott's Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma? I looked up this question last night and found some good information that might help you. I'll post some of it here...

[quote]The existence of the Accidents without a Subject
As there is a real distinction between the substance and the accidents of the body, God, who, as causa prima, can produce the operation proper to a causa secunda, can through His immediate activity preserve the accidents of the bread and wine. God does not maintain them in being by allowing them inhere in Himself (causa meaterialis), but, as causa efficiens, He effects everything which the substances of bread and wine effected before the consecration. The accidents continuing without subject do not cease to be accidents since they receive from another Being (God) the inhaerentia aptitudinalis or exigentialis (S. th. III 77 1 ad 2; aptitudo ad subiectum) that is, the disposition and need for a subject in which they may inhere. This implies that essential dependence, which belongs to the concept of the accident. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, only the accident of dimensive quantity (quantitas dimensiva), that is extended quantity, is miraculously preserved in being immediately by God. The other accidents inhere in dimensive quantity as in their proximate subject. Cf. S. th. III 77 1 and 2[/quote]

Hope this helps some...

  • 2 months later...
Fiat_Voluntas_Tua
Posted

I finished my paper for Metaphysics... I will post it below... if you have time [b]please read and comment/critique[/b] if you'd like. (format may be a little messed up due to copy and paste from Word)

Metaphysical Infrastructure of the Eucharist

In the 13th century a Dominican philosopher and theologian by the name St. Thomas of Aquinas wrote numerous works concerning the nature of things both natural and supernatural. Among his many writings, the Summa Theologiae is one of his greatest works, in which he takes up questions pertaining to the Faith. In the Tertia Partes Summae, he addresses questions pertaining to the Sacraments and specifically questions pertaining to the Sacrament of the Altar. This paper will examine what can be said about the substance and accidents of the bread in regards to the Sacrament and also what can be said about the body of Christ after the consecration. Specifically it will bring us up to the discussion on how each particle of the host is the full body of Christ, a task which can only be down by turning to a discussion on the manner of esse. In order for this to be done, the metaphysical principles concerning substance and accidents in which St. Thomas is working must be laid out. For this task, the book, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, by Fr. Joseph Owens, and the book De Ente et Esentia, will be used.
To begin our conversation we must start with an examination of being and essence. Now being can be said in two ways; however, only one way will be considered in this paper . The way in which it will be considered is as an actual existing thing which can be classified as one of the ten categories. The ten categories themselves are divided into two modes of existence: (1) substance and, (2) accident. Those beings which fall into the first of the ten categories are called substances and those beings which fall into the other nine categories are called accidents. For example, ‘animal’ falls into the first category and is therefore considered a substance; but ‘furry’ falls into one of the latter nine categories and is therefore considered an accident.
Now, since this paper deals with examining what something is, it is necessary to know what makes a specific thing the kind of thing that it is. In order to know what we mean when we call something a book or bread or flesh, we must know that by which the thing being spoken of is what it is. When we talk about the essence of ‘man’, ‘rock’, and ‘sharp’ we are referring to that whereby the thing is what it is. The essence of ‘X’ is simply the answer to the question, “What is X?” For example, the essence of ‘a rock’ is the answer to the question, “What is a rock?” The essence of a thing is that which is expressed by the definition of that thing. It is possible for thing1 to be a black cat and thing2 to be a white cat, and yet both are still cats. This is possible because that whereby thing1 is what it is, is the same as that whereby thing2 is what it is. Namely, the essence of thing1 is the same as the essence of thing2. The definitions of both things are one and the same.
It was stated above that there are two modes of being; another way of stating this using the terminology of Thomas is to say, “The broadest division of all follows upon the independence or dependence in being that an essence enjoys.” That is to say that an essence ‘enjoys’ its esse (existence) in one of two ways: independently or dependently. Thus, essences are distinguished based upon whether a things’ esse (existence) is dependent or independent upon some other ens (actually existing thing) . If an ens is not dependent upon some other ens for its esse, then its essence is that of a substance. On the other hand, if an ens is dependent upon some other ens for its esse its essence is that of an accident.
These principles may be better understood through an example of a table. When one walks into a kitchen and sees a piece of furniture consisting of a smooth flat slab fixed on a leg(s) , he recognizes this object as a table. (What material the table is made from, the color, the smell, etc., does not pertain to the definition of a table as a table because wood, metal, and the color brown do not pertain to that whereby the table is a table, because a table could be made from many various materials and be of various colors.) On the other hand, if the object does not attain to the definition of a table, it could not properly be called a table. And thus it is not the essence of a table. However, the color brown, the smell of the table, and the size (3ft x 6ft) of the table are all dependent upon the existence of some other being, and thus they are accidents of the substance table.
Now that it is known how a thing can be said to be a specific thing, i.e. by way of definition, it is possible to move onto what is said about the Sacrament of the Altar. Thomas begins by stating that the Sacrament of the Altar is the true body and the true blood of Christ which cannot be detected by the senses, but rather it is known by faith. That is to say, that the following questions proceed based upon the fact that, by faith, we hold the body and blood of Christ to be truly present in the Sacrament, and by granting this we have our starting point. Following this, Thomas states that in order for this to be, the substance of the bread and the substance of the wine do not remain after the consecration. (Since the Sacrament is not bread anymore, but rather it is flesh.) He says that this transformation is a conversion of one thing into another, and hence whatever is truly converted into a different thing no long remains after such conversion. Furthermore, in substantial change, that whereby a thing is what it is no longer remains the same thing. So, for the substance (that whereby a thing is what it is) to change simply means that the thing no longer is what it was. Thus, in order to say what used to be bread is now flesh is to say that what was previously the substance of bread has been converted into the substance of flesh. (Therefore, concluding that the substance of the bread does not remain after the consecration.)
Thomas then clarifies what kind of change is present by stating, “Hence this is not a formal, but a substantial conversion; nor is it among the natural conversions, but with a proper name, it can be called ‘Transubstantiation.’” It is clear what is held to be the fundamentals of Transubstantiation, namely that the substance of the bread is converted into the substance of Christ’s flesh, and that the bread is no longer present regardless of what the senses tell us. It is evident that after the consecration the accidents of the bread remain. This is quite profound since now the accidents of the bread exist despite the non-existent substance of bread. This is made possible only through the Divine Providence and Omnipotence of God. Namely, it is so, because God wills it to be so . Now, as Thomas states, an effect depends more on the first cause than on the second ; since God is the first cause of all things, it is possible for that which follows to remain (the accidents of bread), while that which is first (the substance of bread) is taken away.
This would lead one to question whether or not the accidents of bread remain accidents after the consecration or if they now fall into the category of substance, for they are no longer dependent upon the substance of bread for their esse. It would seem that the accidents could now be called a substance by definition. Yet, this is not so; for, the accidents of bread remain in such a miraculous way that they have being that is not in a subject. However, this still does not attain to the definition of substance. Since the accidents still maintain their nature that they should require esse in some other ens albeit their original ens does not exist anymore, this is possible because esse does not enter into the definition of any finite thing. “Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum Auicennam in sua Metaphisica, esse non potest poni in diffinitione alicuius generis vel speciei.” Namely the essence of the accidents does not change, that is to say, they exist in such a way that they should naturally require the substance of bread; however, as a result of God’s omnipotence and providence, He holds the accidents in existence without the substance of bread. “Unde patet quod, quamvis accidens miraculose sit non in alio, non tamen pertingit ad diffinitionem substancie.” This instance is not natural, but rather transcends the natural order. (This is possible by the reason given above.) Thus, in the words of Fr. Joseph Owens, “the accidents retain their natural aptitude to exist in their proper substance, even though that substance itself no longer exists.”
Now that a foundation of the metaphysical principles in which Thomas is working has been established, it is possible to proceed to the investigation of how he is able to give a metaphysical account for Transubstantiation. At the beginning of question 76 in the Tertia Partes Summae, Thomas answers the questions of whether the whole Christ is under this Sacrament , and if so if He is under every part of the Sacrament . Thomas addresses the first question by pointing out that in order to maintain the truth of the Catholic Faith it is necessary for the whole Christ to be under this Sacrament. However, he points out that there is a two-fold way in which Christ is under this Sacrament. The first way in which he is present is by the power of the Sacrament, the second way is by natural concomitance. To the first, he is present in this Sacrament through the words, “This is my body/blood.” To the second way, as Thomas says, “But from natural concomitance there is also in this Sacrament that which is really united with that thing wherein the aforesaid conversion is terminated. For if any two things are really united, then wherever the one is really, there must the other also be: since things really united together are only distinguished by an operation of the mind.” By this Thomas means that whenever two things are really united, (e.g. matter and form) wherever you actually find the one (matter) there to you will actually find the other (soul) . For example, man is a composite substance, and it cannot be said that the soul of a man or the body of a man can be called man, but rather man is a composite of both body and soul. Man is one thing, and that the division of the body and the soul is made by the mind. Thus, where a man’s body is there man’s soul is concomitantly present. It is from this reasoning that Thomas states, “…the true body of Christ is present by the power of the Sacrament, but His soul from real concomitance.” Meaning the whole of Christ, body and soul, is present in this Sacrament, by way of the power of the Sacrament and by natural concomitance.
This same reasoning can be applied to the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body existing concomitantly in the Sacrament. As was said above, Christ is present in this Sacrament in two ways. In regards to the first way, by the power of the Sacrament, Christ’s dimensive quantity is not present. For it was said, that the conversion within the Sacrament ends at the substance of Christ’s body and not at the conversion of the dimensive quantity of the bread into the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body, as was observed. Thus, through the power of the Sacrament the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is not present. However, “The existence of the dimensive quantity of any body cannot be separated from the existence of its substance.” Again, the separation of the substance of a body and its’ dimensive quantity is only made possible through an operation of the mind. Thus, wherever the substance of a body exists, there too will be the dimensive quantity of that body. Namely, wherever the substance of Christ’s body exists, there too will be the concomitant existence of the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body as well as all of its other accidents.
This statement concerning the accidents of Christ body existing in the Eucharist leads to the difficulty stated below. The objection is as follows:
“It seems that the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is not in this Sacrament. For it was said [in article 3] that Christ’s entire body is contained under every part of the consecrated host. But no dimensive quantity is contained entirely in any whole, and in its every part. Therefore it is impossible for the entire dimensive quantity of Christ’s body to be there.”

What this says is that no part of the whole is equal to the whole. In other words, a piece of the pie is not equal to the whole pie. Thomas responds to this objection by appealing to the fact that the essence of a thing is determined by what belongs to it of itself, and not what is accidentally with it.
He brings forth an example to help clarify what is meant to say the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body exist in the Sacrament. Each sense has its own proper (essential) object, and Thomas turns to the sense of sight. Sight’s essential object is color; it is through color that things are present to the sight. Now if an object is both white and sweet, the essential object of the sight is the objects whiteness. However, sight can observe that the object is sweet, not by way of sweetness (i.e. the eye does not taste the sweetness) but by way of whiteness. The fact that the object is both white and sweet, by seeing the white object one is truly seeing the sweet object. Thus, it is proper for the observer to say, “I see a sweet object.” Through this analogy, although an incomplete analogy as all analogies are, Thomas is able to account for a thing not being present in its’ essential (natural) manner.
Likewise, in a similar fashion as sweetness is present to sight, not in the manner of sweetness but in the manner of whiteness; so too the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is present in the substance of Christ’s body. However, the dimensive quantity is not present as an accident but is present in the manner of a substance.
In order not to fall into error it is crucial that the various manners of existence be disclosed. The first manner of existence is that of a substance. This manner of existence means that the whole is in the whole and the whole is in every part of the whole. For example the wholeness of man is in the body of man taken as a whole, and also the wholeness of man is in each and every part of the man, namely man is in his fingers, and his eyes, etc. This is contrasted to the other manner of existence, accidental. Accidental existence is similar to substantial existence in the respect that the whole is in the whole, but differs in the fact that the whole is not in every part, but rather the parts are in the parts. For example, a whole pie is in the whole pie, but the whole pie is not in every piece of the pie, rather every piece of the pie is in every piece of the pie. This holds immense significance for the Sacrament of the Altar. For, what it means to say that the whole dimensive quantity is existent in the manner of substance is to say that the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is existent in the whole Sacrament, and that the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is existent in every part of the Sacrament. Take for example, a priest who fractures a host after the consecration. Prior to the priest fracturing the host, the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body was present in the whole host, and after the facture each half of the host still contains the entire dimensive quantity of Christ’s body. Now, one would suppose that half the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is present in each half, for the whole is equal to its composing parts, but this supposition is erroneous. This is the case (the whole is equal to its composing parts) only in regards to dimensive quantity existing in the manner of an accident, not of a substance. Therefore, the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body exists in each half of the host as well as the whole host.
Thus, it has been shown that what St. Thomas Aquinas holds to be true in regards to Transubstantiation. That is to say, the bread prior to consecration consists of the substance and accidents of bread, both of which are existing in their natural manner (accidents existing as accidents and substances existing as substances). Once the consecration is complete, the substance of the bread is converted into the substance of the body of Christ, leaving the accidents of the bread existing miraculously without the substance of bread. Also, it is held that the whole body of Christ is present under each and every part of the Sacrament, namely that the dimensive quantity of the Body of Christ is concomitantly present not in the manner of an accident, but in the manner of a substance (the whole is in the whole and the whole is also in the parts). Thus, each and every particle of the Sacrament, namely even the smallest speck not visible to the eye, is just as much the whole body of Christ as is the one which we were commanded to eat in order to obtain eternal life, “Whoever eats my flesh and drinks my blood shall have eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day.”

Gloria Deo.

p.s. - I just foundout i canattach files... so if you'd like the formatted version with footnotes and sources download and view.

Fiat_Voluntas_Tua
Posted

no love? :-(

phatcatholic
Posted

A few observations:

[b]1.[/b] I found some spelling and punctuation errors.

[b]2.[/b] The first part of the paper, on accidents, substance, and essence was very good.

[b]3.[/b] With technical papers like this, you have to make sure you define your terms. You never defined "concomitance" which would have been helpful to the reader. Also, the whole second half of your paper is handicapped by the fact that you never defined "dimensive quantity." When you refer to the "dimensive quantity" of Jesus, what are you referring to? I think it was a MAJOR oversight that you never defined what you meant there.

[b]4.[/b] This may be picky but, as far as concomitance is concerned, it explains not only how the soul is present with the body, but also how the blood is present with the flesh (in the consecrated bread) and how the flesh is present with the blood (in the consecrated wine).

[b]5.[/b] The analogy of sweetness was excellent. Never heard that one before.

[b]6.[/b] How is the wholeness of man in his fingers and his eyes?

[b]7.[/b] I thought the pie analogy was very inadequate in illustrating the manner in which accidents exist. Actually, the entire portion of your paper on how Jesus can be said to be wholly present in every part of the Eucharist was confusing to me.

I commend you for taking on a subject like this. It's very difficult to write about the metaphysics of the Eucharist. I consider your paper to be a valiant effort.

Pax Christi,
phatcatholic

  • 4 weeks later...
Laudate_Dominum
Posted

I got your PM and I intend to take a looksee soon. Sorry for the delay!

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