Free Will --- Human Soul

[theculturewarrior]

Thesis: If human beings have free will, this faculty must emanate from the soul, and not the body. To deny that human cognition emanates from the soul is deny that human beings have free will. Discuss.

[N/A Gone]

Fine, I will play

Why must it emanate from the soul? There are humanists who say we have free will because we are not bound, yet have no soul.

How does self-causation work? How is the will free? If we are truely free and equal in the will, then why do some pick salvation and some do not? To truely have a free will then we can not be determined.

For over two years now I have wanted to work out a way to take my openess background and either find a way to make it work within catholicism, or find a way to defeat it. But since it seems we can make no progress on the openess issues. my other option has to do with the essenence of choice and the nature of the soul

say we have 2 wills.(2 people, person a and person b) Both are influenced by the outside world and by spiritual beings yet both come to a different conclusion of faith. So why do they choose different?

possible options..

1.)god influences people different(calvin)

2.) outside forces influence us that much(complete product of our
enviroment thus not our responsability)

3.) we are born either pointed towards one of the directions(calvinism again)

4.) it is a random dice roll decision

5.) genetic from our parents..

now,in openess my inital response would be that the way I frame the question and pose the options rules out free will
at the start. and to look for causes to why one chooses one way or another is to assume at the start that the agent is not self causing.

To be free means that we, to some extent, initiate and originate new lines of causation. It means we can't exhaustively account for decisions by appealing to antecedent causes. So, it means that we can't exhaustively explain why agent 1 chooses X while agent 2 chooses Y. Yes there are innumerable influences that come to bare uniquenly on each, influences which reach back to the beginning of creation (which is why even these cannot be explained in any more than a very abbreviated way by a finite agent). But these influences are not coercive.

If, as Calvinists and other determinists contend, the notion of self-causation is unintelligible, so if we can only conceive of free will in compatibilistic sense, then you have to hold that God only has compatibilistic freedom. An unintelligible concept doesn't become intelligible just because we apply it to God. So,unless one is willing to say that all God's decisions are caused by antecedent factors, one has to admit libertarian freedom is
intelligible.

Now the issue once again is why does one soul choose heaven, and one choose hell? How can we have free will and be the source of our decisions if God "has already seen them" thus we are not self-causing.Why do some put platonic reasoning above occam razor understanding of the old test?(*most jewish scholars are offended at the notion of God's emotions being anthropromorphic and do feel he can and has changed his mind---I spoke to Dr. Sprinkle about it)

im a dork...wanna believe this keeps me up at night?

sorry...more thoughts about self-causing but very briefly, isn't it the case that our choices create our perception of what is "good" and "evil", of what ends we want to pursue and avoid, etc... If God locked in our perception of himself as good -- there would be no choice.

In other words, its not like there's this objective reality for all to see, and we choose between A and B. (e.g. heaven and hell) Rather, our choice is dialectically related to our perception...

Ultimately the choice is not between destinies, but between lordship -- ourselves as lord, or God as lord. This choice then is manifested -- and further created -- in our choice over what we pursue, and what we see as "good" etc...but then I am stuck at the beginning again.Why.

There you go sir.

ur the militant..edu-ma-cate me..

[theculturewarrior]

My question is more biological than theological. Where do decisions come from, if not the soul? What organ, what physiological process, and what initiates a decision, if not a thought?

[theculturewarrior]

Is cognition an physiological process, like ovulation, and if so, how does decision making work. What initiates the physiology of a decision?

Edited March 22, 2007 by theculturewarrior

[theculturewarrior]

Is cognition a physiological process, like ovulation, and if so, how does decision making work. What initiates the physiology of a decision?

[Guest JeffCR07]

The manner in which you are phrasing the question is already problematic. It implicitly assumes a false dichotomy between cartesian dualism on the one hand and materialistic reductionism on the other. To ask "is it the body or is it the soul?" is to assume that it must be one and not the other.

However, a properly Thomistic/Aristotelian philosophy of mind will deny this dichotomy. It will say, first, that the soul is simply the principle of actuality for the human. Now this human being, as a holymorphic compound of potentiality and actuality can engage in many activities. Most of these activities, such as ovulating, are material activities. However, one of its activities, [i]Nous[/i], or intellection, is an immaterial activity.

[i]Both[/i] material [i]and[/i] immaterial activities proceed from the soul, because the soul is the principle of actuality. Thus, ovulation is as much a result of the agency of the soul as intellection. The difference is that one is a material action while the other is immaterial.

Now I'm sure you didn't intend to exclude the Aristotelian postion, however, Descartes has radically affected the manner in which we in the West approach philosophy and his influence is notoriously difficult to shake. This is a perfect example.

An Aristotelian/Thomistic response is going to call for a radical reconfiguring of how we look at the human person. The human person is fundamentally and substantially a combination of actuality and potentiality. The issue of corporeality and incorporeality is secondary (or perhaps even tertiary) in our minds. Moreover, we do not conceive of the "soul" as a cartesian immaterial thinking substance. Rather, the soul is the unitary principle of actuality, and so includes within itself and pertains to both the immaterial and the material functioning and structure of the human being. Strictly speaking, free will [i]must[/i] proceed from the soul because [i]all[/i] activity proceeds from the soul, but the "soul" here discussed is very different from the Cartesian/Platonic soul implied in your question.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[N/A Gone]

Hi Jeff

[Guest JeffCR07]

hey man!

[N/A Gone]

so um...fix me?

[theculturewarrior]

[quote name='JeffCR07' post='1217430' date='Mar 22 2007, 05:31 PM']The manner in which you are phrasing the question is already problematic. It implicitly assumes a false dichotomy between cartesian dualism on the one hand and materialistic reductionism on the other. To ask "is it the body or is it the soul?" is to assume that it must be one and not the other.

However, a properly Thomistic/Aristotelian philosophy of mind will deny this dichotomy. It will say, first, that the soul is simply the principle of actuality for the human. Now this human being, as a holymorphic compound of potentiality and actuality can engage in many activities. Most of these activities, such as ovulating, are material activities. However, one of its activities, [i]Nous[/i], or intellection, is an immaterial activity.

[i]Both[/i] material [i]and[/i] immaterial activities proceed from the soul, because the soul is the principle of actuality. Thus, ovulation is as much a result of the agency of the soul as intellection. The difference is that one is a material action while the other is immaterial.

Now I'm sure you didn't intend to exclude the Aristotelian postion, however, Descartes has radically affected the manner in which we in the West approach philosophy and his influence is notoriously difficult to shake. This is a perfect example.

An Aristotelian/Thomistic response is going to call for a radical reconfiguring of how we look at the human person. The human person is fundamentally and substantially a combination of actuality and potentiality. The issue of corporeality and incorporeality is secondary (or perhaps even tertiary) in our minds. Moreover, we do not conceive of the "soul" as a cartesian immaterial thinking substance. Rather, the soul is the unitary principle of actuality, and so includes within itself and pertains to both the immaterial and the material functioning and structure of the human being. Strictly speaking, free will [i]must[/i] proceed from the soul because [i]all[/i] activity proceeds from the soul, but the "soul" here discussed is very different from the Cartesian/Platonic soul implied in your question.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff[/quote]

Let me put it this way... Can there be free will if we are merely bodies without souls? What would a neuropsychologist say?

[Guest JeffCR07]

depends on what you mean and what neuropsychologist/neurophysiologist you talk to. An Aristotelian neurophysiologist would say that there couldnt be a [i]body[/i] without a soul. Certainly there are many "physicalists" who would answer your question "yes," but there are philosophical reasons to object to their assumptions and premises.

However, my point remains that an Aristotelian/Thomist would object to even the [i]possibility[/i] of such a body/soul dichotomy.


***

Rev, it seems that you have pretty much got a grasp on most of the central concepts in the contemporary free will debate. However, I'm surprised that you don't mention anything about the compatibilist option. You talk about the determinist approach and the libertarian approach, and you clearly choose the libertarian approach, but if you want to give a full acount, you're gonna have to deal with compatibilism at some point.

Also, if you take a libertarian view (which at this point in time I think may be the strongest position), you will have to explain [i]how[/i] this libertarian view works. Is it that there must really be an open option between, say, A and B, or is it possible for A to be the only "choice" but we are free to choose it in a multiplicity of ways or for a multiplicity of reasons?

Anyways, the only other thing I have time to say at this point is that it seems you are still struggling with the fact that a libertarian view of freedom [i]really is compatible[/i] with God's perfect foreknowledge. But this is an old problem.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[N/A Gone]

thanks Jeff, it seems that no matter how I can reconcile the view of freedom with God out of time, I cant seem to do it with the idea that God knows the furure inexhaustively. ok, /rant..sorry TCW