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Guest JeffCR07
Posted

Hey Rev, I'm glad to talk to you too! I hope everything is going well. Last time I talked to you, we were both pretty overloaded on classes, have you been able to catch up on some sleep?

Oh, and for phat:

L_D actually posted it above, but just for convenience, here it is again, from the Third Session of the First Vatican Council:

[i]All things are open and laid bare to His eyes, even those which will be brought about by the free agency of creatures[/i]
In latin: [i]Omnia enim nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius, ea etiam, quae libera creaturarum actione futura sunt[/i]


Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

Posted

TWT..sounds cool.;)

actually, a big development off of Boyd's work with Open theism was the implications on theodicy as a warfare worldview within the evangelical community. Issues like Christus victor and the book "Is God to blame" gained vast debate. to the point that Boyd was brought before the evangelical council on charges of heresy.

anywho, a big part of what brought me back to catholicism was trinitarian theology in light of the open view(*hence my interest in the filioque issue)

when I became catholic Boyd wanted me to change the name of my theology with the openess view. He is kinda anti-catholic.

hence Trinatarian warfare theodicy

Posted

I am working on a response to Jeff and L_D, but in the mean time. What do you think of this? Part of me still is trying to make this a viable catholic expression, but I am battling that.


[quote]Open Theism is the view that God knows the future partly as a realm of what might and might now come to pass. Since God sovereignly choose to give angels and humans free will, this view holds, the future is partly “open.” Defenders of this view, such as myself, argue that this view is biblically, philosophically and practically superior to the more traditional view that holds that the future has been exhaustively settled (in God’s knowledge if not by God’s will) from all eternity. This view has arguably been the single most controversial issue debated among conservative Christians for the last decade or so. As one who has followed this debate rather closely, I’d like to take this opportunity to clear up a foundational misunderstanding that has permeated the debate.

Without question, the single most often repeated criticism of Open Theism raised in the vast literature written against this view is that it allegedly diminishes “God’s sovereignty.” Since the God of Open Theism doesn’t know the future as exhaustively settled, many argue that this God may be taken by surprise at what comes to pass. The God of Open Theism therefore can’t promise to have a plan in place to bring good out of evil, as Romans 8.28 seems to teach. Suffering might be altogether pointless. Indeed, a number of critics have made the claim that since in the Open View God isn’t certain of all that will come to pass, the God of Open Theism can only guess at what might occur and hope things turn out reasonably well. In the words of Bruce Ware, one of the foremost critics of Open theology, the God of Open Theism is a “limited, passive, hand-wringing God.”

Such an impotent view of God understandably strikes fear, if not revulsion, in the hearts and minds of many believers who hear it. In reality, I will now argue, the charge could hardly be further from the truth. I will contend that if we truly believe God is omniscient, possessing unlimited intelligence and knowledge, there is no basis for concluding he is less “in control” if he knows the future partly as a realm of possibilities than he is if he knows the future exclusively as a realm of eternally settled facts. In fact, I shall argue that any view of God which thinks God gains any significant providential advantage simply by virtue of knowing the future exclusively as a realm of eternally settled facts (rather than as partly comprised of possibilities thereby concedes that it has a limited view of God. More specifically, ironic as it sounds, I shall argue that this charge is premised on a denial of God’s omniscience.

To begin, we humans obviously are less “in control” when we face a future partly comprised of possibilities than we are when we face a future that is exhaustively settled. This is why we experience more stress playing a (serious) game of chess, for example, than we do when working on an assembly line. But this is so only because we humans have a limited amount of intelligence. The more possibilities we have to anticipate, the more we have to divide up our limited intelligence to anticipate each one.

Unlike us, however, God is not limited in intelligence. So far as I can see, very few people – including most critics of the Open View of God – have adequately come to grips with this important fact. . If God has unlimited intelligence, God doesn’t have to divide up his intelligence to cover possibilities the way we do. Rather, a God of infinite intelligence could anticipate each and every one of any number of possibilities as though each and every one was the only possibility – which is to say, as though each and every one was an absolute certainty.

In other words, for a God of unlimited intelligence, there is no functional difference between anticipating a possibility, on the one hand, and anticipating a certainty, on the other. With regard to any event that comes to pass, the open theist can say as confidently as a traditional theist: “God had been anticipating this very event from the foundation of the world.” It’s just that the Open Theist adds that, because agents have free will, any number of other events could have taken place as well. Yet, because the Open Theist believes God is infinitely intelligent, he can maintain that if any other event had taken place he would be saying the exact same thing about that event. “God had been anticipating this very event from the foundation of the world.”

Though we repeatedly read the claim that open theists deny God’s omniscience, it should now be clear that, as a matter of fact, the God of Open Theism doesn’t know less than the God of classical theism. To the contrary, in this view God knows much more. The God of classical theism knows only one future story-line as a certainty and therefore anticipates it perfectly. The God of Open Theism knows an innumerable number of possible future story-lines – but God anticipates each and every one as though it was the only future story-line. Far from diminishing God’s intelligence and knowledge, therefore, the Open View greatly exalts it.

In fact, we may go further and note that only a God who lacked infinite intelligence and exhaustive knowledge would gain any significant providential advantage by knowing the future exclusively as a realm of settled facts as opposed to a realm partly composed of possibilities. Only a God of limited intelligence and knowledge could improve his anticipatory skills by acquiring certainty about a possible future event. In other words, only a limited God would anticipate a certainty better than a possibility. Hence, only a limited God could be in any way threatened by a partly open future; would have to “guess” at what might come to pass; might be caught by surprise, and would be put in a position where he must passively hope for the best.

Ironic as it seems, therefore, I have to conclude that the criticism that the Open View denies God’s omniscience that diminishes his sovereignty is itself premised on a denial of God’s omniscience!

In closing, when Bruce Ware informs us that the God who faces a partly open future is a “limited, passive, hand-wringing God,” he’s actually telling us a good deal about his own view of God – but absolutely nothing about the God of Open Theism. Sadly, it’s evident that Bruce Ware’s God would be reduced to a “hand-wringing” deity if he had to anticipate possibilities rather than certainties. His God must foreknow all as a certainty (and, in point of fact, predestine all) in order to confidently face the future. But a truly omniscient God – a God of unlimited intelligence and knowledge -- would have no such requirements.

My encouragement to Bruce and to the numerous other critics who dread the consequences of a partly open future would be: Have faith in God’s infinite intelligence! If you do, you’ll see you have nothing to fear about a partly open future.

Dr. Gregory A. Boyd [/quote]

Trusting God’s Infinite Intelligence: Why We Need Not Fear A Partly Open Future
By Dr. Gregory A. Boyd

Guest JeffCR07
Posted (edited)

It seems to me that Boyd makes a number of mistakes here, however I will narrow in on just one.

Right off the bat, with all this heavy focus on God's sovereignty, it is clear (as you have pointed out), that Boyd is fighting a Protestant battle against Protestant opponents, and so we should not expect him to be speaking to a Catholic audience. This having been said, if Boyd's response is true, it ought to be true universally, and so should not contradict any other true claims that are made about God. It is my contention that the implications of Boyd's system result in a radical incompatibility between his stance of "open theism" and the fact of Divine Perfection. If one is to take Boyd as correct, one must assert that God is imperfect, and if one is to assert that God is perfect, then one must reject Boyd's position.

[b]Divine Perfection[/b]

Whenever there is a change, that change is nothing other than a motion from potentiality to actuality. If my computer is currently "on," but could, in the future, be "off," then my computer is, at this very moment, [i]actually[/i] on and [i]potentially[/i] off. When I turn my computer off, this change is a motion from it being potentially off to it being actually off, and from it being actually on to being potentially on. Every change is a motion from potency to act.

Now, a perfect being is a being which has everything that is good. Moreover, if we were to compare two beings, one which has these good qualities in potentiality and the other that has these good qualities in actuality, the latter is more perfect than the former. This is why [i]La Pieta[/i] is "more perfect" as a sculpture than a block of uncarved marble. While the marble has all of the good sculptural qualities as the [i]pieta[/i], it has them in potentiality as opposed to in actuality.

Now, from these two observations, it follows that a perfect being is pure actuality. Perfection neither changes nor grows, for in either case, that would imply that at some point, there was something that perfection lacked. However, if perfection lacks, then it is not perfection. The Perfect Being, then, undergoes no change on account of being pure actuality.

[b]Boyd's Changing God[/b]

In the picture that Boyd paints of God, he seems to do a good job in protecting Him from accusations of betraying God's sovereignty (though a number of points remain fuzzy and unclear). He does this, however, at the expense of leaving his god open to an attack of a much stronger kind. Namely, Boyd's God can [i]change[/i], and, as shown above, if he can change, then he isn't perfect, and so not God at all.

If Boyd's "Open Theism" is to make any sense at all, we must understand that God's knowledge of the future is of a qualitatively different kind than His knowledge of the present and the past. The present and the past God knows as certain and set, whereas His knowledge of the future he knows as uncertain and "open." However, if this is true, then what God once knew as "open" and uncertain God now knows as certain and set. If this is true, then God's knowledge undergoes a qualitative change as time goes by and humans make their free decisions. This means that what God knows now as [i]potentially[/i] certain (i.e. a future event) he may one day know as [i]actually[/i] certain. Therefore, Boyd's God undergoes a movement from potency to act and undergoes change. In other words, Boyd's God is imperfect.

[b]Conclusion[/b]

It seems that there is simply no way around this. If Boyd is correct and the future is open in the way he characterises it, then God's knowledge (and thus God Himself) undergoes qualitative change. From this, it follows that God at this moment lacks something that he will one day possess, and so, because the Perfect Being is pure act and admits no potentiality, then Boyd's God is not perfect. However, if God is not perfect, he is not God. It seems to me that we must, then, reject Boyd's position. The future is not "open" in the way that Boyd argues, but it does not necessarily follow from this that Man is not free.

I maintain that it is possible for us to understand man's freedom as a true, ontological, non-deterministic freedom, and to do so [i]without[/i] rejecting the perfect unchangability of God. St. Anselm provides one possible way of doing so - a way that is thoroughly in line with the Fathers and Doctors of the Church who came before him - in his [i]De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis
et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio[/i]. Here, he makes the brilliant distinction between preceeding and subsequent necessity, and points out that our future actions are "certain" or necessary according to [i]subsequent[/i] necessity - which stems from the timeless, eternal nature of God, and not from[i]preceeding[/i] necessity, which is the chain of causes. Thus, God is capable of knowing our future actions as certain while, simultaneously, we are in no way [i]forced[/i] into those actions.

In summary, I find Boyd's position to be untenable and his dichotomy (my way vs. denial of human free will) to be a false one. We need not appeal to Boydian "openness" in order to make sense of God's omniscience coinciding with our free will. God's certain knowledge of the future does not force our actions, as Anselm and the other Doctors and Fathers of the Church convincingly show.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

Edited by JeffCR07
Posted

utter brilliance.

Jeff, thank you very much for what you have written.

Posted

(Jeff I am working on a reply to you, thank you so much for the care you have put into this)

I am gonna address L_D first.

L_D

It is kind of ironic that both of us are lacking time needed to discuss in depth an issue on time. Thank you for your reflection on the Catholic Worldview.

I agree with you that our discussion is rooted in philosophy/natural theology, but needing to be understood within the parameters of orthodoxy. I think a problem right now is my personal dualism between Catholicism and being and evangelical. It is something i have been struggling with for a while now and it is clouding my reasoning a little bit. Either I am too causious and will not speak any thoughts on a subject; needing to cross-check and ask every redundant issue. Or I am afraid If I think naturally as an evangelical I will not answer in a way well pleasing to the church.

As an evangelical, it is not uncommon for me to look at your quotes and interpret them in a way that is friendly to my view, as long as it isnt too horribly stretched. I find myself doing that.

When you cite things as common place for the christian faith, please refrain from that language. It automatically is polemic to someone who has an issue with it as being non-christian. Where it might be non-catholic, but it is still considered a viable expression of christian faith. Or by saying they get taken for granted it speaks as if it is settled, where as this is a big debate within the evangelical community for very good reasons.

I have no issue with a “beginning of time” or an “end of time” As shown in my pretty pictures, I acknowledge a settled linear time, just that it is being settled, not yet settled.

Terminology such as “time” and what it means to be “beyond time” might be standard to you, but I think this ground foundation is a serious problem I am having with this. As an evangelical, and to an extent as an open theist the passage with moses is interpreted probably different to what you see it as. Being “beyond time” is still compatible to open theism, and with my mutant offspring.

In your passage on times being present in their immediacy, you cite that God includes the free will response for man. This can happen by having God know the reactions we have to things, but it does not need a God that is motionless, that wouldnt work in according to temporal theism. Why does God speak of “ifs,””might” “perhaps” and “buts” in scripture.

I think that by saying time is not possible, or saying it is not possible to create a God where outcomes are possible could be seen as denying omnipotence. I still do not see the functional need for God to not experience time except for the fathers to use the Greek ignorance of change.

Another issue I have right now is the issue of causation. Yes, we could argue that God knows us perfectly and knows all the influences perfectly that he can know what we will do. Ironically, “knowing” and “seeing” are two different things and you are using time language. But, the concept of self-causation needs to be addressed. Humans are not just equations, but we have the ability to do random things, do things not logical, not predictable things. I have an itch. Do I itch it or not? Am I predestined to itch it? If God has control and can influence and knows every outcome perfectly than we have a dilemma. Either this is the best possible world. (*hard to imagine that, and the fall being perfect), God has no control over out time and we become theists, or God left it open the the possibilities and works with us as it happens. As shown in the old testament when God appears to react to human action. Is God munipulating and knows our exact outcome yet we still have a crappy world? Regardless of the freedom of our will, is our will even free if it is completely for known in its actions?

Ok, sorry tagent there. As you can see I am still strongly rooted in the implications of an openess doctrine. In my pictures I adopt a view that Time is contained within God, the past is closed as we know and experience it, and the future is open. Yet in that openess God experiences that openess and can know it perfectly, but it is not settled while our causation has not settled it yet. Thus allowing God to work with our reactions and options as we settled them.

I agree that in our intentions we must understand that this is a complex issue and we can not claim to know more than what we are perhaps able to know. But I think it is an equal mis justice to attribute the classic view of time as an ability for us to understand those metaphysics. If this is open for doctrine, let it be open for doctrine, but why do we lock something that we might not have the key for? If we use the concept of Occam's razor would not our experience of God, and our experience of time be given at least legitimacy over Greek metaphysical philosophy on change?

About the Catechism..

- God creates by wisdom and love
-no problem
- God creates "out of nothing"
-sounds good
- God creates an ordered and good world
-I think we can define what it means to be ordered and good, but on first look it is good
- God transcends creation and is present to it.
-what do you mean “present” and “transcends”
- God upholds and sustains creation.
-yup
- Providence and secondary causes
-In reading this I see language that I think shows God moving in time with us. He Guides us through the journey, which would appear to be the same as what I have said about God working with us as time progresses. (For God grants his creatures not only their existence, but also the dignity of acting on their own, of being causes and principles for each other, and thus of cooperating in the accomplishment of his plan). Sounds like self-causation.
In closing, the TWT thread was lengthy, I sound almost like a child at times speaking a different language as a non catholic/recent convert. If you have read God of the Possible, you have a good foundation in Openess. I would recommend “Is God to Blame” it shows the practical theodicy to it and since this is more of a practical debate of my own understanding rather than a neutral theology debate maybe it would help. I could fed-ex it to you tommorow if you pm ur address again.(*speaking of pm, have you got mine on GO)

I actually know Bruce Ware from the debate on the evangelical council and the reply Boyd had when openess was brought as a heresy. Those letters are displayed in the TWT thread.

I had some questions/objections brought up on the first page that I am curious about. Post 5 and the drawings on post 13

I think one problem I am having is I considered reversion/conversion under the belief that open theism was a compatible option within catholicism. Being assured that from a priest and bishop after numerous days of debate the idea that it isnt reconcilable is disturbing me. I know the “good lil catholic boy” should just submit to the church and her teachings. I just cant. Dont get me wrong, Im not pulling a hans kung and teaching open theism anymore. But can I intellectually control my worldview? No matter the argument how do I change that? Maybe part of it is my teachers know the dualism I am facing and are kinda feeding into it. My only catholic fellowship comes from phatmass and speaking to some of you online. I had a project on free will in light of open theism assigned to me by the same patristics teacher that has been the most focal on my conversion and even told me to be a “free church catholic” (*glorified cafeteria)

ok, now Jeff

Laudate_Dominum
Posted

[quote name='Revprodeji' post='1119053' date='Nov 13 2006, 05:06 PM']
When you cite things as common place for the christian faith, please refrain from that language. It automatically is polemic to someone who has an issue with it as being non-christian. Where it might be non-catholic, but it is still considered a viable expression of christian faith. Or by saying they get taken for granted it speaks as if it is settled, where as this is a big debate within the evangelical community for very good reasons.
[/quote]
Rev, the point you allude to is not some polemical jab that I'm making up. Much of the open theist literature that I've read quite clearly admits to being at odds with the early ecumenical councils and historical christian theology in general. I do not believe that one can objectively evaluate open theism without realizing this basic fact.
One of the fundamental assumptions of even your beloved Boydian open theism is that the history of christian theology has been tainted by hellenistic thought and that open theism represents a hermeneutic purification.
It is not I who have created some sort of false dichotomy; this dichotomy is in many respects the very basis of open theism.
It is true that if one examines the history of christian thought it is possible to identify anthropomorphic teachings from time to time, but the fact still remains that open theism is a novel and alien theology.
The simple fact that the theology is open for debate within evangelical circles does not mean that I can assent to the proposition that it is a viable expression of the christian faith. I could not agree to such a statement without in effect saying that christianity is an absurdity.
This is not something personal either; I would say the same of Calvinism or Arianism.
And this is not merely because I am Catholic; this is because I believe that something that is true is intrinsically rational. Even though the ultimate subject matter of Christian theology is beyond our threshold of reason, theology as such exists in a continuum and thus conforms to the structures of rationality. The intrinsic relationship between truth and reason, even truths of faith and natural reason, is not severed.
Now since Christianity is not merely a set of postulates but is in fact a historical reality rooted in actual historical events, it follows logically to my mind that Christian belief as seen through a historical context must have an essential continuity otherwise it can rightly be described as absurd.
Therefore, a doctrine or system of theology which fundamentally undermines the historical continuity of christian belief cannot coexist with the assertion that Christianity is true. One might be able to suggest that their particular brand of Christian belief is true, but then they are speaking of a personal system of belief, not a revelation which transcends the individual and is rooted in historical events. As disrespectful as it may sound, I see persons such as Dr. Boyd to be less like Christian teachers and more like gurus who happen to use the Bible.

Just so you know there is much more I have to say regarding this point. I hope that it has been made sufficiently nonetheless.

Posted

Jeff,(*this isnt a response to your Boyd article, but rather to the original post you made on the first page--the boyd artitcle will follow such. Thank you for all your time and wisdom)

I have about as much credibility with Boyd as Bush does with Jon Stewart. When I asked Boyd about some of your objections he simply told me that as long as I am willing to be indoctrinated and not use logic and scripture he can not help me. He is sore about me not taking any of the evangelical scholarships I have been offered that he helped to set up. So I am honestly debating this from my own limited knowledge and no doubt I am under dressed for this occasion.


"God knows the future, including the free acts of his creatures, with an infallible certitude".

-What is certitude? My urge is to argue this statement to be open to other concepts. Sadly this evangelical method of hermeneutics does not take into effect the authors intent, only the ability to manipulate text to fit the doctrine I am wanting to convey. In defense of my position, I am agreeing that God knows the future acts with infallible certitude, just that they are known as possibilities if they are in fact open still, that is not determined. In the purity of the dogma, I am still within line. Of course, I could be legalistic here and not take into intention what the authors had in mind.

Ironically, as I continue in your reading I see that you first understand that I will not be consistent with the original intentions of the author. My only justification would be “how”, how do we know that the Church fathers intended it to be strictly a closed situation? Do we not expound on dogma and develop the doctrine progressively? Could not openness be looked as a development within the guidelines put in place by the fathers? I am not trying to challenge you here Jeff, I respect you and I am in debt for the work you and the others have put into this debate. I am not debating in an effort to challenge the church or to engage in simple metaphysical rhetoric, you know this issue is a burden to me and I need to challenge all the strings that could still be open. My desire is to reconcile my world view with the teaching of the church, or at least to be within the guidelines she allows us to work in. For it is theology that works on the hinges of doctrine, expounding our understanding.

Your second point is that “open theism would render certitude meaningless,” you base this on the understanding that by definition “if a thing is a possible without being a necessary, then that thing is not certain.” You assert that God knows “future actions as possibilities, not as necessary”. I think here is where we drift in logic. As time progresses and we come closer to an action the possibilities are limited by our own actions, and your general chaos theory components. (butterfly in India creates hurricane in Miami-related actions that appear to be random) In this you can see that all actions are equally necessary, because while percentage-wise one might be more likely, either is a possibilities, thus necessary. If there is a possibility that can not happen than it is no longer a possibility, thus no longer necessary. But the remaining possibilities are all necessary up until the action is determined, acted out and no longer a possibility, but a settled occurrence. In your conclusion here you deduce that “God does not know with infallible certitude which future action will be taken through the free acts of his creatures.” it is my understanding that in your metaphysic God is out of time, and experiences all of time at once. Yet, why do you use time-dependent language like “will be taken”? I still adhere that God does know the future with infallible certitude, I am just in disagreement with you as how he knows that future. Not to limit God, but just that the “future” actions are not yet settled, thus are not capable of being known in any form other than the possibilities in which they consist of progressively. We come back to the base argument here in that I see no reason to hold to this metaphysic of a static/stoic God that “experiences” all of “time” at once. I think this is an impressive stretch of not only common logic, but rather common experience and natural scriptural understanding. If the Occam's razor is a God that experiences, then why do we go against that? I could care less if classic Boydian open theism is no longer confessed in my theology. He would tell me that I am in the wrong by attempting to reconcile with Church teaching, so in that I have a progressed theology than him. But sir, if one of us is putting loopholes in place than I must admit that I felt that I would need to be doing this in order to come to a neutral acceptance of this teaching you are sharing. This is something I can not do. To show the gravity of this offense I have quit taking the Eucharist while I am not in communion with what appears to be church teaching. I hold to a strong believe in the sacraments, and at this moment I would be perverting it like any protestant.

Now, onto your response to Boyd's article.

Guest JeffCR07
Posted

Rev, I appreciate the thoughtful response. I understand this is something that you are struggling with, and all intellectual struggles take time. I want nothing more than for you to take all the time you need, be patient, and be open to the Holy Spirit speaking to you through the Church. I'll wait to provide a response until after you have posted something to answer my longer, more thorough post.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

Posted

thanks Jeff...you can play with that first post if you want. Since it is about your original post. I am working on a reply to your letter.

Guest JeffCR07
Posted

nah, I'll wait. If we start talking about that we'll get bogged down and never get to the more important stuff (namely, my longer, more thorough post). ;)

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

Posted

ok..cool..but ONLY, if you incorrporate both of the posts. I feel I hit on some important things in the above post. I am workin on the other one right now.

Guest JeffCR07
Posted

If we get hung up on this, I am going to be really upset :P: but here is how I would respond to your post above:

To be totally honest, I'm not sure there is much by ways of a substantial refutation here. Your last, and biggest paragraph is where you make your strongest argument, to I will address that, but even here it seems to me that your position is highly problematic. You seem to be unclear as to the nature of possibility and necessity, when, for example, you say, "all actions are equally necessary, because while percentage-wise one might be more likely, either is a possibilities, thus necessary." But this is incoherent. If two mutually contradictory things are possible, they cannot both be necessary. If it is equally possible that I will be sitting or standing at 1:00 this afternoon, then neither is necessary.

Then you seem to move on to discuss options closing as time moves on, but that doesn't actually help your case at all. Lets say it is 12:58 and I find myself, through some strange turn of events, chained upright to a wall. Now at this point it looks like the percentage chance of my being seated at 1:00 will be very small indeed. But none of this changes the nature of possibility or necessity. If a thing is [i]necessary[/i] then we know it will happen. If a thing is [i]possible[/i] then we know it [i]might[/i] happen, [i]but we aren't certain[/i]. And that, really, is the clincher.

If I were to walk up to your God-inside-Time right now and ask him whether I will be sitting or standing at 1:00 this afternoon, he could list all of an infinite set of possibilities, but when I press him, he will shrug and say "I'm not certain."

Posted

Jeff

Now, onto your response to Boyd's article. (*ala, the “longer post”)

I agree that Greg makes plenty of “mistakes”, in light you must understand that he is working from scripture and his own logical philosophy. He is a strong advocate of the idea that faith is genuine only if it comes genuinely from your own understanding. You can learn from others, but unless it progresses into the inclination of your will and logic is is not a genuine faith. This is a major problem he has with catholicism that differs from the theological progression in soteriology of protestant compared to a catholic. This is not directed at you, but I sometimes sense that catholics automatically discredit/disrespect protestant theologians because of this concept. The truth of the matter is Boyd is a dedicated Christian, highly accredited and in all humility smarter than most of us here. I do not want to justify him, just point out that I might be a peon, but he is not.

I do respect how you disclaim in understanding that Boyd is speaking in a protestant arena to a protestant audience. Thus, obviously he will not be catholic-friendly necessarily, or speak in a language that is compatible with your theology. I respect that you point this out right away. Sometimes I think this is an issue when we study the theology of our Christian brothers in other confessions.

I agree with your insight that Boyd is speaking in the issue of sovereignty, which is a heavy protestant issue (*in my opinion it should be a catholic issue, but it is not and i do not seem to understand this.) So it does not speak to us, but in the same that a diabetic could care less about the use of chocolate chips found in a cookie, we can not ignore the work he does with this. Sovereignty is not essential to this metaphysic, it just has heavy implications in it.

Your passage on universal truth had me thinking. I believe there is one truth about God. I agree that this truth is not subjective. But I also feel that the truth can be beyond our current understanding, thus we should not limit ourselves to development in it. An aspect as undeveloped as metaphysics can not be expected to have complete understanding in the patristic period. Being against something because of our limited understanding as a human seems wrong to me. Was it not St. Paul who instructed us to test everything and hold onto the good?

Divine imperfection was the original objection we brought to the service in the old TWT thread. To be fair I am not going to even look at that thread, rather just work through it right now as I am, as I have progressed in my theology from then. You boldly state that if we accept an openness theology into our metaphysic that “one must assert God is imperfect, and if one is to assert God as perfect then we must reject the openness position.” At first glance I still do not process how God is imperfect if he can experience. I feel this sells out as the Christian attempt of Aristoles “great non-mover” rather than just a clear reading of scripture. As I considered a conversion to catholicism I was instructed that there was a significant debate about whether the simplicity doctrine is true and what the doctrine even means, let alone implies, if it is true. After all, whatever "simplicity" means, it obviously doesn't mean "absolutely One thing" since God is a Trinity. Seems to me one could say God is "simple" or "infinitely complex," depending on what one means by "simple" or "complex." Given this ambiguity, what tends to happen is that people presuppose their own meaning into "simplicity" and then deduce that another person's theology is incompatible with it.

In the same way that Molinism holds that God's middle knowledge consists entirely of “would” counterfactuals. Openess holds that it also includes “maybes.” Here is how I see it flowing.

1. God is omniscient.
2. An omniscient God must know the truth value of all propositions.
3. Propositions about what "might" and "might not" happen have truth
value that God must know.
4. There's no reason to think that all "might" and "might not"
propositions are false -- let alone necessarily false (viz. by virtue of
God being omniscient).

Thus, God's pre-creational knowledge would consist of knowledge of
A_ all that WILL occur
B) all that will not occur
C) all that would occur in other situations
D) all that might and might not occur in the future world and in all
logically possible worlds.

Thesis

Possiblities are real.

God knows all reality, just as it is.

Hence, God knows possibilities.

Defense: The logical contradiction of "x will" is not "x will not" but "x might not." If God knows the truth value of all "x will" or "x will not" statements, God must know the truth value of all "x might" and "x might not" statements. Hence, an omniscient God must, by logical necessity, know the truth value of "might and might not" propositions.

God could decide to create a world in which all "might and might not" propositions are rendered false -- viz. a wholly determinant world --but there's no good reason to think he has. Hence, its at least logically possible that the omniscient God created the kind of world in which some "might and might not" statements are True.

"No perfect thing can change from one state of perfection to another" –Why would I assume this? It's the classical assumption that lies behind classical theology, but I still see it as utterly baseless. Its just one huge assumption, going back to plato. It assumes that all change is either for the better or the worse -- hence not applicable to a perfect being. But why can't change be "from one perfect state to another" -- in response to changing circumstances?

Suppose I have a "perfect character." This is immutable. Now I'm happy as a lark and I walk into a room and find a person in utter despair. Would this not impact me and alter my disposition -- precise because my perfect character is unchanging? Would it not be insensitive of me if my happy disposition was unchanging despite this persons despair?

If God is really related to the world, it impacts him, and precisely because he is perfect and unchanging in his character, he is supremely changing in his experience.

Apparently I just babbled. Well, to get back on track. Divine perfection...

You define change as a motion from potential to actual. Working within a linear time model I could see this logic, but in th computer example you have a device that could be either at the one time. There is nothing changing about it due to time. Where as if I say God regrets making humanity, the act of regret is something expressed from God, but that does not mean he is constantly regretting. Or always has the “formula of regret that we instigate” but that he genuinely feels. If we, as feeble humans yet in His image experience relationships and emotion why would we assume that God can not do the same? To me the relational God is stronger than the stoic. You continue to describe perfection as the creature that has everything in actuality, rather than the one that has aspects in potential. Your analogy of a sculpture fits this, but I do not see how it works in relations with God. How is a God that is experiencing settled time as linear, utterly prepared and aware of any possible future, yet experiencing with us(*my pictures) and thus expressing emotion and the ability to change his course based on the world less perfect than a distant near-deistic God? I do not think this God is lacking anything. I would argue he is capable of more than the stoic God and thus more “perfect” than the Stoic.

You define that a perfect being is pure actuality. Why is experience lacking in perfection? An imperfect being will change in his essence with experience, but a perfect being will not. We can “grow” in our development because we are imperfect. We are not near the standard to which our fulfillment can be. But God is the standard. I do not see how God would be lacking and then gaining from an experience in a way that can “harm” his perfection.

Boyd's changing God.

(*it took me this long, I am sorry Jeff. Thanks for everything)

You talk again of change as harming God. I still do not see this as an issue with Christianity. Maybe Greek philosophy. But I have voiced that concern above and in the past. The sovereignty that Boyd fights against is the Calvin model of utter predestination. A concept that is against Catholic theodicy as well.

Now you wrote something that might be a break through for us.

If Boyd's "Open Theism" is to make any sense at all, we must understand that God's knowledge of the future is of a qualitatively different kind than His knowledge of the present and the past. The present and the past God knows as certain and set, whereas His knowledge of the future he knows as uncertain and "open."

Yes, I agree completely. This could be THE major difference we can develop from. We experience the past, now, and future as different. We can not change the past. It is settled and done. Written and published, we have no causation over it. The “now” is the actualization of our decisions based on the options open. (*if a car hits me, it might be my choices, but it could be an icy road or bad driver) The future is still the openness of my possible actions. Now, you explained that for God this different type of knowledge is a bad thing. But I do not see how this is qualitatively different. It is time, it is what is available, it is what exists. God is not limited because he can not see the monkey sitting on my lap. The monkey just is not there. You cite that as time goes from open to settled there is a change, as humans make their free decisions.. Now, I am not denying this change. I embrace it. I do not see the problem with this. You see this as wrong because it is a change in how God knows something and that is a threat to his perfection- a point that we can clearly work with in my education.

Your conclusion

You are right in the understanding that Boyd's God does undergo a change in his knowledge. Or at least the type of Knowledge. I Do not think there is anything that God “does not” know. He just either knows it as possible or settled. There is nothing God is unprepared for, nothing he is not perfectly able to embrace and experience. I agree with you here.

I disagree that God lacks something that he will one day possess. I do not see this. In humans a lack of knowledge and the learning of something or experiencing of something can progress us towards or away from our individual perfection, because we are imperfect and can still change in our essence. Where as God can experience change and not change himself because he is perfection. He knows everything. He is in the water with the current and ripples, but is unmoved. Ask a fish how he avoids the current and he would ask you what water is. Our fathers tried to develop a metaphysic that incorporated their world view and Christian truths into a theology. I just think our understanding was strongly based on greek logic and can be opened to further understanding. Did not Anselm do just that?

Sorry for the babble again, God's knowledge changing does not make God change. He does not lack something that he will one day possess. Creation is in itself potentiality, God opened himself up to experience in creation. In experience there is risk, risk is only legit if it is possible.

You finished by saying

The future is not "open" in the way that Boyd argues, but it does not necessarily follow from this that Man is not free.

In the past it seems that you have logically tried to show how time could be scripted and known, yet not figured out(*it seemed like God was still predicting based on action or “knowing” not seeing—still bound by linear time). But I would disagree and say that you have not shown how we are anything other than scripted. How do we escape the matrix, how do we have freedom and control? The difference in preceding and subsequent necessity seems like a script to me. There are many issues I initially have with it. Just plug a random soul in and see what happens. How is it true without self-causation? Perhaps you should link me to this discussion again. I do not want to review the old TWT thread at the risk of drifting further into confusion. (*i'm hoping I have progressed from there)

Yet, the curious thing is how your final conclusion seems like an argument for a God that “knows” the future certaintly, yet it has not yet happened. You even use linear time language. “capable” “knowing” not seeing.

“Thus, God is capable of knowing our future actions as certain while, simultaneously, we are in no way [i]forced[/i] into those actions.”

Your summary

You do not like Boyd's dichotomy, which is, in your own words, “me vs denial of human will” but could that not be the accusation of anyone that has ever questioned anything? Boyd, and myself in this, does see a serious denial of not only Human freedom, but also how God relates with Humanity as shown to us in the Old testament and in the life of Christ. I see no problem with God's omniscience conflicting with our free will. I have never had a problem with this. God “knowing” does not make it happen, but you make time a settled situation, thus God knows it because it is available. I am not questioning what God knows of the available, but what is to be known. Time is not done. It is not experienced at once and always. I see far to many problems with this to reconcile.

I do not want to to misunderstand my objections to you. I am not objecting to you, but trying to process the information and challenge it against what I have been taught and subsequently believe. Almost like fighting a virus. You sometimes need to prescribe what the initials symptoms appear to be telling you, those meds can often led to more damage being done progressing to a better understanding of the symptoms. I respect you Dr. thank you.

This finishes your “big” post. I still need to respond to L_D's post and your last small post (*promised I would not get off track) yet, to get off-track for the moment, I did have random questions pop up while responding to you

-creating is experiencing. We have not always been, thus we “happened” and in happening there is a “moment when God did not have us”

-incarnation is an experience. The divinity experienced with the humanity

-Old test
-regrets making humanity
-numerous times when God changes his mind.

In heaven are we timeless as well. Do we not experience relations and change.

If perfection is non-changing, are you implying that angels are perfect or do they manage to be “out of time” yet not perfect?

The fall of the angels is an event that concludes “happening” whether or not when we say this happened, the point is it happened. Denoting an existence of lineal events in the metaphysical realm.

I will try to get to those last 2 posts tommorow.(**sorry for the length...bear with me brother)

Posted

I'm not going to step into this debate with certain points, but only with the general observation that all parties involved should probably work on Catholic definitions of terms such as

- change
- potency
- actuality
- perfection
- nature (essence)

It seems that there is a lot of talking across each other due to slight differences in understanding these terms.

Guest JeffCR07
Posted

Rev, thanks for the reply. A number of points jump out at me, so I will take each in turn:

First, you attempt to argue that change is compatible with perfection, but rather than actually provide an argument for [i]why[/i] change is compatible with perfection, you take the negative approach and claim that the only reason anyone says that change and imperfection are incompatible is on account of greek philosophy (which apparently you reject).

But two thoughts immediately come to mind. First, the lecture that the Pope recently gave (the one that resulted in all the confusion with Muslims), was specifically about how it is foolish to attempt to rip greek philosophy and christianity apart from one another. Greek philosophy heavily influenced the early Church Councils (really [i]all[/i] of the Church Councils), and so constitutes an integral part of the Christian Tradition. This does not mean that one must be a platonist or an aristotelian, but it does mean that one cannot simply throw out greek philosophy.

The second thought that comes to mind is this: I have provided a whole host of good reasons for why we should think that a changing god and a Perfect God are incompatible. Any motion from potentiality to actuality is possible only if the thing changing is actually lacking something. But actually lacking something is incompatible with Perfection. As such, a perfect being actually lacks nothing, and so cannot undergo change.


Moreover, it seems to me that you are misunderstanding the alternative position. You seem to horrified by a "linear" time model that you fail to see the incredibly significant point that the Fathers and Doctors of the Church have been making for centuries - [i]God is outside of time[/i]. Boyd's god is not the simultaneously transcendent and immanent Creator-God of Scripture and Tradition. Boyd's god is an imperfect, changing being caught up in the winds of time, experiencing life in fundamentally the same way that you or I do.

But God, the True God, is outside of time. He is simultaneously infinitely above it and intimately within it. He is the ground for all of this creation that is around us, without being just one more part of it. This is exactly why the Incarnation can be such a life-altering mystery. The God who is both perfectly transcendent and perfectly immanent, the God who is outside of time and experiences all of time as one eternal whole, [i]took flesh and became man[/i]. The uncircumscribable circumscribed Himself by becoming man.

But Boyd's god makes this impossible. Boyd's god is already within time. His god was never transcendent. His god is merely the most knowledgible and powerful being that actually exists, not [i]that than which nothing greater can be thought[/i]. For Boyd's god to become incarnate - thats no big deal - he's already nothing substantially more than a creature anyways.

None of this is intended to be polemic - it is not. Rather, it is meant to illustrate what I see to be very powerful flaws in Boyd's god. He is conceived of as being bounded by time, he can undergo change, and, most importantly of all, he is at odds with the God of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church. What's more, I find absolutely no intellectually compelling reason to try to make the theology of a Boydian god work. In fact, I don't think it can be done, but more importantly, I wonder - why try?

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

Posted

Thanks Jeff..I am going to read over that again and pray over it as well. If you could, I have specifics that seem to not be making any sense to me. Could you give a quick explaination on them..


-creating is experiencing. We have not always been, thus we “happened” and in happening there is a “moment when God did not have us”

-incarnation is an experience. The divinity experienced with the humanity

-Old test
-regrets making humanity
-numerous times when God changes his mind.

In heaven are we timeless as well. Do we not experience relations and change.

If perfection is non-changing, are you implying that angels are perfect or do they manage to be “out of time” yet not perfect?

The fall of the angels is an event that concludes “happening” whether or not when we say this happened, the point is it happened. Denoting an existence of lineal events in the metaphysical realm.

Posted

[quote name='Revprodeji' post='1128077' date='Nov 26 2006, 08:46 PM']
Thanks Jeff..I am going to read over that again and pray over it as well. If you could, I have specifics that seem to not be making any sense to me. Could you give a quick explaination on them..
-creating is experiencing. We have not always been, thus we “happened” and in happening there is a “moment when God did not have us”

-incarnation is an experience. The divinity experienced with the humanity

-Old test
-regrets making humanity
-numerous times when God changes his mind.

In heaven are we timeless as well. Do we not experience relations and change.

If perfection is non-changing, are you implying that angels are perfect or do they manage to be “out of time” yet not perfect?

The fall of the angels is an event that concludes “happening” whether or not when we say this happened, the point is it happened. Denoting an existence of lineal events in the metaphysical realm.
[/quote]

[size=4][b]Summa.Theol.1,13,7: Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?
[/b][/size]

Objection 1. It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally.

Objection 2. Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.

Objection 3. Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jeremiah 31:3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity.

Objection 4. Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally.

Objection 5. Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.

Objection 6. Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.

I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.

To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.

Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.

Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.

Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.

Reply to Objection 1. Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.

Reply to Objection 2. As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Psalm 89:1).

Reply to Objection 3. The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like.

Reply to Objection 4. Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.

Reply to Objection 5. Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.

Reply to Objection 6. To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself.

Guest JeffCR07
Posted

Rev, the quotation from St. Thomas that Myles has supplied is most definately more technically correct than any response that I could give. However, in case you are not familiar with scholastic theology and are having trouble making sense of this quote, allow a less technically accute response:

All of your objections only make sense if we are imagining God as being "within" time. If God is outside of time, and God is simple, pure act, then it follows that every "temporal action" of God's is in fact the issuing forth in time of the one, timeless, eternal act that is God's being. The temporal moments of Divine action are perfectly comprehensible as expressions in time of God's single, perfect, eternal action.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

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