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Pope suggests contraceptives could be used


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Posted
8 hours ago, Spem in alium said:

The pope said that avoiding pregnancy is not an absolute evil and suggested it could be practiced by people in areas at risk of Zika. He said nothing about contraception being okay, and there are other, natural ways of avoiding pregnancy which are licit: natural family planning and abstinence being two of them. Of course, though, his words are more likely to be read as supporting the use of contraception, partly because that is what many people want to hear. I do think though that if he did not intend to come across in this way, there should be some sort of clarifying statement. It seems rather ambiguous and difficult to arrive at an exact understanding. 

But avoiding pregnancy within marriage with the use of artificial contraceptive is evil. And according to Lombardi's follow-up, at least as reported by LSN, this is what the Holy Father actually referred to.

4 hours ago, MarysLittleFlower said:

 

 

2 hours ago, Peace said:

I am not so convinced that the use of a condom or other contraceptive means is intrinsically evil. Let's take the case of rape as an example. The Church says that even in the case of rape, once there has been conception, abortion cannot occur. That is because abortion is an intrinsic evil. Can't be done under any circumstances.

But can a rape victim use a contraceptive drug to prevent conception? Can a woman who is being raped ask the rapist to wear a condom? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes" which some people seem to suggest, then I think it is pretty clear that the use of a condom by itself is not intrinsically evil. What makes the use of a condom evil is the specific purpose for which the condom is used - specifcially, the use of a condom by a married couple for the specific purpose of preventing pregnancy.

So can you then make an argument that if the condom is used not to prevent pregnacy, but to prevent the spread of some disease like HIV from one person to another, that the double effect test is satisfied? I think you can make a reasonable argument. For example:

http://marccortez.com/2010/11/23/the-pope-condoms-and-the-principle-of-double-effect/

To determine whether PDE applies to this scenario, we must see if the scenario meets the following conditions:

  1. The Nature of the Act: The act in question must be at least a morally neutral act (i.e. it cannot be an intrinsically bad act).
  2. Means-End: The bad effect  cannot be the means by which the good effect is accomplished.
  3. Right-Intention: The bad effect cannot be that which is intended by the actor.
  4. Proportionality: The good effect must be equivalent to or greater than the corresponding bad effect.

And, as I see it, the condom-use scenario meets all four conditions.

  1. The Nature of the Act: It seems to me that even for Catholic theologians, condom use is a morally neutral act. In and of itself, using a condom has no moral consequences (e.g. using it as a water balloon). It is one  particular result of using a condom (preventing conception and, consequently, separating the sexual act from its procreative function) that is instrinsically wrong.
  2. Means-End: As in most PDE scenarios the good effect and bad effect are inseparable. Wearing a condom during the sexual act (assuming that the condom does not malfunction) necessarily results in both consequences. But, it seems clear that the bad effect in this situation is not the means for accomplishing the good effect – i.e., a person does not seek to separate the sexual act from its intended purposes as a means to preventing the spread of a deadly disease. The two consequences are inseparable, but the one is not the means for accomplishing the other.
  3. Right-Intention: This is critical. For this situation to come under PDE, the actor must intend the good effect and not the bad one. So, in this scenario, the person using the condom must intend to stop the spread of a deadly disease and not to prevent procreation.
  4. Proportionality: The benefit of preventing the spread of a deadly disease must outweigh the drawback of separating the sexual act from its procreative function. As with most PDE scenarios, there is a strong element of subjectivity in this final step. But, it is certainly not obvious that this scenario violates this condition.

Now, I am not saying that the above analysis is correct. I think you can put forth a good argument that the test is not satisfied as well. But I think the matter is still an open question within the Church. I don't think that there are any dogmatic statements that compel the conclusion that condoms cannot be used as a means to stop the spread of a disease (although many in the Church have suggested this). I don't think there are any papal encyclials that really address the issue head on, either. Humanae vitae was written well before the AIDS outbreak and I don't think it was really written with that modern problem in mind.

Another hypothetical for you - let's say that one spouse has contracted HIV through a blood transfusion and that the other spouse has not yet contracted it. By some miracle of technology, a new condom is created that is a fiddler of sorts. This new condom prevents the HIV virus from being transmitted, while at the same time not preventing contraception. It fiddlers out HIV but does not fiddler semen. Can the couple use the condom? Sure they can. They are using the condom not to prevent contraception, but to prevent the spread of disease. Let's say that they use this new condom during intercourse, but for whatver reason one time it does not work properly and has the unintended consequence of preventing conception. Have they sinned because the condom did not work and had the unintended consequence of preventing pregnancy? I don't think they have sinned in this scenario.

If technology has not yet developed and they are left with a regular condom, I do not know if they have sinned if they choose to use it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV from one spouse to anohter, if their intent is not to stop contraception and they would have otherwise used the new condom were it available.

Sure, you can make some distinctions between the two scenarios, but I think there is at least a decent argument that they are morally equivalent, as long as there is no specific intent to stop procreation, and as long as the use of a condom itself is not wrong in every circumstance. . .

I do think it is kind of an open question for the Church, and perhaps there will be a new encyclical in the future that addresses the question head on . . .

*fiddler not fiddler*

LOL. Why does Phatmass automatically change Fi-L-ter to "Fiddler"?

This is a good reply and I am going to try to spend an appropriate amount of time on it.

Posted (edited)
3 hours ago, Peace said:

I am not so convinced that the use of a condom or other contraceptive means is intrinsically evil. Let's take the case of rape as an example. The Church says that even in the case of rape, once there has been conception, abortion cannot occur. That is because abortion is an intrinsic evil. Can't be done under any circumstances.

But can a rape victim use a contraceptive drug to prevent conception? Can a woman who is being raped ask the rapist to wear a condom? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes" which some people seem to suggest, then I think it is pretty clear that the use of a condom by itself is not intrinsically evil. What makes the use of a condom evil is the specific purpose for which the condom is used - specifcially, the use of a condom by a married couple for the specific purpose of preventing pregnancy.

So can you then make an argument that if the condom is used not to prevent pregnacy, but to prevent the spread of some disease like HIV from one person to another, that the double effect test is satisfied? I think you can make a reasonable argument. For example:

http://marccortez.com/2010/11/23/the-pope-condoms-and-the-principle-of-double-effect/

To determine whether PDE applies to this scenario, we must see if the scenario meets the following conditions:

  1. The Nature of the Act: The act in question must be at least a morally neutral act (i.e. it cannot be an intrinsically bad act).
  2. Means-End: The bad effect  cannot be the means by which the good effect is accomplished.
  3. Right-Intention: The bad effect cannot be that which is intended by the actor.
  4. Proportionality: The good effect must be equivalent to or greater than the corresponding bad effect.

And, as I see it, the condom-use scenario meets all four conditions.

  1. The Nature of the Act: It seems to me that even for Catholic theologians, condom use is a morally neutral act. In and of itself, using a condom has no moral consequences (e.g. using it as a water balloon). It is one  particular result of using a condom (preventing conception and, consequently, separating the sexual act from its procreative function) that is instrinsically wrong.
  2. Means-End: As in most PDE scenarios the good effect and bad effect are inseparable. Wearing a condom during the sexual act (assuming that the condom does not malfunction) necessarily results in both consequences. But, it seems clear that the bad effect in this situation is not the means for accomplishing the good effect – i.e., a person does not seek to separate the sexual act from its intended purposes as a means to preventing the spread of a deadly disease. The two consequences are inseparable, but the one is not the means for accomplishing the other.
  3. Right-Intention: This is critical. For this situation to come under PDE, the actor must intend the good effect and not the bad one. So, in this scenario, the person using the condom must intend to stop the spread of a deadly disease and not to prevent procreation.
  4. Proportionality: The benefit of preventing the spread of a deadly disease must outweigh the drawback of separating the sexual act from its procreative function. As with most PDE scenarios, there is a strong element of subjectivity in this final step. But, it is certainly not obvious that this scenario violates this condition.

Now, I am not saying that the above analysis is correct. I think you can put forth a good argument that the test is not satisfied as well. But I think the matter is still an open question within the Church. I don't think that there are any dogmatic statements that compel the conclusion that condoms cannot be used as a means to stop the spread of a disease (although many in the Church have suggested this). I don't think there are any papal encyclials that really address the issue head on, either. Humanae vitae was written well before the AIDS outbreak and I don't think it was really written with that modern problem in mind.

Another hypothetical for you - let's say that one spouse has contracted HIV through a blood transfusion and that the other spouse has not yet contracted it. By some miracle of technology, a new condom is created that is a fiddler of sorts. This new condom prevents the HIV virus from being transmitted, while at the same time not preventing contraception. It fiddlers out HIV but does not fiddler semen. Can the couple use the condom? Sure they can. They are using the condom not to prevent contraception, but to prevent the spread of disease. Let's say that they use this new condom during intercourse, but for whatver reason one time it does not work properly and has the unintended consequence of preventing conception. Have they sinned because the condom did not work and had the unintended consequence of preventing pregnancy? I don't think they have sinned in this scenario.

If technology has not yet developed and they are left with a regular condom, I do not know if they have sinned if they choose to use it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV from one spouse to anohter, if their intent is not to stop contraception and they would have otherwise used the new condom were it available.

Sure, you can make some distinctions between the two scenarios, but I think there is at least a decent argument that they are morally equivalent, as long as there is no specific intent to stop procreation, and as long as the use of a condom itself is not wrong in every circumstance. . .

I do think it is kind of an open question for the Church, and perhaps there will be a new encyclical in the future that addresses the question head on . . .

*fiddler not fiddler*

LOL. Why does Phatmass automatically change Fi-L-ter to "Fiddler"?

"But can a rape victim use a contraceptive drug to prevent conception? Can a woman who is being raped ask the rapist to wear a condom? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes" which some people seem to suggest, then I think it is pretty clear that the use of a condom by itself is not intrinsically evil. What makes the use of a condom evil is the specific purpose for which the condom is used - specifcially, the use of a condom by a married couple for the specific purpose of preventing pregnancy."

Ok. That is fair. We should instead distinguish between artificial contraception during marital relations, and use of contraception for other purposes. The use of a condom during intercourse in marriage would always and everywhere be evil. And I think it is morally relevant that this is the officially intended purpose of a condom, but that is neither here nor there.

"So can you then make an argument that if the condom is used not to prevent pregnacy, but to prevent the spread of some disease like HIV from one person to another, that the double effect test is satisfied? I think you can make a reasonable argument."

In this case I do not think so. It would be a contraceptive use within marriage which, even theoretically allowing some other non-contraceptive use, is still inherently evil.

"The Nature of the Act: It seems to me that even for Catholic theologians, condom use is a morally neutral act. In and of itself, using a condom has no moral consequences (e.g. using it as a water balloon). It is one particular result of using a condom (preventing conception and, consequently, separating the sexual act from its procreative function) that is instrinsically wrong."

No, this is where it goes wrong. That is like saying that abortion is not inherently evil because forceps have legitimate uses. There are permissible uses for a condom, like using it as a water balloon, but this is a totally different act. "Using a condom" is not really an act, at least not in a way that makes any sense to talk about. We have to be intellectually honest here and actually refer to what we are talking about, which would be the use of a condom during intercourse within a marriage. That act is inherently evil.

"Means-End: As in most PDE scenarios the good effect and bad effect are inseparable. Wearing a condom during the sexual act (assuming that the condom does not malfunction) necessarily results in both consequences. But, it seems clear that the bad effect in this situation is not the means for accomplishing the good effect – i.e., a person does not seek to separate the sexual act from its intended purposes as a means to preventing the spread of a deadly disease. The two consequences are inseparable, but the one is not the means for accomplishing the other."

I may want to argue with this later, but I am quite sick this morning so I will leave it unchallenged. However if my characterization of the act is correct, this is irrelevant.

"Right-Intention: This is critical. For this situation to come under PDE, the actor must intend the good effect and not the bad one. So, in this scenario, the person using the condom must intend to stop the spread of a deadly disease and not to prevent procreation."

If we dig deeper, the bad effect and the good effect are essentially the same, which would be "the disease spreading through procreation." I think we can make a reasonable argument that prevention of procreation is absolutely intended in our scenario, even if it is intended for less selfish reasons.

"But I think the matter is still an open question within the Church."

I do not think so. We can have discussion about very unusual cases (specifically Paul VI's and Benedict XVI's) where we are speaking, respectively, of forced intercourse and sodomy which is already inherently closed to life. Those cases bring different wrinkles to the story which are morally relevant. Here we are talking about couples specifically choosing to use contraceptives, specifically because they do not want to become pregnant. Yes there are serious reasons that cause them to think this, but the act itself is the same and is not permitted.

"Another hypothetical for you - let's say that one spouse has contracted HIV through a blood transfusion and that the other spouse has not yet contracted it. By some miracle of technology, a new condom is created that is a fiddler of sorts. This new condom prevents the HIV virus from being transmitted, while at the same time not preventing contraception. It fiddlers out HIV but does not fiddler semen. Can the couple use the condom?"

Well, this is not really a condom anymore. Or rather it is not a contraceptive device. Yes, such a device should be permissible since it specifically does not prevent conception.

"Let's say that they use this new condom during intercourse, but for whatver reason one time it does not work properly and has the unintended consequence of preventing conception. Have they sinned because the condom did not work and had the unintended consequence of preventing pregnancy? I don't think they have sinned in this scenario."

It might depend on a couple facts, like if they knew this was a possibility, how likely this possibility was, etc. But if your case as stated is accurate, and the 'condom' was designed specifically not to prevent pregnancy, yet it did through a mistake or a design flaw, I would agree that there is no sin. This is rather like 'nocturnal self-pollution' (lol) which does not engage the will, or if a man were to accidentally ejaculate outside of his wife. Not intended, in fact the opposite is intended.

"If technology has not yet developed and they are left with a regular condom, I do not know if they have sinned if they choose to use it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV from one spouse to anohter, if their intent is not to stop contraception and they would have otherwise used the new condom were it available."

No, this is not the case. Such a couple should only abstain from intercourse. (And this sacrifice would bring them great graces, if they properly disposed themselves to it.) The act itself, which the use of contraceptive devices during intercourse within marriage, remains evil, even if intentions are good. Perhaps their intentions remove their culpability (perhaps), but they do not change the evil nature of the act.

"Sure, you can make some distinctions between the two scenarios, but I think there is at least a decent argument that they are morally equivalent, as long as there is no specific intent to stop procreation, and as long as the use of a condom itself is not wrong in every circumstance. . ."

A decent argument perhaps, but ultimately a wrong one. The couple may not intend that they use contraceptive devices, but they are. For as long as your technology does not exist which would allow us to actually separate disease-prevention from contraception, the condom remains a contraceptive device, and its use during sex remains an evil act. The Church's teaching is pretty well developed on this point, and I do not think there are any loopholes to exploit.

_____

A somewhat lengthy quotation from Veritatis Splendor:

 

77. In order to offer rational criteria for a right moral decision, the theories mentioned above take account of the intention and consequences of human action. Certainly there is need to take into account both the intention — as Jesus forcefully insisted in clear disagreement with the scribes and Pharisees, who prescribed in great detail certain outward practices without paying attention to the heart (cf. Mk 7:20-21; Mt 15:19) — and the goods obtained and the evils avoided as a result of a particular act. Responsibility demands as much. But the consideration of these consequences, and also of intentions, is not sufficient for judging the moral quality of a concrete choice. The weighing of the goods and evils foreseeable as the consequence of an action is not an adequate method for determining whether the choice of that concrete kind of behaviour is "according to its species", or "in itself", morally good or bad, licit or illicit. The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species.

Moreover, everyone recognizes the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of evaluating all the good and evil consequences and effects — defined as pre-moral — of one's own acts: an exhaustive rational calculation is not possible. How then can one go about establishing proportions which depend on a measuring, the criteria of which remain obscure? How could an absolute obligation be justified on the basis of such debatable calculations?

78. The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the "object" rationally chosen by the deliberate will, as is borne out by the insightful analysis, still valid today, made by Saint Thomas.126 In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in the perfect good, primordial love. By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person. Consequently, as theCatechism of the Catholic Church teaches, "there are certain specific kinds of behaviour that are always wrong to choose, because choosing them involves a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil".127 And Saint Thomas observes that "it often happens that man acts with a good intention, but without spiritual gain, because he lacks a good will. Let us say that someone robs in order to feed the poor: in this case, even though the intention is good, the uprightness of the will is lacking. Consequently, no evil done with a good intention can be excused. 'There are those who say: And why not do evil that good may come? Their condemnation is just' (Rom 3:8)".128

The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God, to the One who "alone is good", and thus brings about the perfection of the person. An act is therefore good if its object is in conformity with the good of the person with respect for the goods morally relevant for him. Christian ethics, which pays particular attention to the moral object, does not refuse to consider the inner "teleology" of acting, inasmuch as it is directed to promoting the true good of the person; but it recognizes that it is really pursued only when the essential elements of human nature are respected. The human act, good according to its object, is also capable of being ordered to its ultimate end. That same act then attains its ultimate and decisive perfection when the willactually does order it to God through charity. As the Patron of moral theologians and confessors teaches: "It is not enough to do good works; they need to be done well. For our works to be good and perfect, they must be done for the sole purpose of pleasing God".129

 

"Intrinsic evil": it is not licit to do evil that good may come of it (cf. Rom 3:8)

79. One must therefore reject the thesis, characteristic of teleological and proportionalist theories, which holds that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species — its "object" — the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behaviour or specific acts, apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned.

The primary and decisive element for moral judgment is the object of the human act, which establishes whether it is capable of being ordered to the good and to the ultimate end, which is God. This capability is grasped by reason in the very being of man, considered in his integral truth, and therefore in his natural inclinations, his motivations and his finalities, which always have a spiritual dimension as well. It is precisely these which are the contents of the natural law and hence that ordered complex of "personal goods" which serve the "good of the person": the good which is the person himself and his perfection. These are the goods safeguarded by the commandments, which, according to Saint Thomas, contain the whole natural law.130

80. Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature "incapable of being ordered" to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church's moral tradition, have been termed "intrinsically evil" (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that "there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object".131 The Second Vatican Council itself, in discussing the respect due to the human person, gives a number of examples of such acts: "Whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia and voluntary suicide; whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit; whatever is offensive to human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution and trafficking in women and children; degrading conditions of work which treat labourers as mere instruments of profit, and not as free responsible persons: all these and the like are a disgrace, and so long as they infect human civilization they contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer injustice, and they are a negation of the honour due to the Creator".132

With regard to intrinsically evil acts, and in reference to contraceptive practices whereby the conjugal act is intentionally rendered infertile, Pope Paul VI teaches: "Though it is true that sometimes it is lawful to tolerate a lesser moral evil in order to avoid a greater evil or in order to promote a greater good, it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it (cf. Rom 3:8) — in other words, to intend directly something which of its very nature contradicts the moral order, and which must therefore be judged unworthy of man, even though the intention is to protect or promote the welfare of an individual, of a family or of society in general".133

81. In teaching the existence of intrinsically evil acts, the Church accepts the teaching of Sacred Scripture. The Apostle Paul emphatically states: "Do not be deceived: neither the immoral, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor sexual perverts, nor thieves, nor the greedy, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor robbers will inherit the Kingdom of God" (1 Cor 6:9-10).

If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain "irremediably" evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person. "As for acts which are themselves sins (cum iam opera ipsa peccata sunt), Saint Augustine writes, like theft, fornication, blasphemy, who would dare affirm that, by doing them for good motives (causis bonis), they would no longer be sins, or, what is even more absurd, that they would be sins that are justified?".134

Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act "subjectively" good or defensible as a choice.

82. Furthermore, an intention is good when it has as its aim the true good of the person in view of his ultimate end. But acts whose object is "not capable of being ordered" to God and "unworthy of the human person" are always and in every case in conflict with that good. Consequently, respect for norms which prohibit such acts and obligesemper et pro semper, that is, without any exception, not only does not inhibit a good intention, but actually represents its basic expression.

The doctrine of the object as a source of morality represents an authentic explicitation of the Biblical morality of the Covenant and of the commandments, of charity and of the virtues. The moral quality of human acting is dependent on this fidelity to the commandments, as an expression of obedience and of love. For this reason — we repeat — the opinion must be rejected as erroneous which maintains that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behaviour or specific acts, without taking into account the intention for which the choice was made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned. Without the rational determination of the morality of human acting as stated above, it would be impossible to affirm the existence of an "objective moral order"135 and to establish any particular norm the content of which would be binding without exception. This would be to the detriment of human fraternity and the truth about the good, and would be injurious to ecclesial communion as well.

83. As is evident, in the question of the morality of human acts, and in particular the question of whether there exist intrinsically evil acts, we find ourselves faced with the question of man himself, of his truth and of the moral consequences flowing from that truth. By acknowledging and teaching the existence of intrinsic evil in given human acts, the Church remains faithful to the integral truth about man; she thus respects and promotes man in his dignity and vocation. Consequently, she must reject the theories set forth above, which contradict this truth.

Dear Brothers in the Episcopate, we must not be content merely to warn the faithful about the errors and dangers of certain ethical theories. We must first of all show the inviting splendour of that truth which is Jesus Christ himself. In him, who is the Truth (cf. Jn 14:6), man can understand fully and live perfectly, through his good actions, his vocation to freedom in obedience to the divine law summarized in the commandment of love of God and neighbour. And this is what takes place through the gift of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of truth, of freedom and of love: in him we are enabled to interiorize the law, to receive it and to live it as the motivating force of true personal freedom: "the perfect law, the law of liberty" (Jas 1:25).

 

 

Edited by Nihil Obstat
Spem in alium
Posted
51 minutes ago, Nihil Obstat said:

But avoiding pregnancy within marriage with the use of artificial contraceptive is evil. And according to Lombardi's follow-up, at least as reported by LSN, this is what the Holy Father actually referred to.

Is there an actual quote from the Holy Father, or is it just assumed or considered "most likely" that he meant this? He seems to have a strong history of being taken out of context and his words misappropriated, likely because people have assumed he meant one thing when he really meant another. As I don't know all the facts, and as I don't know the pope's intentions in making those comments, I prefer to give him the benefit of the doubt (and believe he meant avoiding pregnancy by other means) until proven otherwise.

Posted
5 hours ago, MarysLittleFlower said:

My understanding is that if the pill can cause contraception (simply if couple is not celibate), its not allowed even if the intent is something else. I checked with a priest known for orthodoxy and he confirmed. (I wouldn't advise the pill even to celibate people though cause its very unhealthy to take it and a person may get used to it and have a hard time quitting if they marry). I assume its the same with condoms. If someone has a serious reason to avoid pregnancy or has HIV their only option is periodic continence or complete abstinence (depending on what it is). It may sound harsh ..I fully believe a person can live a full meaningful life being celibate. 

Hmm maybe he meant abstinence? I hope it would be clarified. As we know the Church allows that for sufficient reasons..

That seems to be what I was taught too. What about the comment on Pope Paul VI and rape? 

MLF, priests "known for orthodoxy" don't necessarily know what they are talking about. If an unwanted side effect of a medication is sterility then a couple is not obliged to either forgo treatment or withhold marital relations. Only if the object of taking the medication is sterility, is there a problem.

A good example is treatment for cancer. Many drugs and treatments will render conception impossible (temporarily and often permanently). If someone sought these treatments out for that purpose, that would be wrong. However if it's just a side effect and not the primary purpose a patient is not obliged to sacrifice the marital relationship for the sake of treatment. 

The combination of synthetic hormones used in the Pill is morally neutral. If you go to an nfp doctor with ovarian cysts, endometriosis etc, they will usually give you the exact same hormones, just in a form that is not marketed for contraceptive use. Although they do control the formation of cysts and endometriosis in many cases, their mode of action is the same as the Pill. They inhibit conception, but in this scenario as a side effect only. It comes down to the intention of the patient. 

MarysLittleFlower
Posted
3 hours ago, Peace said:

I am not so convinced that the use of a condom or other contraceptive means is intrinsically evil. Let's take the case of rape as an example. The Church says that even in the case of rape, once there has been conception, abortion cannot occur. That is because abortion is an intrinsic evil. Can't be done under any circumstances.

But can a rape victim use a contraceptive drug to prevent conception? Can a woman who is being raped ask the rapist to wear a condom? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes" which some people seem to suggest, then I think it is pretty clear that the use of a condom by itself is not intrinsically evil. What makes the use of a condom evil is the specific purpose for which the condom is used - specifcially, the use of a condom by a married couple for the specific purpose of preventing pregnancy.

So can you then make an argument that if the condom is used not to prevent pregnacy, but to prevent the spread of some disease like HIV from one person to another, that the double effect test is satisfied? I think you can make a reasonable argument. For example:

http://marccortez.com/2010/11/23/the-pope-condoms-and-the-principle-of-double-effect/

To determine whether PDE applies to this scenario, we must see if the scenario meets the following conditions:

  1. The Nature of the Act: The act in question must be at least a morally neutral act (i.e. it cannot be an intrinsically bad act).
  2. Means-End: The bad effect  cannot be the means by which the good effect is accomplished.
  3. Right-Intention: The bad effect cannot be that which is intended by the actor.
  4. Proportionality: The good effect must be equivalent to or greater than the corresponding bad effect.

And, as I see it, the condom-use scenario meets all four conditions.

  1. The Nature of the Act: It seems to me that even for Catholic theologians, condom use is a morally neutral act. In and of itself, using a condom has no moral consequences (e.g. using it as a water balloon). It is one  particular result of using a condom (preventing conception and, consequently, separating the sexual act from its procreative function) that is instrinsically wrong.
  2. Means-End: As in most PDE scenarios the good effect and bad effect are inseparable. Wearing a condom during the sexual act (assuming that the condom does not malfunction) necessarily results in both consequences. But, it seems clear that the bad effect in this situation is not the means for accomplishing the good effect – i.e., a person does not seek to separate the sexual act from its intended purposes as a means to preventing the spread of a deadly disease. The two consequences are inseparable, but the one is not the means for accomplishing the other.
  3. Right-Intention: This is critical. For this situation to come under PDE, the actor must intend the good effect and not the bad one. So, in this scenario, the person using the condom must intend to stop the spread of a deadly disease and not to prevent procreation.
  4. Proportionality: The benefit of preventing the spread of a deadly disease must outweigh the drawback of separating the sexual act from its procreative function. As with most PDE scenarios, there is a strong element of subjectivity in this final step. But, it is certainly not obvious that this scenario violates this condition.

Now, I am not saying that the above analysis is correct. I think you can put forth a good argument that the test is not satisfied as well. But I think the matter is still an open question within the Church. I don't think that there are any dogmatic statements that compel the conclusion that condoms cannot be used as a means to stop the spread of a disease (although many in the Church have suggested this). I don't think there are any papal encyclials that really address the issue head on, either. Humanae vitae was written well before the AIDS outbreak and I don't think it was really written with that modern problem in mind.

Another hypothetical for you - let's say that one spouse has contracted HIV through a blood transfusion and that the other spouse has not yet contracted it. By some miracle of technology, a new condom is created that is a fiddler of sorts. This new condom prevents the HIV virus from being transmitted, while at the same time not preventing contraception. It fiddlers out HIV but does not fiddler semen. Can the couple use the condom? Sure they can. They are using the condom not to prevent contraception, but to prevent the spread of disease. Let's say that they use this new condom during intercourse, but for whatver reason one time it does not work properly and has the unintended consequence of preventing conception. Have they sinned because the condom did not work and had the unintended consequence of preventing pregnancy? I don't think they have sinned in this scenario.

If technology has not yet developed and they are left with a regular condom, I do not know if they have sinned if they choose to use it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV from one spouse to anohter, if their intent is not to stop contraception and they would have otherwise used the new condom were it available.

Sure, you can make some distinctions between the two scenarios, but I think there is at least a decent argument that they are morally equivalent, as long as there is no specific intent to stop procreation, and as long as the use of a condom itself is not wrong in every circumstance. . .

I do think it is kind of an open question for the Church, and perhaps there will be a new encyclical in the future that addresses the question head on . . .

*fiddler not fiddler*

LOL. Why does Phatmass automatically change Fi-L-ter to "Fiddler"?

I think the argument might fail on the first point.. I think...the act has to be morally neutral not the physical objects used in the act. Using a condom as a contraceptive device seems to already be intrinsically evil ?

I mean if it achieves contraception or could 

Posted
13 minutes ago, Spem in alium said:

Is there an actual quote from the Holy Father, or is it just assumed or considered "most likely" that he meant this? He seems to have a strong history of being taken out of context and his words misappropriated, likely because people have assumed he meant one thing when he really meant another. As I don't know all the facts, and as I don't know the pope's intentions in making those comments, I prefer to give him the benefit of the doubt (and believe he meant avoiding pregnancy by other means) until proven otherwise.

LSN linked to a statement from Lombardi which was in Italian. If I see an English translation of those remarks coming out, I will certainly post it here. However, LSN is not known for fabricating sources. If they are reporting honestly, then Lombardi confirmed that the Pope was indeed speaking about contraception.

MarysLittleFlower
Posted
7 minutes ago, Maggyie said:

MLF, priests "known for orthodoxy" don't necessarily know what they are talking about. If an unwanted side effect of a medication is sterility then a couple is not obliged to either forgo treatment or withhold marital relations. Only if the object of taking the medication is sterility, is there a problem.

A good example is treatment for cancer. Many drugs and treatments will render conception impossible (temporarily and often permanently). If someone sought these treatments out for that purpose, that would be wrong. However if it's just a side effect and not the primary purpose a patient is not obliged to sacrifice the marital relationship for the sake of treatment. 

The combination of synthetic hormones used in the Pill is morally neutral. If you go to an nfp doctor with ovarian cysts, endometriosis etc, they will usually give you the exact same hormones, just in a form that is not marketed for contraceptive use. Although they do control the formation of cysts and endometriosis in many cases, their mode of action is the same as the Pill. They inhibit conception, but in this scenario as a side effect only. It comes down to the intention of the patient. 

I have heard there are different views on this. With cancer treatment, it doesn't work *by* contraception occurring. That seems to be a possible difficulty.. 

I'm pretty sure my priest is very well educated in these things..  I'll maybe ask for more clarification 

Nihil do you happen to have anything on that? I keep hearing different views on that 

Spem in alium
Posted
2 minutes ago, Nihil Obstat said:

LSN linked to a statement from Lombardi which was in Italian. If I see an English translation of those remarks coming out, I will certainly post it here. However, LSN is not known for fabricating sources. If they are reporting honestly, then Lombardi confirmed that the Pope was indeed speaking about contraception.

Thank you. It would be good to get a sense also of Fr Lombardi's view and whether he supports the statements on which he is commenting. 

Regardless of what's true, the Holy Father needs prayer.

Posted (edited)
16 minutes ago, MarysLittleFlower said:

I have heard there are different views on this. With cancer treatment, it doesn't work *by* contraception occurring. That seems to be a possible difficulty.. 

I'm pretty sure my priest is very well educated in these things..  I'll maybe ask for more clarification 

Nihil do you happen to have anything on that? I keep hearing different views on that 

If infertility is an unintended consequence of some other treatment, there is no sin. If the 'treatment' actually is contraception, as in the case of using condoms to prevent disease transmission, it is not licit.

In the case of endometriosis, cysts, etc., I would argue that a married woman would have the responsibility to first see if other treatments are available, but if in this case the specific combination of hormones which actively treats the condition has the unintended consequence of infertility, there should be no sin. Unless this combination of hormones is potentially abortifacient, in which case that woman is obligated to abstain for as long as she uses that treatment.

_____

If anyone here can translate reasonably from Italian, please take a look for yourself. 

Of course we all should hope that the Pope did not make such a great mistake. But even if he did, he certainly has ample opportunity to correct it. And he remains pope, even if he does make mistakes.

Edited by Nihil Obstat
MarysLittleFlower
Posted
6 minutes ago, Nihil Obstat said:

If infertility is an unintended consequence of some other treatment, there is no sin. If the 'treatment' actually is contraception, as in the case of using condoms to prevent disease transmission, it is not licit.

In the case of endometriosis, cysts, etc., I would argue that a married woman would have the responsibility to first see if other treatments are available, but if in this case the specific combination of hormones which actively treats the condition has the unintended consequence of infertility, there should be no sin. Unless this combination of hormones is potentially abortifacient, in which case that woman is obligated to abstain for as long as she uses that treatment.

The first paragraph is my understanding too. For the second, I think my priest brought up the pill causing abortion too but he also suggested the couple abstaining during that time. I thought that's because its not like cancer treatment, its actually a contraceptive pill being used. If I misunderstood, I'll check with him. 

Posted (edited)
33 minutes ago, MarysLittleFlower said:

The first paragraph is my understanding too. For the second, I think my priest brought up the pill causing abortion too but he also suggested the couple abstaining during that time. I thought that's because its not like cancer treatment, its actually a contraceptive pill being used. If I misunderstood, I'll check with him. 

Yes, we are not speaking of cancer treatment with regards to hormonal contraceptive pills. And whether or not they can act in an abortifacient manner is a question of fact rather than of moral philosophy.

 

_______

 

 

 

Edited by Nihil Obstat
Posted

Nihil:
I am honestly not sure what the answer to the question is. Just to clarify, I am not advising that people go out and start using condoms to prevent the spread of HIV and other diseases. On the other hand, I don't think the answer is necessarily as black-and-white as some folks seem to make it. It would be nice if we had a papal encyclial that clearly addresses the specific issue at hand. But that might not happen for pragmatic reasons - the Church does not want to be in a position where others might take Her teaching on the matter as a license to fornicate.

1 hour ago, Nihil Obstat said:

"But can a rape victim use a contraceptive drug to prevent conception? Can a woman who is being raped ask the rapist to wear a condom? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes" which some people seem to suggest, then I think it is pretty clear that the use of a condom by itself is not intrinsically evil. What makes the use of a condom evil is the specific purpose for which the condom is used - specifcially, the use of a condom by a married couple for the specific purpose of preventing pregnancy."

Ok. That is fair. We should instead distinguish between artificial contraception during marital relations, and use of contraception for other purposes. The use of a condom during intercourse in marriage would always and everywhere be evil. And I think it is morally relevant that this is the officially intended purpose of a condom, but that is neither here nor there.

Now, if we have a dogmatic statement that says "the use of a condom during intercourse in marriage is always and everywhere evil" I would agree with you. But I don't think we have such a statement, and it certainly would not be difficult for the Church to make a dogmatic statement like that if She were of that mind.

I am not sure if the "officially intended purpose of a condom" is particularly relevant. If a condom-maker makes a condom in order that pregnancies be prevented, and I buy a condom and use it as a balloon, my use of the condom as a balloon is not sinful because the condom was intended by the manufacturer to prevent pregnancy. Likewise, if I buy a condom and use it to prevent the transmission of HIV during sex, the use of the condom for that purpose does not become sinful. What is the significant difference between the two situations?

One can argue that what makes the condom sinful is its use for the purpose of preventing pregnancy. But if it is used for an entirely different purpose, the prevention of the pregnancy seems to fall into the category of the "unintended bad effect" under the double effect test.

Any flaw in my reasoning here?

1 hour ago, Nihil Obstat said:

"So can you then make an argument that if the condom is used not to prevent pregnacy, but to prevent the spread of some disease like HIV from one person to another, that the double effect test is satisfied? I think you can make a reasonable argument."

In this case I do not think so. It would be a contraceptive use within marriage which, even theoretically allowing some other non-contraceptive use, is still inherently evil.

Well. I would agree that if the use of a condom during marriage is intrinsically evil that would be the end of the discussion. But that is the point that I am not convinced about. Do we have any dogmatic statement that says the use of a condom, while not intending to prevent pregnancy, but for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV or another disease like HIV, would be considered evil?

I think that it is reasonable to draw your conclusion from some of the broad principles that the Church has set forth, but I do not think the other side of the argument is without merit.

1 hour ago, Nihil Obstat said:

"The Nature of the Act: It seems to me that even for Catholic theologians, condom use is a morally neutral act. In and of itself, using a condom has no moral consequences (e.g. using it as a water balloon). It is one particular result of using a condom (preventing conception and, consequently, separating the sexual act from its procreative function) that is instrinsically wrong."

No, this is where it goes wrong. That is like saying that abortion is not inherently evil because forceps have legitimate uses. There are permissible uses for a condom, like using it as a water balloon, but this is a totally different act. "Using a condom" is not really an act, at least not in a way that makes any sense to talk about. We have to be intellectually honest here and actually refer to what we are talking about, which would be the use of a condom during intercourse within a marriage. That act is inherently evil.

Here I think you need to define "abortion". You cannot define it as "any act that results in the terminatino of a pregnancy" right? Let's say that a pregnant woman has cancer and she needs to have her womb removed. It's 100% certain that in that situation the act will terminate the pregnancy but the Church would allow this procedure to take place. To call "abortion" intrinsically evil you have to define it something along the lines of "an act that has the direct intention to terminate a pregnancy." Since the only purpose of the morning-after pill is to terminate a pregnancy it is not allowed, but since the purpose of removing the womb is not to terminate the pregnancy but to save the life of the mother the act is allowed.

But what if the morning-after-pill had some other legitimate use, such as preventing a specific form of cancer, for example? If a woman were to take the pill in order to cure herself of cancer, but at the same time the pill had the effect of terminating her pregnancy as a side-effect, could she take the pill? I think so, if she is taking the pill to cure her cancer and not to terminate the pregnancy.

How do you distinghish condom use then? If someone uses it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV (a deadly disease), although having the knowledge that it will 100% prevent pregnancy, how is that really much different than the person who undergoes a procedure to have her womb removed (in order to prevent death) although she knows that it will 100% terminate her pregnancy, or the person who might take medication to cure cancer, although the know side effect of that would be to terminate the pregnancy?

1 hour ago, Nihil Obstat said:

"Means-End: As in most PDE scenarios the good effect and bad effect are inseparable. Wearing a condom during the sexual act (assuming that the condom does not malfunction) necessarily results in both consequences. But, it seems clear that the bad effect in this situation is not the means for accomplishing the good effect – i.e., a person does not seek to separate the sexual act from its intended purposes as a means to preventing the spread of a deadly disease. The two consequences are inseparable, but the one is not the means for accomplishing the other."

I may want to argue with this later, but I am quite sick this morning so I will leave it unchallenged. However if my characterization of the act is correct, this is irrelevant.

OK. But if you ever decide to take this point up, consider that you can have a situation where semen is transmitted from husband to wife (as in the case of a broken condom), the wife gets pregnant, while at the same time the use of the condom prevents the transmission of HIV (HIV is not only transmitted through semen, but can also be caused by certain types of skin on skin contact).

1 hour ago, Nihil Obstat said:

"Right-Intention: This is critical. For this situation to come under PDE, the actor must intend the good effect and not the bad one. So, in this scenario, the person using the condom must intend to stop the spread of a deadly disease and not to prevent procreation."

If we dig deeper, the bad effect and the good effect are essentially the same, which would be "the disease spreading through procreation." I think we can make a reasonable argument that prevention of procreation is absolutely intended in our scenario, even if it is intended for less selfish reasons.

Not necessarily. See the point above. HIV can be transmitted through semen, but it can also be transmitted from one person to another during sex by way of skin-on-skin contact (I think this is primarily the way by which women transmit HIV to men during sex). Preventing HIV does not necessarily equal preventing contraception. I do not think that they are one in the same.

1 hour ago, Nihil Obstat said:

"But I think the matter is still an open question within the Church."

I do not think so. We can have discussion about very unusual cases (specifically Paul VI's and Benedict XVI's) where we are speaking, respectively, of forced intercourse and sodomy which is already inherently closed to life. Those cases bring different wrinkles to the story which are morally relevant. Here we are talking about couples specifically choosing to use contraceptives, specifically because they do not want to become pregnant. Yes there are serious reasons that cause them to think this, but the act itself is the same and is not permitted.

Well if a couple specifically uses a condom to prevent pregnancy I agree that is a sin. But that is not necessarily the case with some couples. What if a childless couple seriously desires children but one has HIV and the other does not? I don't think that you can just assume that if they use a condom it is because of some secret desire of theirs not to have children. They may just want to have sex without subjecting one spouse to a life threatening disease.

I will admit that the scenario I proposed is uncommon, but I think it helps us answer the question of whether "all condom use is intrinsically evil".

What is your opinion on condom use outside of marriage, by the way? The prostitue hypothetical, for example? Again - here I do not think that the Church has really spoken.

1 hour ago, Nihil Obstat said:

"If technology has not yet developed and they are left with a regular condom, I do not know if they have sinned if they choose to use it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV from one spouse to anohter, if their intent is not to stop contraception and they would have otherwise used the new condom were it available."

 

No, this is not the case. Such a couple should only abstain from intercourse. (And this sacrifice would bring them great graces, if they properly disposed themselves to it.) The act itself, which the use of contraceptive devices during intercourse within marriage, remains evil, even if intentions are good. Perhaps their intentions remove their culpability (perhaps), but they do not change the evil nature of the act.

Sure. But it again comes down to whether all condom use is intrinsically evil. I am not so convinced of that.

You seem to suggest that there might be some situations where condom use (outside of marriage, for example) could be considered not evil. But if the use of a condom is intrinsically evil then it is evil both inside marriage and outside of marriage, is it not? That would lead to the conclusion that a man who cheats on his wife with a prostitute should not use a condom, risk bringing HIV back to his wife, and risk having the prostitute abort a child, which is what most prostitutes do when they get pregnant. That conclusion just seems a bit nonsensical to me. Is that what you would advocate? That if a man cheats on his wife with a hooker he should NOT use a condom?

But if you say "OK, it is only evil within the context of marriage," but if a man cheats on his wife outside of marriage with a hooker, using a condom so that he does not give his wife AIDS might be the right thing to do, then you seem to recognize that the purpose for which a condom is used is relevant in determining whether or not its use is evil. You seem to say that if the purpose to is to prevent pregnancy during marital sex then the act is evil, but if there is some other purpose, let's say preventing HIV in the case of a gay male couple, rape, or prostitution, then the act is not evil. Your position seems to be a bit inconsistent. Is purpose/intention relevant or is it not relevant?

Now, if you want to say "the use of a condom is intrinsically evil under any circumstance where the prevention of pregnancy occurs, whether prevention of pregnancy is intended or not, therefore it would not be right for a man to use a condom when he cheats on his wife with a hooker, and it would not be right for a woman who is about to be raped to ask her attcker to use a condom," then at least you would be consistent. Is this your position?

Again - I am not necessarily saying that you are wrong. But I think there are good arguments on both sides and that the analsyis is a bit complicated . . .

Posted
18 minutes ago, Peace said:

Nihil:
I am honestly not sure what the answer to the question is. Just to clarify, I am not advising that people go out and start using condoms to prevent the spread of HIV and other diseases. On the other hand, I don't think the answer is necessarily as black-and-white as some folks seem to make it. It would be nice if we had a papal encyclial that clearly addresses the specific issue at hand. But that might not happen for pragmatic reasons - the Church does not want to be in a position where others might take Her teaching on the matter as a license to fornicate.

Now, if we have a dogmatic statement that says "the use of a condom during intercourse in marriage is always and everywhere evil" I would agree with you. But I don't think we have such a statement, and it certainly would not be difficult for the Church to make a dogmatic statement like that if She were of that mind.

I am not sure if the "officially intended purpose of a condom" is particularly relevant. If a condom-maker makes a condom in order that pregnancies be prevented, and I buy a condom and use it as a balloon, my use of the condom as a balloon is not sinful because the condom was intended by the manufacturer to prevent pregnancy. Likewise, if I buy a condom and use it to prevent the transmission of HIV during sex, the use of the condom for that purpose does not become sinful. What is the significant difference between the two situations?

One can argue that what makes the condom sinful is its use for the purpose of preventing pregnancy. But if it is used for an entirely different purpose, the prevention of the pregnancy seems to fall into the category of the "unintended bad effect" under the double effect test.

Any flaw in my reasoning here?

Well. I would agree that if the use of a condom during marriage is intrinsically evil that would be the end of the discussion. But that is the point that I am not convinced about. Do we have any dogmatic statement that says the use of a condom, while not intending to prevent pregnancy, but for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV or another disease like HIV, would be considered evil?

I think that it is reasonable to draw your conclusion from some of the broad principles that the Church has set forth, but I do not think the other side of the argument is without merit.

Here I think you need to define "abortion". You cannot define it as "any act that results in the terminatino of a pregnancy" right? Let's say that a pregnant woman has cancer and she needs to have her womb removed. It's 100% certain that in that situation the act will terminate the pregnancy but the Church would allow this procedure to take place. To call "abortion" intrinsically evil you have to define it something along the lines of "an act that has the direct intention to terminate a pregnancy." Since the only purpose of the morning-after pill is to terminate a pregnancy it is not allowed, but since the purpose of removing the womb is not to terminate the pregnancy but to save the life of the mother the act is allowed.

But what if the morning-after-pill had some other legitimate use, such as preventing a specific form of cancer, for example? If a woman were to take the pill in order to cure herself of cancer, but at the same time the pill had the effect of terminating her pregnancy as a side-effect, could she take the pill? I think so, if she is taking the pill to cure her cancer and not to terminate the pregnancy.

How do you distinghish condom use then? If someone uses it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV (a deadly disease), although having the knowledge that it will 100% prevent pregnancy, how is that really much different than the person who undergoes a procedure to have her womb removed (in order to prevent death) although she knows that it will 100% terminate her pregnancy, or the person who might take medication to cure cancer, although the know side effect of that would be to terminate the pregnancy?

OK. But if you ever decide to take this point up, consider that you can have a situation where semen is transmitted from husband to wife (as in the case of a broken condom), the wife gets pregnant, while at the same time the use of the condom prevents the transmission of HIV (HIV is not only transmitted through semen, but can also be caused by certain types of skin on skin contact).

Not necessarily. See the point above. HIV can be transmitted through semen, but it can also be transmitted from one person to another during sex by way of skin-on-skin contact (I think this is primarily the way by which women transmit HIV to men during sex). Preventing HIV does not necessarily equal preventing contraception. I do not think that they are one in the same.

Well if a couple specifically uses a condom to prevent pregnancy I agree that is a sin. But that is not necessarily the case with some couples. What if a childless couple seriously desires children but one has HIV and the other does not? I don't think that you can just assume that if they use a condom it is because of some secret desire of theirs not to have children. They may just want to have sex without subjecting one spouse to a life threatening disease.

I will admit that the scenario I proposed is uncommon, but I think it helps us answer the question of whether "all condom use is intrinsically evil".

What is your opinion on condom use outside of marriage, by the way? The prostitue hypothetical, for example? Again - here I do not think that the Church has really spoken.

Sure. But it again comes down to whether all condom use is intrinsically evil. I am not so convinced of that.

You seem to suggest that there might be some situations where condom use (outside of marriage, for example) could be considered not evil. But if the use of a condom is intrinsically evil then it is evil both inside marriage and outside of marriage, is it not? That would lead to the conclusion that a man who cheats on his wife with a prostitute should not use a condom, risk bringing HIV back to his wife, and risk having the prostitute abort a child, which is what most prostitutes do when they get pregnant. That conclusion just seems a bit nonsensical to me. Is that what you would advocate? That if a man cheats on his wife with a hooker he should NOT use a condom?

But if you say "OK, it is only evil within the context of marriage," but if a man cheats on his wife outside of marriage with a hooker, using a condom so that he does not give his wife AIDS might be the right thing to do, then you seem to recognize that the purpose for which a condom is used is relevant in determining whether or not its use is evil. You seem to say that if the purpose to is to prevent pregnancy during marital sex then the act is evil, but if there is some other purpose, let's say preventing HIV in the case of a gay male couple, rape, or prostitution, then the act is not evil. Your position seems to be a bit inconsistent. Is purpose/intention relevant or is it not relevant?

Now, if you want to say "the use of a condom is intrinsically evil under any circumstance where the prevention of pregnancy occurs, whether prevention of pregnancy is intended or not, therefore it would not be right for a man to use a condom when he cheats on his wife with a hooker, and it would not be right for a woman who is about to be raped to ask her attcker to use a condom," then at least you would be consistent. Is this your position?

Again - I am not necessarily saying that you are wrong. But I think there are good arguments on both sides and that the analsyis is a bit complicated . . .

I will reply in the same format again, because the quote function is frustratingly non-functional.

 

"Now, if we have a dogmatic statement that says "the use of a condom during intercourse in marriage is always and everywhere evil" I would agree with you. But I don't think we have such a statement, and it certainly would not be difficult for the Church to make a dogmatic statement like that if She were of that mind."

There are only a handful of strictly dogmatic statements that have ever been made. :P The entirety of what it means to be a faithful practicing Catholic is not limited only to those very few statements.

"I am not sure if the "officially intended purpose of a condom" is particularly relevant."

I think it could be morally relevant in the sense that condom manufacturers are likely morally culpable for their evil uses. Like I said, probably not relevant for our scenarios. Just a side-note.

"One can argue that what makes the condom sinful is its use for the purpose of preventing pregnancy. But if it is used for an entirely different purpose, the prevention of the pregnancy seems to fall into the category of the "unintended bad effect" under the double effect test."

But the purpose of a condom in the context of intercourse is contraception. It can be used for other things, even simultaneously, but its contraceptive purpose is immediate and a part of the act itself. We cannot treat it as an unintended side effect because it is not in any way separate from its other effects. The introduction of a condom to sexual intercourse is never permissible as its nature as a literal barrier thwarts first the procreative, and second also the unitive purpose of sexual union itself. This is what a condom always does and what it is designed to do.

"Here I think you need to define "abortion". You cannot define it as "any act that results in the terminatino of a pregnancy" right? Let's say that a pregnant woman has cancer and she needs to have her womb removed. It's 100% certain that in that situation the act will terminate the pregnancy but the Church would allow this procedure to take place. To call "abortion" intrinsically evil you have to define it something along the lines of "an act that has the direct intention to terminate a pregnancy." Since the only purpose of the morning-after pill is to terminate a pregnancy it is not allowed, but since the purpose of removing the womb is not to terminate the pregnancy but to save the life of the mother the act is allowed."

Yes, that sounds like the double effect principle represented fairly enough. I prefer to use the example of a fallopian tube with an ectopic pregnancy, simply because the biology is a bit simpler to me. I do not know whether the removal of an entire womb might be morally different... I would speculate it is not, but this is just a caveat that I have not researched it. I am sure you will not mind if I use the fallopian tube case instead.

"How do you distinghish condom use then? If someone uses it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV (a deadly disease), although having the knowledge that it will 100% prevent pregnancy, how is that really much different than the person who undergoes a procedure to have her womb removed (in order to prevent death) although she knows that it will 100% terminate her pregnancy, or the person who might take medication to cure cancer, although the know side effect of that would be to terminate the pregnancy?"

The removal of a fallopian tube in the case of an ectopic pregnancy results in the death of the child in an indirect manner. The death occurs as a somewhat more distant and less immediate result of the removal of the fallopian tube. Theoretically, although the technology does not yet exist, such a case could still allow for the saving of the child's life, because the procedure does not kill the child. It does bring about a new circumstance which will lead to the child's death, and which for now we do not have an effective means of preventing.
Condom use is morally distinct because its barrier effects are immediate, proximate, and intended. In terms of its prevention of procreation, the actual functioning of the condom as it was designed to be used functions to directly block any chance of procreation. It is not an unintended side effect - it is working exactly as intended.

"Well if a couple specifically uses a condom to prevent pregnancy I agree that is a sin. But that is not necessarily the case with some couples. What if a childless couple seriously desires children but one has HIV and the other does not? I don't think that you can just assume that if they use a condom it is because of some secret desire of theirs not to have children. They may just want to have sex without subjecting one spouse to a life threatening disease."

Like we have established, their motivations and intentions may lessen or remove culpability, but they cannot sanctify an objectively immoral object, which is the use of artificial contraception. Such a couple must abstain.

"You seem to suggest that there might be some situations where condom use (outside of marriage, for example) could be considered not evil. But if the use of a condom is intrinsically evil then it is evil both inside marriage and outside of marriage, is it not? That would lead to the conclusion that a man who cheats on his wife with a prostitute should not use a condom, risk bringing HIV back to his wife, and risk having the prostitute abort a child, which is what most prostitutes do when they get pregnant. That conclusion just seems a bit nonsensical to me. Is that what you would advocate? That if a man cheats on his wife with a hooker he should NOT use a condom?"

I equivocated a little with with reference to Paul's and Benedict's very fact-specific cases. When Benedict referred to a hypothetical case of a homosexual prostitute who begins to use a condom, we have a few very relevant considerations here. First, sodomy is inherently against life and therefore contraception is not an actual consideration. One cannot sin by practicing contraception when one is already not open to life by the nature of their own circumstances. If a hermit walks around all day wearing a condom, he might be mentally ill, but he is not committing the sin of contraception. In addition, homosexual sodomy is already not unitive by its nature because homosexual activity already is radically against God's will. Second, Pope Benedict had spoken of this hypothetical case as representing a moral awakening of sorts, where this prostitute who chooses to use a condom does so because he begins to recognize - though still obviously in a deficient way - his responsibilities to others.
Paul's case regarding nuns in danger of rape is still being debated. I will leave that alone for now, since I am not even sure it is not a myth, and even if it is not I have not fully studied or evaluated the question it concerns.
I would say that any time a heterosexual couple engages in intercourse, whether in marriage or not, the introduction of a condom is inherently evil. In the case of a couple who are not married at all, or who are not married to each other, they add the sin of contraception to the sins of fornication or adultery. For a couple who are married to each other, they only add the sin of contraception, though they also violate their marriage vows in a severe manner.
If a man cheats on his wife with a prostitute, he commits the mortal sin of adultery. If he uses a condom he adds to his sin the mortal sin of contraceptive use. The risk of abortion for the man is not a direct effect, though he would almost certainly also bear some degree of culpability if he were complicit in a subsequent abortion. Those are two acts which are more properly separated, because the man's cooperation is less proximate theoretically. The prostitute's act is the direct one. Therefore that line of reasoning is mostly a misdirection.

"Now, if you want to say "the use of a condom is intrinsically evil under any circumstance where the prevention of pregnancy occurs, whether prevention of pregnancy is intended or not, therefore it would not be right for a man to use a condom when he cheats on his wife with a hooker, and it would not be right for a woman who is about to be raped to ask her attcker to use a condom," then at least you would be consistent. Is this your position?"

It seems to me that an act of sexual violence adds morally relevant considerations that are not otherwise present. I will leave that one alone for now and not make an argument one way or another, but if I have a chance to study it more I might return to it at a later time.

Posted
On 2/19/2016, 12:59:30, Nihil Obstat said:

https://canonlawblog.wordpress.com/2016/02/18/seven-quick-thoughts-on-the-most-recent-papal-presser/

Seven quick thoughts on the most recent papal presser

February 18, 2016

Frankly, I don’t know how he does it. When I fly to Europe I have to sleep all the way over.  Not Pope Francis. Anyway, may I offer some comments on some topics mentioned in the latest mid-air papal presser?

1. Pope Paul VI, as I understand it, did approve of religious women threatened by rape using contraceptives. It is obvious, though, that such measures were taken in self-defense against criminal acts and, more importantly, would have occurred outside the context of conjugalrelations. Avoiding pregnancy under outlaw circumstances is not only ‘not an absolute evil’, it’s not an evil act at all. I hope that mentioning this unusual episode in a press chat will not contribute unduly to the world’s misunderstanding of the limitations of Paul VI’s position in this case and of the episode’s non-applicability to firm Church teaching on contraception within marriage.

2. An individual becomes “Christian” by, and only by, (valid) baptism. Donald Trump was apparently baptized Presbyterian, which faith community has valid baptism. Donald Trump is, therefore, as a matter of canon law (c. 204), Christian. Trump might be a good Christian or a bad one—I cannot say, and neither can anyone else. Trump might do and say things consistent with Christian values or in contradiction to them, but his status as baptized, and therefore as Christian, is beyond dispute.

3. There is no legitimate “principle” by which a “lesser of two evils” mayever be licitly engaged in. It is fundamental moral theology that even a small evil action may never be licitly engaged in—no matter how much good might seem to result therefrom and no matter how much evil might seem to be avoided thereby. There are, to be sure, principles by which a good or neutral action that has two effects, one good and one evil, might be licitly engaged in under certain circumstances despite the evil effects; and there are principles by which “lesser evils” may be tolerated(not chosen). But parsing these matters accurately and responsibly requires more time than can be devoted to them in a press conference.

4. Abortion (assuming we are talking about doing an action intended to kill a human being prior to birth, and not just suffering ‘abortion’, i.e., miscarriage) is, Francis observed, always evil. Abortion is not, however, “evil” because it is a “crime”. Not all criminal acts are by nature evil and not all evil acts are crimes. Other factors must be considered lest moral principles and legal principles become confused.

5. The Vatican City State, a sovereign nation, has the right to build, and has chosen to surround itself with, a giant wall. Evidently, building or using a national wall is not a non-Christian act nor a stance contrary to Gospel values. The pope’s criticism of building walls on part of a national border is probably better understood as prudential in nature, not principled.

6. It is important (though some might say it is too late) to distinguish between a Catholic’s stance toward “same-sex unions” and that toward “same-sex marriage”. These are not equivalent terms. Legal recognition of “same-sex unions” might be a good idea, a tolerable idea, or a bad idea, but, per se, “same-sex unions” are things over which reasonable minds (including Catholic minds) may differ; in contrast, Catholics may never approve or support “same-sex marriage”, this, upon pain of contradicting infallible Church teaching, if not of committing heresy.

7. The pope said nothing suggesting confusion about “celibacy” and “continence” (c. 277), although the Crux reporter seems to regard the former as another word for the latter. Anyway, I do not know whether there is such a thing as a (priest) who does not have the “friendship of a woman”, but I would not think the “friendship of a woman” is necessary to make a man ‘complete’.

 
 

Yeah, good thing the entire world has Planned Parenthood to protect everyone from scary junk!

Every once in a long while I come back here to see what the latest is, and sometimes I come across a post like this.  It makes me proud to be Catholic - thank you!

Posted
1 hour ago, Nihil Obstat said:

"Now, if we have a dogmatic statement that says "the use of a condom during intercourse in marriage is always and everywhere evil" I would agree with you. But I don't think we have such a statement, and it certainly would not be difficult for the Church to make a dogmatic statement like that if She were of that mind."

There are only a handful of strictly dogmatic statements that have ever been made. :P The entirety of what it means to be a faithful practicing Catholic is not limited only to those very few statements.

I think you have more than a just a handful, but I will concede the point for the sake of argument.

Nevertheless, in the absence of a dogmatic statement you still have to demonstrate that the Church holds to what you assert. I don't think you have done that (with all due respect).

1 hour ago, Nihil Obstat said:

"One can argue that what makes the condom sinful is its use for the purpose of preventing pregnancy. But if it is used for an entirely different purpose, the prevention of the pregnancy seems to fall into the category of the "unintended bad effect" under the double effect test."

But the purpose of a condom in the context of intercourse is contraception. It can be used for other things, even simultaneously, but its contraceptive purpose is immediate and a part of the act itself. We cannot treat it as an unintended side effect because it is not in any way separate from its other effects. The introduction of a condom to sexual intercourse is never permissible as its nature as a literal barrier thwarts first the procreative, and second also the unitive purpose of sexual union itself. This is what a condom always does and what it is designed to do.

I am not sure that if a couple uses a condom during sex the purpose must necessarily be contraception.

Let's say that we have a married couple that is incapable of having children. They are both 75 years old. Let's say that the wife has had oviarian cancer and has had her ovaries removed, and that the man has had testicular cancer and had his testicles removed. Pregnancy will not occur unless an Angel of the Lord appears and performs a miracle.

Let's also say that one of them had a blood transfusion in the 1980's and has HIV. The other does not have HIV.

Can the married couple use a condom? If they use a condom here, it seems to me that the purpose is not to prevent pregnancy, which is impossible. They are married, they are having sex, they use a condom, and the reason they use the condom is so that HIV is not transferred from one person to another.

So I think you can see that a statement that "the introduction of a condom to sexual intercourse is never permissible" is not strictly correct.

If you want to modify that statment so that it reads "the introduction of a condom to sexual intercourse in a marriage where procreation is possible is never permissible" you might be on more solid ground, but I think it's tough for you to argue that the use of a condom by itself is intrinsically evil.

It seems that you are left with something like "the use of a condom under XYZ circumstances is evil" but "the use of a condom under ABC circumstances is not evil." But if an action that is literally the same (putting a piece of plastic on a penis and engaging in sex while married) becomes acceptable in once circumstance but unacceptable in another cirucmstance, then it seems to me that the act itself (putting a piece of plastic on a penis and engaging in sex while married) is not intrinsically evil. I think that the action does pass the first step of the double-effect test and you have to proceed down through the other factors of the test to determine whether the act is utimately moral or immoral under the particular circumstances.

1 hour ago, Nihil Obstat said:

The removal of a fallopian tube in the case of an ectopic pregnancy results in the death of the child in an indirect manner. The death occurs as a somewhat more distant and less immediate result of the removal of the fallopian tube. Theoretically, although the technology does not yet exist, such a case could still allow for the saving of the child's life, because the procedure does not kill the child. It does bring about a new circumstance which will lead to the child's death, and which for now we do not have an effective means of preventing.

Condom use is morally distinct because its barrier effects are immediate, proximate, and intended. In terms of its prevention of procreation, the actual functioning of the condom as it was designed to be used functions to directly block any chance of procreation. It is not an unintended side effect - it is working exactly as intended.

Well. I am not so sure if it is so indirect. Let's say that some psycho doctor was performing an appendectomy and during the surgery decided that he would remove the woman's fallopian tube just for fun and without her permission. You would call that murder right? You would not be saying "Well even though the doctor knew she was pregnant and knew that removing the fallopian tube would kill the child, he only really intended to remove her fallopian tube so we'll let him off the hook." It seems like removing a fallopian tube is a pretty direct if it will result in termination of the prengancy 100% of the time.

But I will concede you that point as well for the sake of argument. A condom does more seem slightly more proximate to preventing contraception than does removing a falliopian tube to terminating  pregnancy. But I am not so sure if the small difference in proximity should matter all that much when the consequences are exactly the same in both cases (and I will ignore the fact that actually, the probability that removing a fallopian tube will end a pregnancy is higher than the probability that using a condom will prevent conception).

You seem to draw a distinction whereby the eptopic pregnancy situation is OK because the technology does not yet exist to acheive the good purpose (removing the fallopian tube to avoid the potential harm) without also causing the bad purpose (terminating the pregnancy). But it seems to me that is exactly the same situation you have with condoms. Science has not yet produced a condom that has the ability to achive the good purpose (preventing HIV) without the also causing the bad purpose (preventing conception). The hypothetical I have posed is where a couple uses a condom to prevent HIV but would have used the "new condom" to prevent HIV while allowing conception if such a condom existed. I honestly don't see why what they have done would be so immoral while the eptopic pregnancy situation is considered moral. I do not see a distinction with substance between the two situations.

1 hour ago, Nihil Obstat said:

If a man cheats on his wife with a prostitute, he commits the mortal sin of adultery. If he uses a condom he adds to his sin the mortal sin of contraceptive use. The risk of abortion for the man is not a direct effect, though he would almost certainly also bear some degree of culpability if he were complicit in a subsequent abortion. Those are two acts which are more properly separated, because the man's cooperation is less proximate theoretically. The prostitute's act is the direct one. Therefore that line of reasoning is mostly a misdirection.

Alright. Now I have you on the hook. I have asked this on the forum before I think but let me ask you this. Let's say your best buddy, who is married, calls you from Vegas and is like "Hey buddy I am about to sleep with a hooker who has HIV." You try to talk him out of sleeping with the hooker but cannot. You try to call the cops but you cannot. You have no contact info for his wife and cannot warn her. Your friend on the phone is like "There is no way I am telling my wife about this when I get back home. I hope she doesn't die of AIDS when I give her HIV."

I think the prudent thing to do in such a situation would be to say "Bro. If I cannot talk you out of sleeping with this hooker, at least use a condom so that you do not give your wife HIV when you get back and risk her dying of AIDS." Would such advice under the circumstances really be so unreasonable? Would I really be committing sin myself and advising him to commit sin if I advised him that?

It just does not seem to fly with our basic moral instinct or common sense to say to him in that situation "Bro. If I cannot talk you out of sleeping with this hooker, make sure that you do NOT use a condom even though you will give your wife HIV and she will die a painful death because of it". But that is where I think your conclusion leads.

Sure, I know the hypothetical is unrealistic, but is that really what you would advise your friend in that situation?

Anyway. I will give you the last word on this topic if you want it. It's not really a super big concern of mine because the plan is to get married to someone without HIV and to have some children. But for folks who find themselves in various situations and decide to make choices, I am a little reluctant to judge their actions because I do think the issue is not exactly as black-and-white as some would try to make it.

 

Posted
4 minutes ago, Peace said:

I think you have more than a just a handful, but I will concede the point for the sake of argument.

Nevertheless, in the absence of a dogmatic statement you still have to demonstrate that the Church holds to what you assert. I don't think you have done that (with all due respect).

I am not sure that if a couple uses a condom during sex the purpose must necessarily be contraception.

Let's say that we have a married couple that is incapable of having children. They are both 75 years old. Let's say that the wife has had oviarian cancer and has had her ovaries removed, and that the man has had testicular cancer and had his testicles removed. Pregnancy will not occur unless an Angel of the Lord appears and performs a miracle.

Let's also say that one of them had a blood transfusion in the 1980's and has HIV. The other does not have HIV.

Can the married couple use a condom? If they use a condom here, it seems to me that the purpose is not to prevent pregnancy, which is impossible. They are married, they are having sex, they use a condom, and the reason they use the condom is so that HIV is not transferred from one person to another.

So I think you can see that a statement that "the introduction of a condom to sexual intercourse is never permissible" is not strictly correct.

If you want to modify that statment so that it reads "the introduction of a condom to sexual intercourse in a marriage where procreation is possible is never permissible" you might be on more solid ground, but I think it's tough for you to argue that the use of a condom by itself is intrinsically evil.

It seems that you are left with something like "the use of a condom under XYZ circumstances is evil" but "the use of a condom under ABC circumstances is not evil." But if an action that is literally the same (putting a piece of plastic on a penis and engaging in sex while married) becomes acceptable in once circumstance but unacceptable in another cirucmstance, then it seems to me that the act itself (putting a piece of plastic on a penis and engaging in sex while married) is not intrinsically evil. I think that the action does pass the first step of the double-effect test and you have to proceed down through the other factors of the test to determine whether the act is utimately moral or immoral under the particular circumstances.

Well. I am not so sure if it is so indirect. Let's say that some psycho doctor was performing an appendectomy and during the surgery decided that he would remove the woman's fallopian tube just for fun and without her permission. You would call that murder right? You would not be saying "Well even though the doctor knew she was pregnant and knew that removing the fallopian tube would kill the child, he only really intended to remove her fallopian tube so we'll let him off the hook." It seems like removing a fallopian tube is a pretty direct if it will result in termination of the prengancy 100% of the time.

But I will concede you that point as well for the sake of argument. A condom does more seem slightly more proximate to preventing contraception than does removing a falliopian tube to terminating  pregnancy. But I am not so sure if the small difference in proximity should matter all that much when the consequences are exactly the same in both cases (and I will ignore the fact that actually, the probability that removing a fallopian tube will end a pregnancy is higher than the probability that using a condom will prevent conception).

You seem to draw a distinction whereby the eptopic pregnancy situation is OK because the technology does not yet exist to acheive the good purpose (removing the fallopian tube to avoid the potential harm) without also causing the bad purpose (terminating the pregnancy). But it seems to me that is exactly the same situation you have with condoms. Science has not yet produced a condom that has the ability to achive the good purpose (preventing HIV) without the also causing the bad purpose (preventing conception). The hypothetical I have posed is where a couple uses a condom to prevent HIV but would have used the "new condom" to prevent HIV while allowing conception if such a condom existed. I honestly don't see why what they have done would be so immoral while the eptopic pregnancy situation is considered moral. I do not see a distinction with substance between the two situations.

Alright. Now I have you on the hook. I have asked this on the forum before I think but let me ask you this. Let's say your best buddy, who is married, calls you from Vegas and is like "Hey buddy I am about to sleep with a hooker who has HIV." You try to talk him out of sleeping with the hooker but cannot. You try to call the cops but you cannot. You have no contact info for his wife and cannot warn her. Your friend on the phone is like "There is no way I am telling my wife about this when I get back home. I hope she doesn't die of AIDS when I give her HIV."

I think the prudent thing to do in such a situation would be to say "Bro. If I cannot talk you out of sleeping with this hooker, at least use a condom so that you do not give your wife HIV when you get back and risk her dying of AIDS." Would such advice under the circumstances really be so unreasonable? Would I really be committing sin myself and advising him to commit sin if I advised him that?

It just does not seem to fly with our basic moral instinct or common sense to say to him in that situation "Bro. If I cannot talk you out of sleeping with this hooker, make sure that you do NOT use a condom even though you will give your wife HIV and she will die a painful death because of it". But that is where I think your conclusion leads.

Sure, I know the hypothetical is unrealistic, but is that really what you would advise your friend in that situation?

Anyway. I will give you the last word on this topic if you want it. It's not really a super big concern of mine because the plan is to get married to someone without HIV and to have some children. But for folks who find themselves in various situations and decide to make choices, I am a little reluctant to judge their actions because I do think the issue is not exactly as black-and-white as some would try to make it.

 

"I think you have more than a just a handful, but I will concede the point for the sake of argument."

A big handful, perhaps. The Credo, the small number of ex cathedra statements which have been made, and the few theological questions major enough that a large proportion of the Patristics pronounced on it. I think you are mixing up dogma and infallible teachings, of which there are many.

"It seems that you are left with something like "the use of a condom under XYZ circumstances is evil" but "the use of a condom under ABC circumstances is not evil." But if an action that is literally the same (putting a piece of plastic on a penis and engaging in sex while married) becomes acceptable in once circumstance but unacceptable in another cirucmstance, then it seems to me that the act itself (putting a piece of plastic on a penis and engaging in sex while married) is not intrinsically evil. I think that the action does pass the first step of the double-effect test and you have to proceed down through the other factors of the test to determine whether the act is utimately moral or immoral under the particular circumstances."

Like with our sodomy example, the concept of contraception is totally meaningless when an act cannot by nature be open to life. For any case in which procreation is directly thwarted, the act remains evil in all circumstances. The introduction of a condom, when an act is open to procreation, directly impedes procreation as a function of its design, and it is therefore intrinsically evil.

"Well. I am not so sure if it is so indirect. Let's say that some psycho doctor was performing an appendectomy and during the surgery decided that he would remove the woman's fallopian tube just for fun and without her permission. You would call that murder right? You would not be saying "Well even though the doctor knew she was pregnant and knew that removing the fallopian tube would kill the child, he only really intended to remove her fallopian tube so we'll let him off the hook." It seems like removing a fallopian tube is a pretty direct if it will result in termination of the prengancy 100% of the time."

But the principle of double effect cannot apply here, because there was no proportionate good. Thus, still murder.

"You seem to draw a distinction whereby the eptopic pregnancy situation is OK because the technology does not yet exist to acheive the good purpose (removing the fallopian tube to avoid the potential harm) without also causing the bad purpose (terminating the pregnancy). But it seems to me that is exactly the same situation you have with condoms. Science has not yet produced a condom that has the ability to achive the good purpose (preventing HIV) without the also causing the bad purpose (preventing conception). The hypothetical I have posed is where a couple uses a condom to prevent HIV but would have used the "new condom" to prevent HIV while allowing conception if such a condom existed. I honestly don't see why what they have done would be so immoral while the eptopic pregnancy situation is considered moral. I do not see a distinction with substance between the two situations."

No. The condom as a device brings together those two purposes inextricably, while the removal of a fallopian tube with an ectopic pregnancy does not by design combine the removal with the death. If the child had to be killed before the fallopian tube was removed, then that act would also be immoral. If the fallopian tube could not, because of some chance of biology, be cut without immediately also cutting the child, it would be immoral. The death in normal formulations of that case is still more remote to the act, while with the condom the contraceptive purpose is immediate. If your 'new condom' technology were to exist, I think it would be generally moral, because the prevention of procreation could be avoided.

"Alright. Now I have you on the hook. I have asked this on the forum before I think but let me ask you this. Let's say your best buddy, who is married, calls you from Vegas and is like "Hey buddy I am about to sleep with a hooker who has HIV." You try to talk him out of sleeping with the hooker but cannot. You try to call the cops but you cannot. You have no contact info for his wife and cannot warn her. Your friend on the phone is like "There is no way I am telling my wife about this when I get back home. I hope she doesn't die of AIDS when I give her HIV."

I think the prudent thing to do in such a situation would be to say "Bro. If I cannot talk you out of sleeping with this hooker, at least use a condom so that you do not give your wife HIV when you get back and risk her dying of AIDS." Would such advice under the circumstances really be so unreasonable? Would I really be committing sin myself and advising him to commit sin if I advised him that?"

The use of a condom would be an additional mortal sin on top of the adultery. Tell his wife not to sleep with him anymore Yes, you would be complicit in his second sin of contraception, though perhaps less culpably so, to advise him in that way.

"It just does not seem to fly with our basic moral instinct or common sense to say to him in that situation "Bro. If I cannot talk you out of sleeping with this hooker, make sure that you do NOT use a condom even though you will give your wife HIV and she will die a painful death because of it". But that is where I think your conclusion leads."

Personally, I think a moral system is probably defective if it does not go against our moral intuition at least some of the time. Otherwise what is the point of even having one?

"Anyway. I will give you the last word on this topic if you want it."

Meh. The Church has it, not me.

Spem in alium
Posted (edited)

I have translated the Italian as best I could. According to Fr Lombardi, the pope was talking about using contraceptives to prevent Zika. And it looks like Fr Lombardi agrees with this view. While I love our Holy Father and pray for him, I continue to hope that this is not the case and that he did not mean it in this way. I think if a couple is at risk of Zika (for example, the woman has been bitten by mosquitoes or they live in an area at risk), they are entitled to consider avoiding pregnancy through natural means, but this should only be done after serious discernment.  What the Holy Father has made clear though is that serious consideration must take place. He is not just saying yes, you can go and use a condom if you live in an area affected; no, he is urging people to consider their situation, think deeply about it, and make an informed choice. In a way, he is showing he understands the plight of people living in these areas. They see what is happening to children, and of course they naturally want to prevent this. But presenting the view that the Pope - and thus, by extension, the Church - is open to the use of artificial contraceptives will likely be welcomed by people who want to see such a change and who criticise and demean the Church for being, in their mind, so "regressive". But I fear it will also do harm and inhibit the promotion of a culture of life.

Here is my translation:

"The key issue seems to have been discovered, and the Pope speaks of abortion as an unacceptable solution. In these situations, however, unfortunately the position of the press seemed to support facilitating abortion, which for us is totally unacceptable. The Pope then clearly distinguishes the radical nature of the evil of abortion as the taking of a human life, and on the other hand, the possibility of recourse to contraception or condoms as relative to emergency or special situations where then, a human life is not suppressed but a pregnancy is avoided. Now it is not that he says that this action should be accepted and used without any discernment; indeed, he made it clear that it can be considered in urgent cases. He gave the example of Paul VI's authorization for religious who were at very serious risk of ongoing violence by the rebels in the Congo, at the time of the Congo war tragedies, to to use the pill. This suggests that this was not a normal situation in which this decision was taken into account. And also remember, for instance, the discussion following a passage from the book, "Light of the World", in which Benedict XVI spoke about the use of condoms in situations where the person is at risk of infection, for example, AIDS. Then the contraceptive or condom, especially in cases of emergency and severity, may also be the subject of a serious discernment of consciousness... Then the Pope insisted that of course we must try to develop all scientific research and vaccines in order to combat this epidemic and the risk of the Zika virus, which is causing so much concern. Therefore it is necessary that we do not fall into panic and take guidelines or make decisions that are not proportionate to the reality of the problem. So understand well the nature of the problem, continue to study it, in order to move forward and to find the most substantial and stable solutions; however, avoid abortion and, if there are any major emergencies, then a well-formed conscience can see if there is any possibility or need for the use of non-abortifacients to prevent pregnancy."

Edited by Spem in alium
Posted
2 minutes ago, Spem in alium said:

I have translated the Italian as best I could. According to Fr Lombardi, the pope was talking about using contraceptives to prevent Zika. And it looks like Fr Lombardi agrees with this view. While I love our Holy Father and pray for him, I continue to hope that this is not the case and that he did not mean it in this way. I think if a couple is at risk of Zika (for example, the woman has been bitten by mosquitoes or they live in an area at risk), they are entitled to consider avoiding pregnancy through natural means, but this should only be done after serious discernment.  What the Holy Father has made clear though is that serious consideration must take place. He is not just saying yes, you can go and use a condom if you live in an area affected; no, he is urging people to consider their situation, think deeply about it, and make an informed choice. In a way, he is showing he understands the plight of people living in these areas. They see what is happening to children, and of course they naturally want to prevent this. But presenting the view that the Pope - and thus, by extension, the Church - is open to the use of artificial contraceptives will likely be welcomed by people who want to see such a change and who criticise and demean the Church for being, in their mind, so "regressive". But I fear it will also do harm and inhibit the promotion of a culture of life.

 

You are concerned, and I think you are right to be. We have to face facts here: the pope might have made an incredible mistake in this. Time will tell. We need to be prepared to defend church teaching.

Spem in alium
Posted
2 minutes ago, Nihil Obstat said:

You are concerned, and I think you are right to be. We have to face facts here: the pope might have made an incredible mistake in this. Time will tell. We need to be prepared to defend church teaching.

He may have, yes, and I'm hesitant to jump to conclusions and start saying that he has. My main concern is what people will take from his words. Naturally, a lot of people look to him for guidance and instruction, which they should, but it's important to remember that when giving a press conference and answering difficult questions like these, even the pope can be fallible.

Defence of the faith is very important, but I think it's also important to try and meet people where they're at. It can be easy to say, "No, you can't do this because of X,Y,Z", but sometimes that kind of instruction just goes right over the person's head. What seems more helpful is understanding the person's concerns, seeing how they're feeling, and trying to offer encouragement in a way that is not contradictory to the teachings of Jesus and the teachings of the Church. It's a struggle, but one that's very important to face. 

 

Posted
16 minutes ago, Nihil Obstat said:

You are concerned, and I think you are right to be. We have to face facts here: the pope might have made an incredible mistake in this. Time will tell. We need to be prepared to defend church teaching.

Or he might have intended exactly what he said and been correct. . .

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