Nihil's Stream Of Insanity

[Nihil Obstat]

[quote name='Jesus_lol' timestamp='1353404122' post='2513578']
Paramilitary 2 is the way to go
[/quote]
It's on my shortlist. I'm thinking about a decent fixed blade first, but after that either the Para or the Manix XL.
Didn't they just update it a little bit too?

[Nihil Obstat]

Sebastien Vettel just won the Formula One World Championship after an extremely hard-fought race in Sao Paulo. Very exciting. I can't wait for next season.

[Nihil Obstat]

So, by request, here is my latest philosophy paper:


“Analyze and discuss Davis' argument for Temporary Disembodiment”
[Irenaeus Saintonge]
[Student number redacted]

“[size="2"][size=1]Since the whole man is comprised in the union of both substances, he must appear in both; for it is necessary that he who passed through life in his entirety be judged in his entirety. Therefore, as he lived, so shall he be judged, because he must be judged concerning the way in which he lived. Life is the reason for judgement, and it must be investigated in as many substances as those in which it functioned.[/size][/size]
“[size="2"][size=1]Therefore, the flesh shall rise again: certainly of every man, certainly the same flesh, and certainly in its entirety. Wherever it is, it is in safe keeping with God through that most faithful Agent between God and man, Jesus Christ, who shall reconcile both God to man and man to God, the spirit to the flesh and the flesh to the spirit.”[/size][/size]
[size="2"][size=1]Tertullian, “The Resurrection of the Dead”, A.D. 208/212 [The Faith of the Early Fathers, Vol. 1, William A. Jurgens][/size][/size]

[size="3"]In “Traditional Christian Belief in the Resurrection of the Body” (Philosophy and Death, pgs. 77-98), Stephen T. Davis defends a philosophical explanation of an afterlife by which, at the time of death, the soul separates from the body temporarily, to be re-united at the time of the eschaton, the 'end of the world'. This understanding hinges on the definition of the human person as being comprised of bodies and souls, and without a unity of both the human remains incomplete. (pg. 78)[/size]
[size="3"]In this paper, I will begin by summarizing Davis' arguments in favour of temporary disembodiment, as well as his response to John Perry's objections. After this summary I will attempt to support what Davis refers to as the 'Patristic' position, which is the rather strong form of the temporary disembodiment argument, which claims that the person's body which is re-united with his soul at the eschaton is the same body as that which he possessed during his life, which is then 'converted' to a glorified body. (pgs. 82-83) Davis does not necessarily disagree with this argument, but indicates a certain alternative. I will attempt to give some support in favour of this Patristic belief.[/size]
[size="3"]Davis begins his essay by outlining the theological foundation of the temporary disembodiment theory. Specifically, he first objects to what he calls “classical dualism”, which considers the body to be somewhat unimportant in relation to the soul. Rather, the traditional Christian position holds that the human person is essentially a material body and an immortal soul. They can be separated, but without their unity the human person is not complete. (pg. 78) [/size]
[size="3"]The temporary disembodiment theory is contrasted against the immortality of the soul theory, by which the soul is the essence of the person, which persists after death. The body, being material, ceases to exist, and the soul then remains bodiless. (pg. 77-78) The immortality of the soul theory corresponds to the classical dualist view of human identity.[/size]
[size="3"]Davis outlines several advantages of the temporary disembodiment theory. Its theological advantages correspond very well with the traditional Christian view of death and resurrection, but are beyond the scope of this paper. Philosophically, the temporary disembodiment theory offers a compelling solution by which identity can be retained over time, including after death. This identity solution addresses an objection against life after death, based on the difficulties associated with what appears to be a temporal gap between death and resurrection, during which the person may be regarded as temporarily not existing. According to the temporary disembodiment theory, this gap does not exist, because the identity of the person is maintained consistently through the disembodied soul.[/size]
[size="3"]Davis addresses what he calls “three main aspects of temporary disembodiment”, which are: separation of the body from the soul, re-unification of the body and the soul, and glorification of the body. (pg. 80) Put simply, the separation occurs at the moment of death, and continues until the eschaton. As we have established, the human being does exist during this time, but being disembodied, is not complete. Davis calls this an “abnormal state” (pg. 80), and Aquinas characterizes it as highly deficient. In fact, according to Aquinas this deficiency is so severe that ultimate happiness is not possible in this state because of the presence of unfulfilled desires. (pg. 81)[/size]
[size="3"]The second aspect of temporary disembodiment is the moment of reunification of soul and body. This is said to occur at the time of the eschaton during which, according to Athenagoras, “the same men as before must come to be again.” (pg. 82) We may also refer back to the passage from Tertullian at the start of this paper where he says “since the whole man is comprised in the union of [body and soul], he must appear in both.” It is important in the retention of identity of the human person that this body be the same body they possessed during life, although the precise way in which this occurs is open for some discussion. Since the human person is a body-soul hybrid, retaining the same body seems to have important bearing on the actual identity of the person. As Thomas Aquinas states, “my soul is not I; and if only souls are saved, I am not saved.” (pg. 82) Since the human being is only complete when body and soul are present and unified, if the body is not somehow resurrected it follows that the human remains incomplete, and not truly human, even though the soul persists.[/size]
[size="3"]The last aspect of temporary disembodiment is the glorification of the body. This is based on the theological basis for the temporary disembodiment theory, but it presents no problems relating to identity. According to Davis, the old body is transformed, similar to how a seed is transformed into a plant. (pg. 83) We can consider the glorified body as a perfected version of our material bodies, which retains the same substance as the old bodies, thus retaining personal identity. This transformation does permit that “[t]he matter of our present bodies ma be arranged differently in the resurrection [...] but the matter will be restored.” (pg. 84) This point is relevant in my support later for the Patristic theory.[/size]
[size="3"]Following his detailed description of the three aspects of temporary disembodiment, Davis answers several objections against the theory. To summarize, these objections are: “that if some immaterial aspect of me survives death, it will not be me that survives death” (pg. 84); that the gradual replacement of atoms of the human person challenges the necessity of the body qua identity (pg. 86); that the actual collection of the same matter of our bodies constitutes a major objection against the possibility of bodily resurrection (pg. 88); and lastly that the concept of disembodied existence is not coherent (pg. 90).[/size]
[size="3"]The first objection, “that if some immaterial aspect of me survives death, it will not be me that survives death” (pg. 84), seems to me to be a rather weak argument, and in my opinion Davis answers it quite easily. Davis offers the example of a computer that is completely disassembled, then reassembled at a later time. It does not seem reasonable to conclude that a different computer exists at the later time, that it is in some sense only a replica of the first computer. On the other hand, if a computer were disassembled, then qualitatively similar parts were used to construct a qualitatively similar computer, it does not seem reasonable to conclude that the same computer exists. (pg. 85) It seems to me that this scenario supports not only the idea that the same person can exist even after a separation of body and soul, but also that the body itself is crucial in retaining that same identity.[/size]
[size="3"]The second objection argues that since the human body constantly sheds and recreates new atoms and molecules, that the body criterion is not relevant to retaining identity over time. (pg. 86)After all, it seems that a person's body at the time of birth is not at all the same body at the time of his death. Davis answers this by referring to the fact that this replacement of atoms is very gradual over time, this maintaining continuity. In this sense, the gradual replacement of the matter of the body is not comparable to a complete, instantaneous replacement. (pg. 87) I believe that Davis' argument here is adequate, however I believe that my own contribution towards the end of this paper offers a potentially stronger answer to the objection. Davis' answer seems only indirection to address the fact that the matter of a person's body at birth is not identical to the matter of a person's body at death. Given this simple fact, continuity over time seems to be only a secondary concern. If we refer back to the computer example, and instead we gradually replace every piece of the computer over its lifetime, it does not seem that the computer is precisely the same at the end of its lifetime. It is also not entirely clear that it is [i]not[/i] the same computer, so we are still left with an unresolved problem of identity.[/size]
[size="3"]The third objection points out what might be considered a practical difficulty with bodily resurrection, namely that since the matter of our bodies is constantly replaced during our lifetimes, and presumably also integrated into other organisms, even other people, that to re-collect the exact same matter seems problematic at best. It may also indicate that several people could share matter between them, which challenges the nature of their identity. (pg 88) Davis offers two answers here. First, he appeals to the omnipotence of God, which I do not think is unreasonable, given that it is an assumption of resurrection from the outset. God, in His omnipotence, would certainly be able to re-locate every individual atom from every person throughout history and re-constitute them into bodies. This also corresponds with, interestingly, the first law of thermodynamics, which does not allow for the creation of matter or energy, only re-arrangement. Second, Davis also indicates that “perhaps omnipotence must accordingly guarantee that no essential part of one person's earthly body is ever a constituent part, or an essential part, of someone else's body.” (pg. 89) I think that this is an excellent answer, which closely relates to the points that I will be making shortly. It does seem reasonable that the “essential part” of a person's body is not necessarily the sum total of every atom which has ever constituted it. This does not present any major problems to the Patristic insistence on the same body being resurrected, because what we are dealing with is what precisely constitutes the “sameness” of a body.[/size]
[size="3"]The last objection that Davis answers has three parts, based on John Perry's book which contains the dialogue with his character “Gretchen Weirob”. (pg. 91) Perry's argument has three main points which, for the sake of space, we will analyze briefly, all at once. Perry's first objection is that the soul, being unobservable, cannot rationally account for identity, since we would not be able to make judgements about persons without being able to observe their identity. (pg. 91) Second, that memory is not sufficient to establish identity because of the fallibility of the individual's memory (pg. 92). Third, that the possibility of identical people creates a contradiction for the concept of life after death. (pg. 92)[/size]
[size="3"]Davis answers these three objections in the following way: To the first objection, that the unobservability of the soul makes it impossible for any person to determine the identity of any other person, including himself, Davis answers that even if the soul is not observable, that does not mean necessarily that there may be methods besides observation that could indicate the presence of the soul. (pg. 93) One might speculate that the presence of the soul in a human person, while unobservable in itself, may have certain effects on the person as a whole which actually are observable. For instance, if it could be demonstrated that the capacity for enjoying the t.v. show “My Little Pony: Friendship is Magic” is inherent in all people with a soul, then observing that capacity would constitute evidence for a soul. For the second objection, that the fallibility of memory indicates that a person's identity may not be continuous after death, Davis answers that it would be sufficient to compare each person's apparent memories, and when a general pattern and consensus began to emerge, that one would then be able to distinguish between these apparent memories, which are fallible, and genuine memories, which represent the actual events that occurred in a person's life. (pg. 93-94) The third objection is that the theory of an afterlife and an omnipotent being makes it conceivable that identical beings could be created, which poses problems to the identity of the 'original'. Perry argues through Weirob that if a person dies, and then two people identical to that person exist in an afterlife, that we cannot conclude that this person actually survived their death, which seems to be a contradictory or absurd conclusion. Davis responds by suggesting that our concept of a person includes a kind of “notion of uniqueness” (pg. 95) that precludes the possibility of multiple identical persons. I think we can refer back to the appeal to God's omnipotence in this case. In an abstract sense an omnipotent being can do anything, but if we call to mind the traditional defences of omnipotence, we recall that the answer that has stood the test of time is that God does not act contrary to His Nature, meaning that He cannot contradict Himself. To create multiple identical persons would in a sense be a contradiction of the unique identity of the individual, and in a similar way, could also constitute an act contrary to God's own creation, which is not possible.[/size]
[size="3"]Last of all, I would like to take a moment to discuss what Davis refers to as the Patristic theory, which holds that the resurrection of the body must raise the same body that a person possessed in their life, rather than creating a new body. Davis argues that certain alternative theories are reasonable, which I will not dispute, however I think a particular version of the Patristic theory lends support to some of Davis' earlier arguments.[/size]
[size="3"]Specifically, it was established earlier that a coherent theory of identity must resurrect the same body that a person possessed in life, since the body itself is important to identity. But we also found that this theory allows for the matter to be re-arranged in some form, to account for the use and re-use of atoms over time. I think we can question here precisely what defines the “essential part” of the human body – what exactly causes sameness. This question allows us to go very deep into Aristotelian – Aquinian theories of substance and essence and accidents, deeper in fact than I am qualified to speculate, but I think that a cursory look at the situation gives some insight and directs us towards further areas of research.[/size]
[size="3"]Thomas Aquinas, as we know, wrote extensively on the exact meaning of “substance”, which is what defines what a thing [i]actually is[/i]. This means that the actual identity of a thing depends on its substance. The substance of a chair is not the wood it is made of, or the precise shape of its legs, or its colour, but rather '[i]chairness[/i]'. So the substance of a person, if we accept the body – soul hybrid concept, is humanity, or personhood. We also find in Aquinian philosophy, that the disembodied soul is the principle of a substance, which is capable of subsisting, or existing, independently, though not as a complete substance. The body, on the other hand, cannot exist independently. It is rather the “material remains of a substance.” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “St. Thomas Aquinas”) So if the body is in some sense critical for identity, we must then ask what qualities of the body constitute its essential part, the identity of the body. I believe that if we explore this further, we find that most, if not all of what we typically consider to be the body are actually non-essential aspects, what Aquinas could have referred to as accidents. They are merely physical properties that could be changed without necessarily changing the substance.[/size]
[size="3"]A parallel is found here in Catholic Eucharistic theology, the dogma of transubstantiation. Within this belief, at the moment of consecration the accidents of bread and wine remain, while the substance of bread and wine is replaced by the substance of the Body, Blood, Soul, and Divinity of Christ. We might think of our discussion of the body as almost the opposite of this case. Is it possible that the accidents of the body might change, while the substance, the substance of an individual person's own body, remains the same?[/size]
[size="3"]If we consider that molecules and atoms, the constituent parts of a human body, are accidental rather than substantial, then we can conclude that it is reasonable that there is a deeper reality to the human body that we have not necessarily grasped yet. There may be some aspect of the body that makes it an individual person's body, but does not rely on its accidental characteristics. A metaphysical quality, perhaps.[/size]
[size="3"]I think that this way of looking at our question lends support to Davis' arguments that we discussed above. First, this supports the concept of the glorification of the body, because it quite easily allows for the body to change in an accidental manner, while remaining substantially the same body. Second, and even more importantly, it completely removes the difficulty presented earlier, which objects to the possibility of material from one body forming parts of another person's body over time, as well as the difficulties with gradual, or even instantaneous, atom replacement. If the actual definition of the body, the true nature of the body, is something deeper than its atoms, then the actual atoms themselves are not relevant in the larger picture. It simply necessitates that the substance of a person's body, the essential part, whatever exactly that is, is given back to him at the eschaton.[/size]
[size="3"]Unfortunately I do not possess either the experience or pre-requisite knowledge to explore this concept any further, so I will leave that possibility to more competent philosophers and theologians. However I do think that it is relevant to Davis' argument, and the temporary disembodiment argument as a whole, and could present even stronger arguments for its reasonableness.[/size]
[size="3"]I think then, that we are safe in concluding that Davis' presentation of the temporary disembodiment theory of life after death is coherent, and able to answer objections that have been levelled against it. Specifically it is able to answer the objections against continuity of identity through death, the possibility of the re-constitution of the body, and questions associated with the general possibility of life after death. I think that a deeper consideration of the “essential part[s]” of the body, with reference to Aristotle's and Aquinas' theories of substance, allows for even stronger arguments to be made. Ultimately, while the subject as a whole rests on a foundation of theology rather than philosophy, it is quite consistent internally and allows for a rational conception of life after death.[/size]

[MIKolbe]

well done.

[Nihil Obstat]

It's not every day you can get away with quoting Tertullian in a secular philosophy class.

[Nihil Obstat]

May I just draw attention to this particularly clever passage.

"To the first objection, that the unobservability of the soul makes it impossible for any person to determine the identity of any other person, including himself, Davis answers that even if the soul is not observable, that does not mean necessarily that there may be methods besides observation that could indicate the presence of the soul. (pg. 93) One might speculate that the presence of the soul in a human person, while unobservable in itself, may have certain effects on the person as a whole which actually are observable. [b]For instance, if it could be demonstrated that the capacity for enjoying the t.v. show “My Little Pony: Friendship is Magic” is inherent in all people with a soul, then observing that capacity would constitute evidence for a soul.[/b]"

[Selah]

Hai.

[Nihil Obstat]

[quote name='Selah' timestamp='1353966180' post='2517138']
Hai.
[/quote]

[Selah]

^_^

[Nihil Obstat]

A'ight, Katy is on the plane now from Houston to Calgary. :proud: Doing our final preparations in terms of cleaning and cooking, and I'll be heading to the airport to pick her up in a few hours.

 

I probably won't be posting much for a while.

 

[PhuturePriest]

A'ight, Katy is on the plane now from Houston to Calgary. :proud: Doing our final preparations in terms of cleaning and cooking, and I'll be heading to the airport to pick her up in a few hours.

 

I probably won't be posting much for a while.

 

 

You have fun, you lovebirds!

[Nihil Obstat]

Hopefully I will get a few pictures to post. :)

[Nihil Obstat]

Waiting in the airport now. :)

[Nihil Obstat]

We're having lots of fun. :proud:

 

 

 

[Nihil Obstat]

Katy is on her way home now. :( I'm sad, but not doing too bad. Cheering up with some tea and anime. :)